Cedric Nahum

In a child protection proceeding, the Office of the Children's Lawyer abandoned a request to present the children's views without a clinician's affidavit.

Counsel for the foster parents sought costs for the attendance and requested an adjournment of an upcoming summary judgment motion due to a scheduling conflict.

The court noted counsel's unprofessional conduct and mischaracterization of a previous hearing involving a student-at-law, but ultimately granted the adjournment to ensure the foster parents could be represented by their counsel of choice.

A timeline for written costs submissions was established.

The applicant child protection agency brought a Wagg motion seeking production of the complete Crown Brief regarding pending criminal charges against the respondent father for sexual offences against his child.

The Attorney General opposed production, arguing it could prejudice the ongoing criminal prosecution and taint witnesses.

The court granted the motion, finding that the agency met the test under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules and that the rights and interests of the parties in the child protection proceeding outweighed any possible prejudice to the Attorney General in the criminal proceedings.

The applicant sought leave under R. v. Garofoli to cross-examine the affiant of Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for three search warrants.

The applicant argued the affiant omitted facts and had an ulterior motive to search for drugs rather than evidence of the stabbing.

The court reviewed the timeline and found that the allegedly omitted information was not known to police until after the first ITO was sworn.

The court dismissed the application, concluding the applicant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would assist in determining whether the necessary grounds existed for the issuance of the warrants.

The applicant children's aid society sought an order for extended society care for two First Nations children with special needs.

The children were removed from their father's care following disclosures of inappropriate touching, though the court could not conclude on a balance of probabilities that the father was the perpetrator.

The court found the children in need of protection due to a failure to provide treatment, emotional harm, and risk of emotional harm stemming from the parents' residential instability, the mother's unaddressed alcohol addiction, and exposure to domestic violence.

The court ordered the children placed in extended society care, finding that neither parent nor the maternal grandmother could provide a safe and stable environment.

Specified access was granted to both parents and the children's First Nations band.

The offenders, who worked as cleaners in a medical office, were convicted of forging prescriptions for opioids and possessing fentanyl and oxycodone.

Both offenders suffered from severe opioid addictions.

The Crown sought custodial sentences of 9 to 12 months, while the defence sought conditional discharges.

The court declined to grant conditional discharges, finding them contrary to the public interest given the seriousness of the offences and lack of rehabilitation plans.

However, considering the significant delay of over five years and the offenders' circumstances, the court imposed 12-month conditional sentences to be served in the community, followed by two years of probation.

The children's aid society sought a temporary order placing a one-year-old Inuk child in the care of the father in Nunavut, subject to a supervision order.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the child's return to her care.

The court found that the child could not be safely returned to the mother due to ongoing concerns regarding substance misuse and mental health.

Applying the placement priorities for Indigenous children, the court determined it was in the child's best interests to be placed with the father and extended family in their community.

The society's motion was granted.

In a child protection proceeding, the Society sought to introduce 45 out-of-court statements made by two children to various individuals, including social workers, a foster mother, a teacher, and therapists.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of these hearsay statements.

The court found that it was reasonably necessary to admit the statements without requiring the children to testify, given their age, special needs, and history of trauma.

Applying the principled approach and traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule, the court assessed the threshold reliability of each statement.

Ultimately, the court admitted some statements for the truth of their contents, some for the children's state of mind, some for narrative, and excluded others where the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value or threshold reliability was not met.

The paternal grandmother brought a motion for a temporary order for alternate weekend access and specified holiday time with her four-year-old granddaughter, who was placed in the custody of the maternal grandmother.

The maternal grandmother opposed a formal order, preferring to manage access at her discretion due to concerns about the paternal grandmother's son and grandson.

The court determined that section 104 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act governed the motion and found that a formal access order was in the child's best interests to manage the tension between the grandmothers.

The court granted alternate weekend access with conditions prohibiting the biological father's presence during visits.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that two children were in need of protection and an order placing them in Extended Society Care.

The mother opposed the application, seeking the return of the children to her care, supported by the father.

Following a lengthy trial, the court found the children in need of protection due to ongoing exposure to domestic violence, chronic school absenteeism, and the mother's inability to meet their basic needs.

The court concluded that the mother's plan was not viable and placed the children in Extended Society Care, while granting specified access to the mother, father, and siblings.

During a trial for domestic assault, the Crown brought an application to admit the complainant's prior audio-recorded out-of-court statement for its truth after she recanted her evidence on the stand.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, focusing on threshold reliability.

The court found that procedural reliability was established because the statement was audio-recorded, the complainant was available for meaningful cross-examination at trial, and she understood the importance of telling the truth to the police.

The application was granted and the statement was admitted.

The children's aid society brought a motion to dismiss a mother's status review application on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction because the issue of access from the initial protection application was still pending following an appeal.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding that status and access are distinct concepts under the legislation.

The court held that an outstanding access issue does not bar a parent from bringing a status review application regarding the children's placement, especially where significant changes in the proposed plans of care have occurred.

In a child protection proceeding, the father sought a temporary order returning the child to a 50/50 shared parenting regime.

The children's aid society and the mother opposed, seeking to confirm an existing order placing the child in the mother's care with supervised access for the father.

The court found that returning the child to the father's care was not in the child's best interests due to unresolved concerns regarding the father's alleged drug use, the presence of inappropriate individuals at his residence, and his behavior during access visits.

The court ordered that the child remain in the mother's care subject to society supervision.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection application, seeking a final order granting joint decision-making responsibility of an Indigenous child to the mother and her former partner.

The father opposed the motion, arguing for shared decision-making and raising concerns about the child's exposure to her First Nations heritage.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded that the proposed order was in the child's best interests, noting the history of domestic violence and the proposed caregivers' commitment to fostering the child's cultural identity.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The defendants, who were patients and cleaners for a family physician, were charged with multiple offences including using forged prescriptions and possessing fentanyl and oxycodone.

The Crown alleged they used their after-hours access to the doctor's office to forge prescriptions and fax them to pharmacies.

The court found both defendants guilty of using forged documents and possessing fentanyl and property obtained by crime, relying on circumstantial evidence including fax transmission times, lack of office stamps, and evidence of cutting and pasting.

The defendants were acquitted of possessing proceeds of crime due to insufficient evidence.

The accused, charged with numerous serious offences including conspiracy to commit murder and firearms offences, applied for interim release.

The accused proposed a release plan involving two sureties and GPS monitoring.

The court found the proposed plan insufficient, noting that the accused had previously breached bail conditions while under the supervision of one of the proposed sureties.

The court ordered the accused's detention on secondary grounds (risk of interfering with the administration of justice) and tertiary grounds (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the offences and the strength of the Crown's case regarding threats).

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion under s. 130 of the CYFSA for the production of third-party records relating to the parents and their five children.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing they had previously consented and the motion was premature.

The kin, who were added as parties to seek access to one child, brought a cross-motion seeking disclosure of the Society's entire file and the third-party records.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding the records relevant to the child protection concerns, with minor exceptions for counselling notes.

The court dismissed the kin's cross-motion, holding that their limited participatory rights only entitled them to records relevant to their claim for access to the one child.

The accused brought an application for certiorari to quash her committal for trial and for a stay of proceedings.

During a judicial pre-trial where she was unrepresented, the Crown added a serious charge without explanation, and the accused was incorrectly advised she had no right to a preliminary inquiry and was not put to her election under section 536 of the Criminal Code.

The court found this to be a jurisdictional error that could not be retroactively corrected by the Crown withdrawing the added charge.

The committal was quashed and the matter remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice for a proper election.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed as premature.

The court heard two openness applications regarding a young child with special needs who was placed for adoption.

The birth father sought monthly in-person contact, while the Office of the Children's Lawyer and the Children's Aid Society supported two visits per year.

The court considered the child's best interests, the need for stability in the adoptive home, and the adoptive parents' ability to comply with the order.

The court ordered a minimum of three in-person openness contacts per year between the child and the birth father, which may include the paternal grandmother.

The mother brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the children's aid society's protection application regarding her infant child.

The society alleged the child was in need of protection due to the father's history of substance abuse, domestic violence, and a prior judicial finding that he likely sexually abused another child.

The court found no triable issue regarding physical or emotional harm, as the mother had adequately cared for the child.

However, applying the cautionary approach to summary judgment in child protection matters, the court concluded there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the mother could protect the child from the risk of sexual harm posed by the father.

The motion was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order placing a 16-month-old child in extended society care.

The child was apprehended at birth.

The mother consented to the order but sought access.

The father, who has Indigenous heritage, developmental delays, and a criminal record, sought the return of the child to his care.

The court found that returning the child to the father posed too high a risk due to his impulsivity, inconsistent access attendance, and inability to cooperate with the Society.

The court ordered the child placed in extended society care.

The court also ordered access for both parents, designating the mother and the child as access holders and the father as an access recipient, to balance the child's need for a permanent placement with the benefits of maintaining a connection to his biological parents.