CITATION: R. v. Sona, 2026 ONSC 4631
COURT FILE NO.: 25-11400741
DATE: 2026/08/11
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: R. v. Michael Sona
BEFORE: Rees J.
COUNSEL: T. Radcliffe, for the Crown
B. Del Greco, for Mr. Sona
HEARD: August 6, 2026
Reasons for Decision
Overview
[1] Michael Sona is alleged to have assaulted his former intimate partner in August 2023 and January 2025. He is charged with assault causing bodily harm, two counts of assault—choking, and assault.
[2] Mr. Sona’s trial is scheduled for later this month in the Ontario Court of Justice. At the request of the complainant, the Crown brings an application for a discretionary publication ban over any information that could identify the complainant under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Crown originally brought the application before the Ontario Court of Justice. Although the reasons of the application judge below were not put before me, I was advised by the Crown that the application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the presiding judge or justice had not yet been determined in that court. The application judge directed the Crown to bring its application, on notice to the media, before the Superior Court of Justice.
[3] The defence takes no position on the Crown’s application but asks that, if the publication ban is granted, it should also include information that could identify Mr. Sona.
[4] For the following reasons, the Crown’s application for a publication ban is dismissed.
Background
[5] There is media interest in Mr. Sona. He came to public attention shortly after the 2011 federal election. He was then a staffer for the Conservative Party of Canada. During the 2011 federal election, Mr. Sona worked as communications director for the Guelph CPC candidate. In that role, he became a major and active participant in a scheme designed to prevent some non-supporters of the CPC from voting. This scheme became known to media as the “robo-calls scandal”: R. v. Sona, 2016 ONCA 452, 132 OR (3d) 372, at paras. 5-6.
[6] Mr. Sona was ultimately convicted of preventing or endeavouring to prevent an elector from voting in a federal election, contrary to s. 281(g) of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9. He was sentenced to nine months’ incarceration followed by 12 months’ probation. His sentence was upheld on appeal: Sona, at para. 35.
[7] While the charges now before the Ontario Court of Justice are unrelated to Mr. Sona’s previous conviction, this history explains the media’s interest in reporting on the present charges and is part of the context in which the Crown’s application is brought.
[8] To date, Frank Magazine and City News have published articles regarding the present charges. Frank Magazine’s article identifies the complainant.
The law
General principles for discretionary publication bans
[9] As the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly reaffirmed, “the open court principle is protected by the constitutionally‑entrenched right of freedom of expression and, as such, it represents a central feature of a liberal democracy”: Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 75, at para. 1. This means that as a general rule, “the public can attend hearings and consult court files and the press — the eyes and ears of the public — is left free to inquire and comment on the workings of the courts, all of which helps make the justice system fair and accountable”: Sherman Estate, at para. 1.
[10] The open court principle is also entrenched under the accused’s right to “a fair and public hearing” under s. 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11; R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, at para. 52.
[11] There is therefore a strong presumption in favour of open courts. That said, there may be “exceptional circumstances” when competing interests justify a restriction on the open court principle: Sherman Estate, at para. 1; see also Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 1994 CanLII 39 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at p. 878; Mentuck, at paras. 32‑39.
[12] According to the well-established test for restrictions on the open court presumption, an applicant must establish:
a. court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
b. the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and
c. as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.
Sherman Estate, at para. 38.
[13] Only where all three of these requirements have been met can a discretionary limit on openness be ordered.
The statutory test under s. 486.5(1) and (7)
[14] The present application was brought under s. 486.5(1), which applies when no order has been made under s. 486.4 (the provision applicable to sexual offences). Subsection 486.5(1) provides that where a judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is “in the interest of the proper administration of justice”, the judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the complainant or witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
[15] Parliament has specified non-exhaustive factors that the judge hearing the application must consider in s. 486.5(7):
Factors to be considered
(7) In determining whether to make an order, the judge or justice shall consider
(a) the right to a fair and public hearing;
(b) whether there is a real and substantial risk that the victim, witness or justice system participant would suffer harm if their identity were disclosed;
(c) whether the victim, witness or justice system participant needs the order for their security or to protect them from intimidation or retaliation;
(d) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of offences and the participation of victims, witnesses and justice system participants in the criminal justice process;
(e) whether effective alternatives are available to protect the identity of the victim, witness or justice system participant;
(f) the salutary and deleterious effects of the proposed order;
(g) the impact of the proposed order on the freedom of expression of those affected by it; and
(h) any other factor that the judge or justice considers relevant.
[16] I return below to the interplay between the general principles articulated by the Supreme Court and s. 486.5.
[17] If granted, a publication ban may be subject to any conditions that the judge or justice thinks fit: s. 486.5(8).
Analysis
A preliminary practice point
[18] Given the direction in the court below that the application should be brought in the Superior Court of Justice, I offer the following practical guidance. Although the Superior Court of Justice has jurisdiction to consider the application for a publication ban over proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice under s. 486.5(4) where the presiding judge or justice has not been determined, discretionary publication bans under s. 486.5 should, as a general practice, be determined in the court with jurisdiction over the underlying proceedings, as this avoids bifurcating proceedings between two levels of court and reduces delay.
[19] The language of s. 486.5(4) should be read contextually and purposively to achieve Parliament’s intention. The language of s. 486.5(4) provides that the application is to be made in writing to the “presiding judge or justice”. This is broader than the words “trial judge”, which are used elsewhere in the Code, because the need to consider a publication ban can arise during pre-trial proceedings. It would therefore be open to a judge or justice in the Ontario Court of Justice presiding over a pretrial step in the proceedings to consider an application for a publication ban.
[20] Here, the trial in the Ontario Court of Justice is scheduled for later this month and this application could have been heard by the presiding judge at the start of trial.
Notice was given to the media
[21] The Crown served the media with a Notice of Request for Publication Ban, consistent with this court’s Practice Directions. No media organization responded to oppose the application. A member of the media was, however, present at the hearing.
[22] The Crown argued that I should consider the lack of opposition from the media when weighing the discretionary factors set out in s. 486.5(7). I disagree.
[23] It cannot be inferred that simply because the media has not responded to or opposed the requested application that the public or media interest in reporting on court proceedings is diminished. It is common knowledge that legacy media is in crisis as its traditional funding model has collapsed over the last two decades. This has resulted in substantial downsizing and local newsroom closures. Given these resource constraints, media frequently make the point that they cannot retain counsel to respond to every application for a restriction on the publication of court proceedings.
[24] In addition, neither the weighing of the open court principle nor freedom of expression should depend on whether the media responds to an application. The fact that the media is not opposing the application does not lessen the importance of these constitutional principles.
[25] Put simply, the lack of a response from the media to the application is not a factor to be considered in weighing whether to grant the publication ban sought by the Crown. Rather, the application must be assessed on its own merits.
The complainant’s concerns
[26] The Crown seeks the publication ban at the request of the complainant, who was Mr. Sona’s intimate partner at the time of the alleged assaults. The Crown and investigating officer met with the complainant to discuss her concerns regarding the absence of a publication ban. The Crown application is motivated by the complainant’s concerns for her personal life, her professional life, and her personal safety.
[27] With respect to her personal life, the complainant estimates that since the media reported on the charges, 20 to 30 of her friends have reached out to her. The complainant advised the Crown that she had not previously disclosed the alleged assaults to these individuals.
[28] Included in the Crown’s material is an email from the complainant attaching a screenshot of a Facebook post that she says was made by Mr. Sona and asking whether the post would breach a publication ban. In the post, a person with the Facebook handle “realmichaelsona” pictured two glasses of cocktails which he states were recently returned to him by the complainant following a court order. The post also makes derogatory and critical statements about the complainant.
[29] The investigating officer’s notes also state that the complainant forwarded an email to police with a recording from a Facebook post apparently made by Mr. Sona. The officer observed a picture of cannolis and a caption that states, “Picked these up at Subito’s today. Cannoli are a delicious part of my heritage. Even if a certain ex had a pathological hatred of them.” The officer writes that the post includes an audio recording of the complainant and Mr. Sona having an argument.
[30] The complainant has expressed concerns for her professional life. She holds an executive-level job. She is concerned that publishing information about the allegations could impact her professional reputation, career trajectory, and authority. The complainant was also previously active in communications in politics and maintains professional relationships with those still working in politics and media.
[31] Finally, the complainant has expressed concerns for her personal safety. She alleges that Mr. Sona’s behaviour has been escalating as the trial approaches. She alleges that Mr. Sona has sent her friends and family members unwanted and intimidating messages about her and the upcoming trial. The complainant believes that Mr. Sona will become desperate and physically retaliate against her. The complainant advised the Crown that she has moved, partly out of concern for her safety, but she remains concerned that Mr. Sona could learn of her new address.
[32] The complainant sent the police and Crown an email enclosing a social media post apparently made by Mr. Sona. He appears to have been attending the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CANSEC) conference in May. Mr. Sona is pictured at the conference facility, surrounded by other delegates, wearing a suit and tie, and holding a military-grade long gun. His post appears with the caption, “I do love my job.”
[33] In her email to the Crown and police, the complainant wrote that she understands his release conditions prohibit him from possessing any firearm, weapon, or imitation weapon. She also observes that she is not aware of any exemption in the order for his employment.
[34] The complainant’s concerns regarding her personal safety are untested. Nor were the intimidating messages that the complainant alleges Mr. Sona sent her friends and family put before the court. The Crown clarified in oral submission that there is no evidence on the record before me of the complainant receiving threats in the context of the media coverage. The Crown did not allege at the hearing that Mr. Sona breached the terms of his release by holding the long gun at the CANSEC conference.
Weighing the factors under s. 486.5(7)
[35] As discussed, Mr. Sona has a right to a fair and public hearing. Public scrutiny of the trial process helps ensure that the judicial system conducts fair trials. Public scrutiny helps ensure that the state does not abuse the accused’s right to be presumed innocent and does not institute unfair procedures. Public scrutiny can also vindicate an accused person who is acquitted, particularly when the acquittal is surprising or shocking to the public: Mentuck, at paras. 53-54; Dagenais, at p. 883.
[36] A publication ban would impinge on this right. Mr. Sona has an interest in justice not only being done, but being seen to be done.
[37] The Crown has not established that there is a real and substantial risk that the complainant would suffer harm if her identity were disclosed. Nor has the Crown established that the complainant needs the order for her security or to protect her from intimidation or retaliation.
[38] As acknowledged by the Crown, there is no evidence that the complainant has received threats because of the media coverage. The complainant’s concerns arise from Mr. Sona’s alleged behaviour, not from the media or the public following the publication of information that could identify her. If there is a well-founded basis for the complainant’s allegation that Mr. Sona is sending intimidating messages to the complainant’s family and friends, that is a matter for the police to investigate. Those allegations have not led to the laying of charges. As to the complainant’s concern that Mr. Sona could discover her current home address, it is difficult to see how her current address would be relevant evidence and thus publicly disclosed at trial. This information is also routinely redacted in Crown disclosure and is unlikely to find its way into the public court record. In any event, I am not persuaded that the media would publish this information.
[39] The complainant’s privacy and dignity are important public interests which may warrant imposing restrictions on the open court principle. A publication ban may be imposed “if the interest in protecting core aspects of individuals’ personal lives that bear on their dignity is at serious risk by reason of the dissemination of sufficiently sensitive information”: Sherman Estate, at para. 33. The focus is not whether the information is personal, but on the impact that the dissemination of sensitive personal information would have on the complainant’s dignity. The applicant must demonstrate that the dissemination of sensitive personal information would occasion an affront to the complainant’s dignity that society as a whole has a stake in protecting.
[40] This is a high bar. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]his public interest will only be seriously at risk where the information in question strikes at what is sometimes said to be the core identity of the individual concerned: information so sensitive that its dissemination could be an affront to dignity that the public would not tolerate, even in service of open proceedings”: Sherman Estate, at para. 34. To attract protection, the information must strike at the biographical core of the individual.
[41] The Crown argues that the Supreme Court made these observations in an appeal from a discretionary common law sealing order in a probate case, and that a less stringent standard has been specified by Parliament in applications for discretionary publication bans under s. 486.5 of the Code.
[42] In my view, the interplay between the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on discretionary publication bans and s. 486.5 is more nuanced than advanced by the Crown.
[43] The Supreme Court has been clear that the constitutional framework for restrictions on the open court principle applies to “all discretionary court orders that limit freedom of expression and freedom of the press in relation to legal proceedings”: Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188, at para. 7; see also Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, at para. 31. The test is subject only to valid legislative enactments: Sherman Estate, at para. 38.
[44] Section 486.5 codifies the discretionary publication ban procedure in criminal proceedings and directs that certain factors be considered. In my view, the constitutional principles applicable to discretionary publication bans which have repeatedly been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court continue to inform the application of the test for granting a publication ban under s. 486.5(1) of the Code and the factors set out in s. 486.5(7). These constitutional principles must be given their proper weight when considering whether granting a publication ban is “in the interest of the proper administration of justice” under s. 486.5.
[45] I do not read R. v. Wagner, 2017 ONSC 6603 as suggesting otherwise. Wagner was an application to the Superior Court of Justice for certiorari of an order of a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice refusing a publication ban. The trial judge erred by failing to apply the statutory test under s. 486.5. Although the court in Wagner, at para. 13, considered the key differences between how the test was articulated in Dagenais/Mentuck and is articulated in s. 486.5, I do not read the court as holding that s. 486.5 should not be interpreted in light of the constitutional principles set out by the Supreme Court.
[46] This is not to ignore the potential “room for divergence” between the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estate test and the test under s. 486.5, which was “made more palpable by the 2015 amendments to s. 486.5”: R. v. Derbyshire, 2016 NSCA 67, 377 NSR (2d) 174, at para. 178.
[47] It is a misnomer to refer to the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estate test as the “common law test” for publication bans. Although the test was developed in the context of common law publication bans, it elaborates constitutional principles. As the Supreme Court reminded us when reviewing the constitutionality of Parliament’s regime for the production of private records in the possession of third parties in sexual offence proceedings, “[t]he law develops through dialogue between courts and legislatures”. Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, Parliament is free to craft its own solution to a problem consistent with the Charter: R. v. Mills, 1999 CanLII 637 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 20.
[48] Parliament is presumed to legislate in conformity with the Charter. Given that Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estate articulates constitutional principles, s. 486.5 should be interpreted through the lens of those constitutional principles.
[49] As the Court of Appeal for Ontario directed in B.M.D. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2022 ONCA 580, “[t]he analysis of an application under s. 486.5 should be anchored in the text of that provision, interpreted as required by the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estate test”: at para. 4.
[50] Here, this means that in weighing the complainant’s privacy and dignity interests under s. 486.5(7), I must consider the Supreme Court’s guidance in Sherman Estate about the kind of impingement on a person’s privacy and dignity that may outweigh the open court principle and freedom of expression. Specifically, I must apply the Court’s guidance that the information must strike at the person’s core identity or biographical core. I need not decide whether there is a meaningful difference between a “serious risk” and a “real and substantial risk” in this context, because even applying the latter standard, it is not met on the facts of this case.
[51] The record regarding whether evidence led at trial would disclose information striking at the complainant’s biographical core is limited. The Crown has not identified information of this nature in its application. As the Crown fairly acknowledged in oral submissions, there is nothing special expected in the evidence; it is “routine”. Nor did the complainant identify specific information regarding her biographical core that she sought to protect in her meeting and emails with the Crown and police.
[52] Although direct evidence is not necessarily required to establish the requisite risk to an important interest, and it is possible to identify objectively discernible harm based on logical inferences, this is not a licence to engage in impermissible speculation. As the Supreme Court explains, “[a]n inference must still be grounded in objective circumstantial facts that reasonably allow the finding to be made inferentially. Where the inference cannot reasonably be drawn from the circumstances, it amounts to speculation”: Sherman Estate, at para. 97.
[53] The assault allegations arise in the context of an intimate partner relationship. It can be reasonably inferred that some information regarding the relationship between the complainant and Mr. Sona will be led at trial. This is information that one would normally, but for the court process, consider private. Yet the discomfort and embarrassment that arises from the intrusion of the court process into a person’s private life is not generally enough to outweigh the open court presumption: Sherman Estate, at para. 2. The Crown did not point to anything specific in the record that suggested that open proceedings would pose either a serious risk or a real and substantial risk to the dissemination of highly sensitive personal information that would result in an affront to the complainant’s dignity.
[54] The Crown and defence confirmed in oral submissions that neither intends to lead evidence regarding the complainant’s sexual history.
[55] Further, based on the Crown’s synopsis of the alleged incidents, there is nothing readily discernible from the allegations that lead me to conclude that there is either a serious risk or a real and substantial risk to the dissemination of highly sensitive personal information that would result in an affront to the complainant’s dignity.
[56] On the record before me, I am not satisfied that highly sensitive personal information is at risk of dissemination.
[57] Society has an interest in encouraging the reporting of offences and the participation of complainants in the criminal justice process, not only for the complainant in this case but also more generally. This is particularly the case in the context of alleged intimate partner violence, which is underreported. That said, making a criminal allegation is a serious matter. A complainant’s evidence is presumptively subject to public scrutiny, which helps prevent perjury, thereby enhancing the search for truth: Dagenais, at p. 883.
[58] When all the circumstances are considered in this case, society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of offences and the participation of complainants in the criminal justice system does not outweigh the open court presumption.
[59] There are no other effective alternatives to a publication ban that would protect the identity of the complainant. It would be the least restrictive measure. But this factor alone cannot overcome the deficiencies identified above. The Crown has not established a sufficiently important risk to justify restricting the open court principle and freedom of expression.
[60] As discussed, a publication ban would restrict the open court principle and limit freedom of expression, including the media’s right to report fully on the trial. The Crown argued that the publication ban sought would be limited and the media could still report the essential elements of the trial, just not that the alleged assaults were against Mr. Sona’s former intimate partner.
[61] I do not agree that the effect of the publication ban would be as limited as the Crown contends. Although not a public figure, the complainant is known professionally to the media and in political circles. Her former relationship with Mr. Sona also appears to be a matter of public record. Given that their former relationship is already in the public domain, much of the context that may be integral to the alleged assaults could not be reported lest it identify the complainant. It is difficult to see how the media could properly fulfil its function as the eyes and ears of the public if it could not report on significant portions of the evidence at trial because doing so could identify the complainant.
[62] The salutary effects of the order sought do not outweigh its deleterious effects. The embarrassment that publicity surrounding the trial may cause to the complainant does not rise to the level of a competing interest of public importance, and the complainant’s personal safety is not at risk because of the publication of the trial proceedings.
[63] Therefore, a publication ban is not in the interest of the proper administration of justice.
Disposition
[64] The Crown’s application for a publication ban is dismissed.
Justice Owen Rees
Date: August 11, 2026