Steven Daniel Baldwin

The plaintiff, Arnold Hennessy Holdings Inc., moved for summary judgment against Flapperless Inc. and Philip Hennessy for unpaid royalties under licensing agreements for "tip-tank" toilet technology.

The defendants argued the claim should be brought by Arnold Hennessy's estate, was statute-barred, and that an oral agreement amended the written contracts.

They also raised procedural issues regarding disclosure and counsel.

The court dismissed the defendants' preliminary objections and found Hennessy Holdings to be the proper plaintiff.

The action was deemed not statute-barred, as the plaintiff discovered the breach within the limitation period.

The court rejected the existence of an oral agreement to vary the written terms, finding Philip Hennessy's uncorroborated evidence insufficient.

While Philip Hennessy was a proper party, the court found no basis to pierce the corporate veil to hold him personally liable for Flapperless's financial obligations.

The plaintiff was granted judgment for unpaid royalties against Flapperless Inc. but denied a declaration seeking to enjoin the transfer of intellectual property to Philip Hennessy, as the transfer had already occurred upon Arnold Hennessy's death and damages were an adequate remedy.

The plaintiff brought a motion to establish a timetable for its summary judgment motion.

The defendants opposed, insisting on receiving the plaintiff's Affidavit of Documents first, citing Rule 30.03.

The court, referencing amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court guidance on summary judgment, ruled that an Affidavit of Documents is not a prerequisite in the absence of a discovery plan or when a summary judgment motion is pending.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, setting a timetable for the summary judgment proceedings and dismissing the defendants' objection.

The plaintiff, Gauvreau & Associates Professional Corporation, sought an interlocutory injunction against the defendants, Pelton & Co. Professional Corporation and Laurie Pelton, to enforce a non-competition agreement.

The agreement stemmed from the sale of Pelton's accounting practice to Gauvreau, which included goodwill and a client list, alongside an independent contractor agreement.

The defendants, after Pelton left Gauvreau, began servicing clients from the sold list.

The court, treating the agreement primarily as a business sale contract but also considering employment interests, found the seven-year, Ontario-wide non-competition clause unduly restrictive.

While acknowledging a serious issue to be tried regarding the enforceability and potential "reading down" of the clause, and finding irreparable harm in the loss of goodwill, the court granted a limited injunction.

This injunction prohibited the defendants from *further* soliciting clients on the sold list until trial, but did not prevent them from accepting business from clients who had already switched or those who had not yet retained them.

Costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The defendant dentist brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' dental malpractice action, arguing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on causation.

The defendant relied on two Rule 53.03 compliant expert reports stating the dental procedure did not cause the plaintiff's infective endocarditis.

The plaintiffs relied on the opinion of the plaintiff's treating cardiologist, who opined the defendant did not wait long enough for prophylactic antibiotics to take effect.

The court found the treating cardiologist was a 'participant expert' whose opinion was admissible without complying with Rule 53.03.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, holding that a trial was required to resolve the competing medical opinions on causation.

Following a four‑week jury trial arising from a motor vehicle collision caused by an impaired driver, the plaintiffs obtained a damages verdict of $220,000 but a much smaller net judgment after statutory deductions and accident benefits offsets.

Both parties sought costs, relying on competing Rule 49 settlement offers and arguments concerning proportionality and the impact of statutory deductibles.

The court held that statutory deductibles are not considered when determining entitlement to costs and rejected the defendant’s argument that its offers were more favourable.

After reviewing the complexity of the trial, expert evidence, motions, and proportionality considerations, the court fixed the plaintiffs’ costs at $250,000 in fees plus $126,598.48 in disbursements and applicable HST.

The court further concluded that recent amendments to the Insurance Act affecting cost calculations should not apply retroactively to this litigation.

Following a jury award in a personal injury action, the parties sought clarification of the terms of judgment concerning deductions for statutory accident benefits relating to housekeeping expenses and disclosure of litigation insurance.

The defendant argued that housekeeping benefits previously received under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule should be deducted from both past and future housekeeping awards.

The plaintiffs submitted that benefits for past housekeeping could only be deducted from the jury’s award for past housekeeping losses and not from future losses.

The court accepted the plaintiffs’ position, holding that past benefits cannot be deducted from future losses, and confirmed the higher judgment amount.

The defendant’s request for disclosure of litigation insurance was found to be premature and unnecessary at that stage.

Following a civil jury verdict arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court was asked to settle the terms of judgment including deductions for statutory accident benefits, the applicable statutory deductible under the Insurance Act, and the appropriate prejudgment interest rate.

The defendant sought to deduct the full amount allocated to income replacement benefits in a prior accident benefits settlement, while the plaintiffs argued only amounts clearly matching the jury award should be deducted.

The court held the settlement allocation for income replacement benefits was binding and deductible.

However, it accepted the plaintiffs’ position that the increased statutory deductible introduced shortly before trial should not apply retrospectively, maintaining the earlier deductible amount.

Exercising discretion under the Courts of Justice Act, the court also set prejudgment interest at 3%.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act arguing the injured plaintiff had not sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function following a motor vehicle collision.

Conflicting medical evidence was presented regarding chronic pain, psychiatric impairment, and the causal connection between the collision and the plaintiff’s symptoms.

The court accepted expert evidence linking facet joint injuries and chronic pain to the accident and found the plaintiff’s condition substantially interfered with his ability to perform the heavy physical duties of his construction business.

The court also rejected suggestions that the plaintiff was malingering.

The plaintiff met the statutory threshold for non‑pecuniary damages.

A fire broke out in the appellants' garage while their son, the respondent, was working on his car.

The appellants' home insurer paid for the property damage and brought a subrogated action against the respondent's automobile insurer.

The trial judge dismissed the subrogated claim on the basis that the respondent was an unnamed insured under the homeowner's policy, and an insurer cannot subrogate against its own insured.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the respondent fell within the policy's definition of an insured, had an insurable interest in the property based on the factual expectancy test, and that policy reasons strongly militated against allowing an insurer to sue its own insured.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the driver of the other vehicle.

After the expiry of the limitation period, the defendant stated at discovery that he lost control on black ice and obtained leave to issue a third party claim against the municipalities for failure to maintain the road.

The plaintiff successfully moved to add the municipalities as defendants based on the discoverability principle.

The municipalities brought a motion for leave to appeal that order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the clock started to run only when the defendant raised the issue of winter maintenance, and the municipalities failed to meet the test for leave to appeal under rule 62.02(4).

The applicant, the former stepmother of the child, brought a motion for interim access.

The biological parents, who shared joint custody, opposed the motion.

The respondent father also brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion for interim access, finding that it was not in the child's best interests given the parents' objections, the potential to undermine their parenting, and the child's expressed wishes.

The court also dismissed the respondent's motion for security for costs, as the applicant was an Ontario resident with substantial equity in her home.

The respondent was awarded set-off costs of $3,500.

A court-appointed receiver sought summary judgment for payment under a manufacturing contract after the defendant failed to pay the contract price for equipment that had been delivered and for which the defendant had already been paid by its own customer.

The defendant asserted legal and equitable set-off based on alleged claims arising from earlier contracts and potential future warranty liabilities.

The court held that the prior claims were unliquidated and unrelated to the contract at issue and therefore could not ground legal or equitable set-off.

The alleged contingent warranty claims were speculative and unsupported by evidence.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the receiver.

The plaintiff's vehicle was impounded by police in August 2009.

She filed a public complaint and later commenced a civil action in October 2013.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff moved to strike the defendants' motion, alleging the supporting affidavit was based on hearsay and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the affidavit proper and the documentary evidence sufficient.

The court granted summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known she had a cause of action by August 2009, making her 2013 claim out of time.

The defendant LawPRO brought a motion to enforce a purported settlement under Rule 49.09.

The plaintiffs had offered to dismiss their claim against LawPRO without costs.

LawPRO purported to accept the offer but added a condition requiring all cross-claiming defendants to execute a release.

The court found that this conditional acceptance constituted a counter-offer, which the plaintiffs never accepted.

The plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their original offer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no binding settlement existed.

The parties sought costs following competing motions in a family law proceeding.

The applicant was substantially successful on her motion for financial disclosure and an advance on equalization, while the respondent was successful on his motion for exclusive possession of the cottage.

The court determined that both parties acted reasonably and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, applying maximum allowable hourly rates.

After assessing the respective costs, the court ordered a net set-off amount of $6,753.47 payable by the applicant to the respondent.

This was a construction dispute arising from an oral profit-sharing arrangement under which the plaintiff provided project management and site supervision services on several commercial projects in exchange for 30% of net profit.

The court resolved disputed factual issues concerning project cost calculations, treatment of superintendent wages, personal charges, and allegedly improper extras billed to owners.

For the Shoppers Drug Mart and Gardiners Road projects, the court directed the parties to recalculate compensation using the agreed formula and the court's findings.

For the Wolfe Springs and The Edward projects, the court held that neither side proved entitlement to compensation or damages, finding in relation to The Edward that both sides bore responsibility for the absence of profit.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter where the respondent father sought costs against the Hastings Children's Aid Society following a 14-day trial.

The Society had brought a protection application alleging the children were at risk of sexual and emotional harm from the father.

The court found the father had not posed a risk of sexual harm and dismissed the Society's application on that ground.

Only the older child was found to be at risk of emotional harm, unrelated to the father's actions.

The court awarded costs of $50,000 against the Society, finding it had failed to conduct a thorough investigation, relied almost exclusively on the mother's allegations, and failed to meet its ongoing obligation to investigate and present all relevant facts to the court.

Following an appeal that set aside an order extending limitation periods but adjourned the issues to trial, all parties sought costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the respondents were substantially successful because they defeated the appellants' motion for summary judgment and maintained their position that the limitation issues should be decided at trial.

The respondents were awarded costs of $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The deceased was struck and killed by two motorists while walking on a highway after becoming intoxicated at a college event.

The deceased's family commenced an action under the Family Law Act more than three years after the accident.

The motion judge extended the two-year limitation period under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act and applied the discoverability rule.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal, holding that the plaintiffs' unawareness of the limitation period did not postpone it, and that whether the requirements of s. 2(8) and the discoverability rule were met should be determined at trial rather than on a motion.