Alexander Hora

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an assignment of an agreement of purchase and sale was null and void.

The assignment was subject to a true condition precedent requiring vendor approval.

The motion judge found that the vendor insisted on unreasonable terms for its approval, which constituted a 'deal breaker', and that the respondents' subsequent attempt to negotiate an abatement was not an anticipatory breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions, and affirmed that the failure of the condition precedent rendered the agreement null and void, entitling the respondents to the return of their deposit.

The defendant 2602317 Ontario Inc. brought a motion to hold the defendants SAI Consulting Services Inc. and Toronto Wire & Solutions Corp. in contempt for failing to comply with a prior court order requiring them to pay specific funds received from a real estate transaction into court.

The responding defendants brought cross-motions to set aside the prior order, arguing it was impossible to comply because the specific funds had already been disbursed.

The court dismissed the cross-motions, finding the prior order was clear and the defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify setting it aside.

The court found the corporate defendants in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, and ordered their directors to respond personally at the penalty phase.

The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment regarding a failed assignment of a pre-construction condominium agreement.

The plaintiff sought to retain a $70,000 deposit after the defendants did not complete the assignment, while the defendants sought its return.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to seek the vendor’s consent to the assignment “forthwith” as required, and that the vendor’s consent documents imposed unreasonable new terms not contemplated by the assignment agreement.

The court held that the assignment agreement was null and void and ordered the return of the deposit to the defendants.

Following an appeal, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The appellant was ordered to pay costs to the respondent in the amount of $5,748.88, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant and his ex-spouse jointly owned two abutting parcels of land.

They executed a charge on one parcel in favour of the respondent bank, and later transferred the other parcel without a severance.

The respondent successfully applied to have the transfers declared void under the Planning Act.

On appeal, the appellant argued that section 44(1) of the Land Titles Act and notations on the register insulated the transactions from the Planning Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'Land Titles Conversion Qualified' notation only guaranteed against Planning Act contraventions up to the date of conversion, and did not oust the operation of the Planning Act for subsequent transactions.

The plaintiff franchisee brought a motion for relief from forfeiture and an interlocutory injunction to reinstate a terminated franchise agreement and commercial sublease for a Williams Fresh Café location.

The franchisor had terminated the agreement after the plaintiff failed health audits, accrued significant debts, and closed the store.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, requiring a strong prima facie case because the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction to enforce a month-to-month agreement with no renewal right.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction.

The appellant, Pamela Bader, appealed a summary judgment order that found her liable to pay a mortgage debt to 1250140 Ontario Inc. The core issues were whether the action was barred by the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act (RPLA) and whether Ms. Bader had acknowledged the debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the RPLA applied to the claim for debt based on a mortgage covenant, even after the property's sale, and that Ms. Bader's affidavit constituted a valid acknowledgment of the debt, thereby extending the limitation period.

This appeal arose from a summary judgment order finding a franchise agreement effectively rescinded due to deficient financial disclosure (FDD) under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The motion judge had also found two individuals to be "franchisor's associates" and jointly and severally liable.

The appellants argued the motion judge misapplied the "informed investment decision test" and erred in finding the individuals were associates and imposing joint and several liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that the FDD was so deficient as to amount to no disclosure, that the informed investor test was correctly applied, and that the individuals met the definition of franchisor's associates, warranting joint and several liability.

The plaintiff in a construction dispute brought a motion to compel the defendants to answer questions refused at discovery and to produce a further and better affidavit of documents.

The core issue was whether the defendants implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege regarding advice received during the negotiation of an Amending Agreement.

The Master found no waiver regarding the negotiation of the agreement, but found an implicit waiver regarding advice on payments made after the agreement.

The Master also ordered disclosure of competing quotations but denied requests for consultant files and financial means.

The plaintiff was granted leave to complete the discovery and awarded partial indemnity costs of $6,500.

The plaintiff, Diamond Drywall Contracting Inc., brought a motion to extend the time for serving its statement of claim, which was opposed by the defendants who also sought a declaration that the lien had expired and the action be dismissed due to non-service.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding the explanation for the nine-month delay "borderline" but acceptable, particularly given the COVID-19 pandemic and the absence of actual prejudice to the defendants.

The defendants' motion was dismissed.

Despite losing on the substantive motions, the defendants were awarded $5,000 in partial indemnity costs, as the litigation was necessitated by the plaintiff's initial failure to serve the statement of claim within the statutory period.

The defendants brought a motion to declare the plaintiff's construction lien expired and to vacate it, arguing it was not preserved in time and the statement of claim was not served within the 90-day statutory period.

The court found the lien was preserved in time based on the actual date of contract termination.

Regarding the late service of the statement of claim, the plaintiff's counsel admitted to a six-month delay, citing oversight and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court adjourned the motion to allow the plaintiff to bring a cross-motion for an extension of time for service, requiring more evidence on the pandemic's effect on the delay.

The plaintiffs, owners of single-family homes, leased their properties to the defendant who fraudulently converted them into illegal rooming houses.

After the defendant failed to comply with a previous court order to restore the properties to single-family dwellings, the plaintiffs brought a motion for contempt and a writ of possession.

The court found the defendant in civil contempt, granted the plaintiffs exclusive possession under its inherent jurisdiction to enforce its orders, and ordered the defendant to pay $36,000 in restitution or face a 120-day jail sentence.

The plaintiffs, owners of twelve residential homes, leased their properties to the defendant based on his fraudulent representation that he would occupy them as single-family residences.

Instead, the defendant converted the homes into illegal rooming houses and rented them to numerous occupants.

The plaintiffs sought an ex parte injunction to evict the occupants.

The court held that while the Landlord and Tenant Board generally has exclusive jurisdiction over residential evictions, the Superior Court has jurisdiction under section 440 of the Municipal Act to grant an injunction to a taxpayer to restrain the contravention of municipal zoning by-laws.

The court ordered the occupants and the defendant to comply with all municipal notices and zoning by-laws requiring the properties to be returned to single-family residences.

The plaintiff advanced significant sums to the defendant and his company over several years, documented by promissory notes.

The trial judge found the advances were demand loans, not investments, and held the defendant and his company liable for fraudulent activities, while dismissing the defendant's slander action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the limitation period, finding that the earliest loans from 2000 and 2001 were statute-barred under the former six-year limitation period and could not be revived by later partial payments.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the damage award accordingly, but dismissed on all other grounds, including the cross-appeal.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking to consolidate, or alternatively to have heard sequentially, their appeal of a property standards order under the Building Code Act, 1992 and a separate civil action against the municipality, neighbours, a supplier, and an engineering firm.

The plaintiffs argued that both proceedings arose from the same factual circumstances regarding retaining walls and responsibility for remediation work.

The court held that the appeal was narrowly limited to determining whether the property complied with applicable standards and whether the ordered repairs were required, while the civil action involved broader questions of liability and damages.

Consolidation or a stay would undermine the purpose of the property standards regime by delaying enforcement.

The motion was dismissed.

The third party moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing allegations of contributory negligence arising from a motor vehicle collision at an intersection where the opposing driver failed to yield at a stop sign.

The responding defendants argued that issues of speeding and failure to keep a proper lookout created a genuine issue requiring trial.

The court reviewed the discovery evidence, witness testimony, and the defendant’s guilty plea to failing to yield.

It concluded there was no evidence supporting contributory negligence by the driver who had the right of way and that the collision was unavoidable from his perspective.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the moving parties.