Lucas Price

The accused were stopped for speeding.

Police smelled marijuana, asked questions without providing rights to counsel, and observed a baggie in one accused's pocket.

The accused were arrested and a search of the vehicle incident to arrest revealed a large quantity of crack cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found breaches of ss. 8 and 10(b) regarding the initial questioning and a premature search of one accused's pockets, but dismissed the application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breaches were minor and the evidence was highly reliable and important.

The appellants, an engineer and his company, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario finding them guilty of professional misconduct and negligence in the design of a manure storage tank.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Discipline Committee breached procedural fairness by adjudicating an allegation regarding a 'cut-out' in the tank wall without providing proper notice to the appellants.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Discipline Committee erred by relying on expert evidence that it had previously ruled inadmissible regarding the standard of practice.

The findings of professional misconduct were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a re-hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The accused were jointly charged with possession of cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possession of $13,000 as proceeds of crime, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused brought a directed verdict motion on the joint counts.

The court found sufficient evidence of possession of the cocaine and cash to proceed to trial, but discharged both accused on the marijuana count due to insufficient evidence.

The court applied the test for directed verdicts and analyzed the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, including residency, bedroom occupancy, and knowledge and control of the drugs and proceeds.

The applicant challenged the judicial authorization to search a residence and seize controlled drugs under section 8 of the Charter of Rights.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the facial validity of the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant.

The applicant initially lacked standing, but the Crown conceded the issue after hearing evidence.

The court applied the test from Hunter v. Southam and R. v. Debot, examining whether there was a credibly-based probability that evidence of a criminal offence would be found at the residence.

After excising problematic boiler-plate language and misleading statements from the ITO, the court found that the remaining evidence—comprising information from two confidential sources and police corroboration of biographical details—was sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for the search warrant authorization.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found crack cocaine, marijuana, and cash in a satchel in the back of a pickup truck he was driving.

The accused testified that he rarely drove the truck, which was primarily used by his son, and that he had taken it in a hurry without knowing the satchel was inside.

The court applied the W.D. principles and found the accused's exculpatory account credible, concluding the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge of the drugs.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with possession of approximately 32 grams of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a police surveillance operation.

The Crown alleged that officers observed the accused conduct a street-level drug transaction before arresting him and locating drugs and cash during a search.

The court identified numerous inconsistencies and logical conflicts within the police officers’ testimony regarding surveillance, the arrest, and the timing and manner of the searches.

An independent civilian witness also gave evidence that materially contradicted aspects of the officers’ account and was found credible and reliable.

Considering the inconsistencies and the witness evidence together, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove possession and related offences beyond a reasonable doubt and entered acquittals.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding his s. 9 rights were violated by an arbitrary roadside stop.

The Crown cross-argued that the stop was lawful.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the stop was arbitrary, as the police lacked reasonable suspicion.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by finding exigent circumstances where none existed and by relying on unsupported evidence regarding another officer's grounds to detain.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted in two separate trials of assault causing bodily harm, criminal harassment, and drug trafficking offences.

He received a 5-year sentence for the assault and an 8-year sentence for the drug offences, resulting in a global sentence of 13 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the second sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the totality principle.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence for the drug offences was reduced to 5 years consecutive, resulting in a global sentence of 10 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine.

He argued that the jury verdicts were inconsistent, the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on aiding and abetting, and the trial judge erred in finding he was not entrapped.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions or the entrapment ruling.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 14-month sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his sentence for an oxycodone-related offence, arguing the trial judge improperly treated his addiction as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge merely reflected an understanding of the appellant's self-awareness.

The sentence was not manifestly unfit given the appellant's criminal record, the serious problem of oxycodone in the community, and his role in spreading the drug.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application from a forfeiture order.

The Crown conceded that the application judge erred in failing to address the matter on the merits and agreed not to argue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order, and remitted the matter back to the Superior Court of Justice to be dealt with on the merits.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that a single interjection by the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample circumstantial evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The court also held that the trial judge's single interjection did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of cannabis resin, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him following a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found that the police had both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant after he received the package and left the residence shortly after with a bag capable of carrying it.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of no Charter breaches under sections 8 and 9.

However, the court quashed the appellant's summary conviction for simple possession of marijuana on consent, as it should not have been tried together with exclusively indictable offences.