Dean D. Paquette

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cannabis marihuana under 3 kilograms for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000.

The defence brought a Charter challenge seeking exclusion of evidence obtained through alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer conducted an unjustified investigative detention without reasonable grounds, failed to inform the accused of the reason for detention or rights to counsel, and conducted a warrantless search without proper justification.

The court determined that the Charter breaches were serious and that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

All charges were dismissed.

The Crown charged two accused jointly with possessing cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possessing $13,000 in proceeds of crime, and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused Ward-Jackson faced additional charges of possession of marijuana for trafficking and possession of $120 as proceeds of crime.

Following a search warrant execution at their residence, the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to establish possession.

The trial judge found that while residency and bedroom occupancy could be inferred, the Crown failed to establish knowledge and control of the drugs and money beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge emphasized the critical distinction between evidence and facts, and the necessity of establishing primary facts before drawing further inferences.

The accused were jointly charged with possession of cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possession of $13,000 as proceeds of crime, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused brought a directed verdict motion on the joint counts.

The court found sufficient evidence of possession of the cocaine and cash to proceed to trial, but discharged both accused on the marijuana count due to insufficient evidence.

The court applied the test for directed verdicts and analyzed the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, including residency, bedroom occupancy, and knowledge and control of the drugs and proceeds.

The applicant sought disclosure of the identities of two confidential informants whose information formed the basis for a search warrant executed at his residence.

The applicant was charged with possessing a semi-automatic assault rifle and an illegal capacity magazine found in his basement.

He argued that his innocence was at stake and that disclosure was necessary to demonstrate that the items were planted or that one of the informants was a suspect with motive and opportunity to plant the items.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the threshold test requiring him to establish that the information sought was not available from any other source and that he was otherwise unable to raise a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with manslaughter in connection with the death of Edward Cieslik, who died from heroin overdose.

The Crown alleged that the accused unlawfully procured heroin for the deceased, divided it into doses, and injected him with one dose, causing his death.

The trial examined whether the accused's actions constituted unlawful act manslaughter or criminal negligence.

The court found that while the accused did traffic in heroin and inject the deceased once, the deceased's voluntary self-administration of a fatal second dose constituted an intervening act that severed the causal chain between the accused's conduct and the death.

The court applied the principle from R. v. Kennedy, finding that the autonomous decision of an informed adult to self-inject a lethal dose breaks legal causation.

The accused was acquitted of manslaughter.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm after forcibly removing apartment keys from the hands of his roommate and dragging her out of the apartment.

The accused claimed justification under section 35 of the Criminal Code (defence of property), arguing the complainant was a trespasser.

The court found that although the accused may have subjectively believed he had the right to eject the complainant, such belief was not objectively reasonable.

The complainant was a tenant with rights to the apartment, had paid rent, was not in arrears, and had not agreed to vacate by the date the accused demanded.

The court found the accused guilty of assault causing bodily harm, holding that his use of force was unreasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession of stolen property after purchasing a dump trailer, cargo trailer, and Bobcat skid steer from an individual known only as "Chico" between November 2011 and January 2012.

The accused admitted possession of all three items but pleaded not guilty, claiming he did not know they were stolen.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was willfully blind to the stolen nature of the property, having ignored numerous red flags including purchasing valuable commercial equipment without ownership documentation, at unreasonably low prices, from an unknown seller, and fraudulently registering the trailers as home-made vehicles.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts.

The accused applied for a review of a detention order following a bail hearing where he had been charged with possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of an undertaking.

The reviewing judge considered the secondary and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code and the standard of review for bail review under s. 520.

The court held that the justice of the peace erred in relying on the tertiary ground after already determining detention on the secondary ground and failed to apply the principle that the tertiary ground must be used sparingly.

The court also found a material change in circumstances based on strengthened surety evidence and the removal of an unsuitable proposed surety.

The accused satisfied the onus for release and was granted bail with strict conditions and substantial sureties.

The appellant, a numbered Ontario corporation, sought costs on an appeal from a conviction under the Liquor Licence Act of Ontario.

The appellant had been convicted in absentia after the prosecutor amended the Information to substitute the appellant as defendant without notice or service.

The court found jurisdiction to award costs under section 129 of the Provincial Offences Act and determined that exceptional circumstances existed warranting a costs award.

Although the prosecutor's conduct was careless rather than malicious, the court found that fairness required the appellant be relieved of the financial burden of the appeal, as it had been wrongly convicted without notice or opportunity to defend.

Costs were awarded in the amount of $4,520.00.