Dean D. Paquette

The accused was charged with five firearms-related offences following a search warrant executed at his residence.

He conceded guilt on three counts relating to careless storage and unlicensed possession of two long guns found under his mattress.

He denied knowledge of an SKS assault rifle and ammunition found hidden in his basement and a cache of 7.62mm ammunition found in his garage.

The court found that the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the accused had knowledge of and was in possession of all three firearms and the ammunition.

The court rejected the defence theories that someone else had stored or planted the weapons without the accused's knowledge, finding such scenarios contrary to common sense and logic.

The accused was convicted on all five counts.

The offender pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death and impaired driving causing bodily harm.

On September 4, 2015, the offender consumed alcohol for four hours at a restaurant, then drove at excessive speed on a busy residential road, lost control of his vehicle, and collided with another vehicle.

His passenger was killed at the scene, and the driver of the other vehicle sustained serious permanent injuries.

The offender's blood alcohol concentration was approximately three times the legal limit.

The court imposed a four-year penitentiary sentence, balancing the serious aggravating factors (high blood alcohol level, death and serious injury, reckless driving) against mitigating factors (early guilty plea, first offender, good character, genuine remorse, strong family support).

Following a trial, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor victim.

The defendant also pleaded guilty to two counts of breaching his recognizance of bail.

The court imposed a sentence of 4½ years imprisonment for the sexual offences, followed by an additional 90 days imprisonment for the breaches, to be served consecutively.

The court also imposed ancillary orders including a DNA order, lifetime sex offender registration, a 10-year prohibition on employment or volunteering with persons under 16, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and a prohibition on communication with the victim during the custodial portion of the sentence.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cannabis marihuana under 3 kilograms for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000.

The defence brought a Charter challenge seeking exclusion of evidence obtained through alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer conducted an unjustified investigative detention without reasonable grounds, failed to inform the accused of the reason for detention or rights to counsel, and conducted a warrantless search without proper justification.

The court determined that the Charter breaches were serious and that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

All charges were dismissed.

The applicant brought a constitutional motion in advance of sentencing challenging s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code insofar as it denied enhanced pre-sentence custody credit to offenders detained under s. 524(4) or (8) after a bail breach.

The court held that the provision engaged liberty and offended the principle of proportionality in sentencing because it made the ultimate period of incarceration depend on the offender's ability to obtain bail, a factor irrelevant to a fit sentence.

The court rejected the Crown's position that gross disproportionality was the governing standard, relied on appellate authority recognizing proportionality in sentencing as a principle of fundamental justice, and found the provision arbitrary in its operation.

Applying s. 1, the court held the provision was not rationally connected in a constitutionally sufficient way, did not minimally impair liberty, and produced deleterious effects outweighing any benefits.

The impugned words were declared of no force and effect to the extent they barred enhanced credit for detention under s. 524(4) or (8), and the applicant was not precluded from seeking enhanced credit for all pre-sentence custody.

The Crown charged two accused jointly with possessing cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possessing $13,000 in proceeds of crime, and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused Ward-Jackson faced additional charges of possession of marijuana for trafficking and possession of $120 as proceeds of crime.

Following a search warrant execution at their residence, the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to establish possession.

The trial judge found that while residency and bedroom occupancy could be inferred, the Crown failed to establish knowledge and control of the drugs and money beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge emphasized the critical distinction between evidence and facts, and the necessity of establishing primary facts before drawing further inferences.

The accused were jointly charged with possession of cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possession of $13,000 as proceeds of crime, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused brought a directed verdict motion on the joint counts.

The court found sufficient evidence of possession of the cocaine and cash to proceed to trial, but discharged both accused on the marijuana count due to insufficient evidence.

The court applied the test for directed verdicts and analyzed the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, including residency, bedroom occupancy, and knowledge and control of the drugs and proceeds.

The applicant sought disclosure of the identities of two confidential informants whose information formed the basis for a search warrant executed at his residence.

The applicant was charged with possessing a semi-automatic assault rifle and an illegal capacity magazine found in his basement.

He argued that his innocence was at stake and that disclosure was necessary to demonstrate that the items were planted or that one of the informants was a suspect with motive and opportunity to plant the items.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the threshold test requiring him to establish that the information sought was not available from any other source and that he was otherwise unable to raise a reasonable doubt.

The offender was sentenced following convictions for historical sexual offences against three complainants who were between eleven and thirteen years old at the time of the abuse.

The offences involved acts including gross indecency, sexual assault, and sexual touching for a sexual purpose, committed while the offender occupied positions of trust such as a hockey coach, mentor, and neighbour.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence under ss. 718, 718.01, and 718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code, given the prolonged abuse, breach of trust, and lasting harm to the victims.

Although the offender had no prior criminal record and positive character evidence, these factors carried limited mitigating weight in light of the gravity of the offences.

A global sentence of eight years’ imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre‑trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The accused was charged with manslaughter in connection with the death of Edward Cieslik, who died from heroin overdose.

The Crown alleged that the accused unlawfully procured heroin for the deceased, divided it into doses, and injected him with one dose, causing his death.

The trial examined whether the accused's actions constituted unlawful act manslaughter or criminal negligence.

The court found that while the accused did traffic in heroin and inject the deceased once, the deceased's voluntary self-administration of a fatal second dose constituted an intervening act that severed the causal chain between the accused's conduct and the death.

The court applied the principle from R. v. Kennedy, finding that the autonomous decision of an informed adult to self-inject a lethal dose breaks legal causation.

The accused was acquitted of manslaughter.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm after forcibly removing apartment keys from the hands of his roommate and dragging her out of the apartment.

The accused claimed justification under section 35 of the Criminal Code (defence of property), arguing the complainant was a trespasser.

The court found that although the accused may have subjectively believed he had the right to eject the complainant, such belief was not objectively reasonable.

The complainant was a tenant with rights to the apartment, had paid rent, was not in arrears, and had not agreed to vacate by the date the accused demanded.

The court found the accused guilty of assault causing bodily harm, holding that his use of force was unreasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession of stolen property after purchasing a dump trailer, a cargo trailer, and a skid steer from an individual known only as 'Chico'.

The accused claimed he did not know the items were stolen and believed he was getting a good deal from a man hiding assets during a divorce.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding him unreliable and noting numerous 'red flags' such as unreasonably low prices, missing VIN plates, and the accused's fraudulent registration of the trailers as home-made.

The court concluded the accused was willfully blind to the origins of the property and found him guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession of stolen property after purchasing a dump trailer, cargo trailer, and Bobcat skid steer from an individual known only as "Chico" between November 2011 and January 2012.

The accused admitted possession of all three items but pleaded not guilty, claiming he did not know they were stolen.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was willfully blind to the stolen nature of the property, having ignored numerous red flags including purchasing valuable commercial equipment without ownership documentation, at unreasonably low prices, from an unknown seller, and fraudulently registering the trailers as home-made vehicles.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts.

The accused applied for a review of a detention order following a bail hearing where he had been charged with possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of an undertaking.

The reviewing judge considered the secondary and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code and the standard of review for bail review under s. 520.

The court held that the justice of the peace erred in relying on the tertiary ground after already determining detention on the secondary ground and failed to apply the principle that the tertiary ground must be used sparingly.

The court also found a material change in circumstances based on strengthened surety evidence and the removal of an unsuitable proposed surety.

The accused satisfied the onus for release and was granted bail with strict conditions and substantial sureties.

The appellant, a numbered Ontario corporation, sought costs on an appeal from a conviction under the Liquor Licence Act of Ontario.

The appellant had been convicted in absentia after the prosecutor amended the Information to substitute the appellant as defendant without notice or service.

The court found jurisdiction to award costs under section 129 of the Provincial Offences Act and determined that exceptional circumstances existed warranting a costs award.

Although the prosecutor's conduct was careless rather than malicious, the court found that fairness required the appellant be relieved of the financial burden of the appeal, as it had been wrongly convicted without notice or opportunity to defend.

Costs were awarded in the amount of $4,520.00.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a serious fraud, arguing the sentencing judge misapprehended the duration and magnitude of the offence.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension on the record and held that the sentencing judge was justified in rejecting a conditional sentence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applied differential scrutiny to the witnesses, and misapplied the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's use of the appellant's denial of a sexual relationship with the complainant's sister to assess his credibility.

The court also held that the trial judge did not apply a differential standard of scrutiny or reverse the onus of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault as a party to the offence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly caution the jury about the frailties of the complainant's evidence.

The complainant had admitted to lying to the police in two separate statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed a reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the legal implications of these inconsistencies and by providing an unbalanced charge that unduly promoted the Crown's case.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The underlying case involved whether a Canada Revenue Agency official was engaged in an investigation or an audit, and whether Charter rights were violated.

Because the Crown had stayed the prosecution, the Supreme Court found the appeal to be moot and granted the motion to quash.

The respondent, a 17-year-old, pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a presumptive offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The YCJA required the young person to justify why an adult sentence should not be imposed and why a publication ban should apply.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that these reverse onus provisions violate section 7 of the Charter because they are inconsistent with the principle of fundamental justice that young people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral culpability.

The provisions were not saved by section 1, and the youth sentence imposed by the trial judge was upheld.