Samantha J. Ramage

The defendant, Madeline Di Santo, was charged with careless driving causing bodily harm under section 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act following a collision with a pedestrian.

The defendant pleaded not guilty.

The court, after a one-day trial, found that the prosecution failed to prove the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge determined that the defendant was not driving at an unreasonable speed, had an advance green light, and the complainant pedestrian was outside the crosswalk, leading to the conclusion that the defendant's driving did not fall below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver.

The collision was deemed an accident, and the charge was dismissed.

The case concerned child support arrangements for the parties' two children.

The applicant mother sought child support based on the father's income, while the respondent father sought an offset amount based on a claim of shared parenting time (40% or more) under section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The court conducted an hourly calculation of parenting time and found that the father did not meet the 40% threshold (3,491 hours vs. 3,504 required).

Consequently, the father's claim for shared parenting and offset support was dismissed.

The court ordered the father to pay the full table amount of child support based on his income for 2022, 2023, and an agreed-upon income for 2024 onwards.

The court also drew an adverse inference against the father for failing to provide updated financial disclosure and dismissed his claim for prior direct payments due to lack of proof.

The appellant appealed his conviction under section 141(5) of the Highway Traffic Act for making an unsafe left turn and colliding with a bicycle.

He argued the trial justice made an unreasonable finding of fact regarding the bicycle's speed and erred in applying the due diligence standard.

The appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings and held that the trial justice properly applied the due diligence standard, noting the appellant turned while his vision was partially obstructed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with "Young Driver – Blood Alcohol Above Zero" contrary to section 44.1(5) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought a Charter motion alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant's right to be advised of her right to retain and instruct counsel was infringed under section 10(b).

Applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

With the breath sample evidence excluded and no other admissible evidence of blood alcohol concentration, the court dismissed the charge, finding the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of the offence.