K.W. Bouchard

The defendant was charged with two counts under the Building Code Act: failing to comply with an order to comply (count 1) and causing construction of a building without a permit (count 2).

The prosecution proved the actus reus of both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found that the defendant established a valid defence of legal non-conforming use on a balance of probabilities.

The defendant, as the current owner of property that had been in her family since the 1940s, demonstrated the requisite intent and commitment to rebuild structures destroyed in 1985 storms.

The court rejected alternative defences regarding direct evidence requirements, the existence of three independent structures, and due diligence.

Both counts were dismissed based on the legal non-conforming use defence.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered three pre-trial motions in a Provincial Offences Act prosecution involving alleged violations of the Building Code Act.

The court granted the prosecution's request to amend the offence dates on the information to a date within the statutory limitation period, rejecting a broader date range that was statute barred.

The court refused to quash the information despite technical irregularities in the jurat signature, holding that substance prevails over form and that the information was properly laid under s.23(1.2) POA.

The court also ruled that the doctrine of discoverability applies to the limitation period under s.36(8) BCA, making the continuing offence argument irrelevant for limitation purposes.

The court granted leave to reapply on amendment and limitation issues based on trial evidence and remains seized of the matter.

The Ontario Court of Justice held a Part III trial under the Provincial Offences Act in absentia for Noel-George Carr regarding three informations under the Building Code Act (BCA).

The court quashed all three informations as statute barred, finding that the doctrine of discoverability had been incorporated into the BCA, rendering the continuing offence doctrine irrelevant for limitation periods.

The court ruled that only s.14(1) of the BCA is a continuing offence, not s.8(1) or s.12(2), and that failure to issue a stop work order does not convert these offences into continuing offences.

The informations were laid well outside the one-year limitation period based on discovery dates.

A corporate defendant was convicted of failing to ensure prescribed occupational health and safety measures at its manufacturing facility, resulting in a worker sustaining four finger amputations.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a sentencing recommendation of $35,000.

The court rejected the joint submission as not being in the public interest, finding that the parties failed to adequately account for inflation when relying on sentencing authorities that were more than five years old.

The court imposed a fine of $55,000, adjusted to reflect post-pandemic inflation from 2015 to 2024.

The defendant, Alicia Braid, faced an application for a recognizance (peace bond) under s.810 of the Criminal Code, brought by Brandi Nunes (the informant) on behalf of her child, AN, alleging reasonable fear of personal injury due to threatening behaviour.

The court found that while the child had subjective fear, this fear was not objectively reasonable.

The court declined to create a modified objective standard for reasonable fear for children, emphasizing that the same objective standard of "reasonableness" must apply to all complainants regardless of age.

The informant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the complainant had a reasonable fear of psychological harm.

The application for recognizance was dismissed.

The Crown applied for a General Production Order under s. 487.014 of the Criminal Code to compel Binance Holdings Ltd/Nest Services Ltd to disclose specific records to the Norfolk Police.

Binance/Nest disputed the Canadian court's jurisdiction, suggesting the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty (MLAT) was the proper avenue.

The court rejected this argument, finding it had jurisdiction based on the corporate entity's virtual presence and a real and substantial connection to Canada, as established by factors including legacy accounts, transaction fees, Canadian employees, and Canadian purchases.

The production order was granted.

The defendant, Madeline Di Santo, was charged with careless driving causing bodily harm under section 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act following a collision with a pedestrian.

The defendant pleaded not guilty.

The court, after a one-day trial, found that the prosecution failed to prove the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge determined that the defendant was not driving at an unreasonable speed, had an advance green light, and the complainant pedestrian was outside the crosswalk, leading to the conclusion that the defendant's driving did not fall below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver.

The collision was deemed an accident, and the charge was dismissed.

The defendant, Melanie Precious, was charged with failing to yield from a driveway contrary to s.139(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution proved the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the defendant successfully demonstrated a due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities, arguing that she took reasonable care by looking in each direction and allowing a preceding vehicle to pass, and that the collision was likely due to the other vehicle's unilluminated headlights in dense fog.

The court dismissed the charge, finding the defendant was without fault.

The defendant, Vivian McClintock, appeared for a Part III trial via Zoom but refused to cooperate, provide her full name, or answer the court's questions, exhibiting behaviour reminiscent of OPCA litigants.

Despite multiple warnings, she continued her contemptuous conduct.

The court, finding direct contempt in the face of the court, issued an arrest warrant for Ms. McClintock pursuant to s. 91 of the Provincial Offences Act, adjourning the original trial sine die.

The court affirmed its common law and statutory authority to issue such a warrant for remote participants.