5 total
Above-ceiling delay warranted a stay despite defence-caused trial adjournment.
The accused brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of a summary criminal harassment charge after total delay reached 906 days.
The court held that although the accused caused the adjournment of the first trial by seeking replacement of court-appointed counsel, the ensuing delay to the second trial was not entirely defence delay because the Crown and court failed to take reasonable steps to minimize rescheduling delay.
Applying Jordan and the contextual apportionment approach in Hanan, the court deducted defence delay but still found net delay remained above the 18-month presumptive ceiling.
The Crown did not establish exceptional circumstances, and the charge was stayed.
Accused acquitted of impaired driving after admissions excluded due to ambiguous breath demand explanation.
The Ontario Court of Justice considered a drink-driving case involving Keith Maiato, focusing on alleged Charter violations under sections 8, 9, and 10(a).
The court analyzed whether the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and whether the Defendant was properly informed of the reasons for detention.
The court found no breach of s. 10(a) or s. 9, concluding that the arrest was lawful and supported by reasonable grounds.
However, the court found the Defendant’s admissions to the Qualified Technician were not voluntary due to the manner in which the breath demand was explained, leading to exclusion of those admissions.
Without the Defendant’s admissions, the prosecution failed to prove identity and impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in acquittal.
The court excluded breath readings and dismissed impaired driving charges after finding police impermissibly steered the accused to duty counsel.
This decision addresses multiple alleged Charter breaches related to the arrest and detention of Rajiv Quinless for impaired driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.
The Court found no breaches regarding the reliance on the Approved Screening Device (ASD) results or the adequacy of the information provided about the reasons for arrest.
There was no breach found in the timing of the right to counsel being read.
However, the Court found serious breaches of the right to counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter, including impermissible steering to duty counsel instead of allowing the accused to contact his brother for legal assistance, and a breach of the right to consult with counsel in private due to the accused’s reasonable belief that the consultation was not private.
The evidence (breath readings and utterances) was excluded under s.24(2) to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, resulting in a dismissal of the charge.
The Crown was granted leave to cross-examine the complainant on a prior inconsistent statement.
During a criminal trial for assault, the prosecutor brought an application under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine their own witness (the complainant) on a prior inconsistent statement.
The defence argued the statement was unreliable due to the complainant's state at the time (medicated, alcohol consumed, sleep-deprived, emotional).
The court found patent inconsistencies between the trial testimony and the prior statement, inferred a possible motive for feigned memory loss, and determined that despite the complainant's condition, the statement was not so unreliable as to create unfairness.
The application was granted, allowing the prosecution to conduct a limited cross-examination.
The section 11(b) Charter application was dismissed because net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.
The applicant, Sabrina Scott-Wolf, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.
The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 19.8 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive Jordan ceiling.
The court calculated the net delay by subtracting periods of defence-attributable delay, including delays in scheduling a Crown Pretrial, a Judicial Pretrial, and a Trial Scheduling Conference.
The court rejected the Crown's argument that late notice of the s.11(b) application constituted defence delay, finding the May 25, 2024 email sufficient notice.
The net delay was determined to be 14.8 months, falling below the presumptive ceiling.
The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings, thus not meeting the criteria for a below-ceiling stay.
While acknowledging the Crown's inexcusable complacency in providing disclosure, the motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, and trial dates were confirmed.