Christopher Webb

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual assault and four counts of administering a stupefying substance, receiving a global sentence equivalent to 10 years imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of trust and that the sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide the breach of trust issue because the sentence was entirely fit given the significant aggravating features, including the 15-year span, multiple victims, and significant planning.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in leaving the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent with the jury, as there was no evidence the appellant took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The majority also held that similar fact evidence was admissible to show a pattern of bizarre sexual behaviour and specific propensity.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a youth charged with possession of a loaded restricted firearm on school property.

The trial judge had excluded the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the youth was arbitrarily detained when police asked for his identification and questioned him about a knapsack.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in inferring psychological detention simply because a police officer requested identification.

The youth's confident conduct in approaching the officers was inconsistent with psychological compulsion.

As there was no detention, the subsequent search of the abandoned bag did not violate the Charter.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, three years probation, and a lifetime driving prohibition imposed on the respondent for criminal negligence causing death.

The respondent, while engaged in a 'show of speed', caused a collision resulting in the death of a 29-year-old mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence could have been more substantial, it was not demonstrably unfit given the respondent's lack of criminal record, absence of alcohol or drug use, and prior good character.

Furthermore, the court noted that reincarcerating the respondent after he had already been released on parole would serve no genuine societal interest.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of robbery, wearing a disguise, attempted robbery, and possession of a dangerous weapon, all relating to incidents involving fast food deliverymen in an apartment building.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to prove identity and intent.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding similar fact evidence, reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the reasoning process for similar fact evidence, provided a deficient explanation of reasonable doubt that failed to comply with Lifchus, and improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defence.

The appellant, a young person, appealed a disposition of 6 months secure custody, imposed in addition to 2 months of pre-disposition custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit, noting the father's responsible and caring commitment to his son.

The court reduced the custodial disposition to time served (seven months) and varied the terms of the one-year probation order.

The appellant was convicted of counselling murder and counselling unlawful bodily harm after tape-recording conversations in which he encouraged two women to have a doctor maimed or killed.

The appellant claimed he did not intend for the crimes to be committed, but only wanted to get the women's intentions on tape to warn the doctor.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the mental element for counselling was satisfied if the appellant intended his advice to be accepted.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred; the offence of counselling requires proof that the counsellor intended the commission of the offence counselled.

As the Crown conceded there was no evidence the appellant intended the substantive offences to be committed, the appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on the ground that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit it to lead similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or unreasonable exercise of discretion in the trial judge's ruling.

The trial judge applied the proper standard, considered the similar acts cumulatively, and reasonably concluded that the prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence outweighed its probative value.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal from his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge did not err in finding the similar fact evidence inadmissible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising issues regarding Crown counsel's conduct, jury instructions on post-offence conduct, the handling of a juror's complaint, and the failure to charge the jury on honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge and noting that Crown counsel's cross-examination was not abusive.

The Crown cross-appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, citing the restrictive conditions, the narrow scope for appellate intervention, and the delay in perfecting the appeal.

The accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown introduced similar fact evidence from the accused's former wife regarding alleged past assaults to show a propensity for non-consensual, painful sex.

The accused argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and that the former wife and the complainant had colluded.

The trial judge admitted the evidence and left the issue of collusion to the jury, resulting in a conviction.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the similar fact evidence was wrongly admitted because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and the trial judge erred in law by failing to resolve the issue of collusion as a condition precedent to admissibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and failing to apply the W.(D.) instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge unequivocally rejected the appellant's evidence as a concoction, making the W.(D.) instruction superfluous.

Although the trial judge erred by referring to relying on credible evidence rather than the totality of the evidence, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding there was no alternative verdict available.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for two counts of robbery with a weapon.

He argued the trial judge failed to separate evidence between the counts and that there was insufficient evidence the weapon used was a firearm under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The court held that while mandatory minimums applied, imposing consecutive minimum sentences resulted in an unduly long total sentence.

The sentence was reduced from eight years to six years.

The respondent was convicted of careless driving after failing to stop at a stop sign, resulting in a fatal collision.

The Provincial Offences Appeal Court set aside the conviction, finding that expert evidence provided a rational explanation for missing the sign.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal court judge failed to apply the proper test for appellate review and improperly substituted his own view of the evidence for that of the trial justice.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted for a sentence appeal.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to include punitive conditions.

The Court of Appeal agreed that an error in principle occurred, noting the trial judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Proulx.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal due to the respondent's family circumstances, his guilty plea, his testimony against co-accused, and the significant passage of time since the offence and sentencing.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his treatment of alibi evidence and by admitting hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by stating he was 'not satisfied' the alibi witnesses were reliable, without considering if their evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence regarding cell phone records through a police officer without meeting the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial for both appellants, declining to apply the curative proviso.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for extortion and impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge had departed from a joint submission and imposed a conditional sentence for extortion and 60 days' imprisonment for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal found the conditional sentence inappropriate but declined to interfere as it was nearly completed.

However, the Court held the 60-day sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm was manifestly inadequate, noting the respondent was on bail for 'over 80' at the time.

The sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm was increased to five months.

The appellant appealed an 18-month custodial sentence imposed after a guilty plea to misappropriating more than $204,000 from her employer over approximately three years.

The court held that the proposed fresh evidence concerning post-arrest mental and physical health was not fresh evidence because it merely restated what had already been attributed to the doctor at trial.

While emphasizing the significant breach of trust, the extensive and repeated nature of the misconduct, and the absence of restitution, the court concluded the sentencing judge erred by treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor rather than simply not a mitigating one.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to 12 months in custody.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a young child.

At trial, the defence cross-examined the complainant on her two-and-a-half-year delay in reporting the abuse, suggesting fabrication.

The Crown called a child psychologist to testify that delayed disclosure is common and does not indicate falsehood.

The trial judge admitted the expert evidence, and the accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the expert evidence was inadmissible.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada solely on the admissibility of the expert evidence.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the expert evidence was not necessary because the principle that delay does not equate to falsehood is not outside the normal experience of a jury and could be addressed through a proper jury instruction.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault arising from an allegation that intercourse continued after consent was withdrawn and escalated to forced anal intercourse.

The Crown had adduced similar fact evidence from the appellant's former spouse concerning seven alleged incidents of physical and sexual abuse.

The court held that the proposed evidence lacked the necessary pattern or distinctive similarity, was weakened by credibility frailties and potential collusion, and primarily invited impermissible propensity reasoning.

Because its slight probative value was outweighed by its highly prejudicial effect, the evidence should not have been admitted.

A new trial was ordered.