Christopher Webb

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault by wounding but acquitted of assault with a weapon arising from an incident where she struck her sister-in-law in the face with a glass during an escalated argument.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the verdicts were inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdicts were logically inconsistent as a matter of law, since both charges arose from the same conduct and the only contested issue was whether the blow was reflexive or intentional.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction for aggravated assault, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of dangerous driving while racing causing bodily harm and dangerous driving while racing causing death.

The Crown's case was that the appellant and Tyler Dodd were racing their vehicles on Highway 21 near Owen Sound when Dodd lost control, crossed into oncoming traffic, and struck another vehicle, killing Dodd and injuring the other driver.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: challenging the finding that the vehicles were racing at the time of the accident, challenging the admissibility of his statement to police, and challenging the causation finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding all findings of the trial judge.

Two accused were charged with forgery‑related offences, tax fraud, and money laundering arising from a business producing false identification cards at a Toronto storefront.

The Crown alleged the moving party operated the enterprise through nominee businesses and bank accounts while failing to report significant income, thereby defrauding the federal government.

The court found that forged identification cards were manufactured and sold through the business and that the principal accused was the directing mind of the operation and the beneficiary of its revenues.

However, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the second accused knowingly participated in the offences or benefited from the income flowing through accounts in his name.

The court convicted the principal accused of forgery‑related offences and tax fraud but acquitted the co‑accused and dismissed the money laundering counts.

The Crown appealed the 18-month global sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing that the sentences for the two offences should normally be consecutive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the global sentence was not demonstrably unfit for this offender.

A contempt of court proceeding against defence counsel Gina DaFonte for her failure to attend court on multiple occasions in a domestic violence matter involving an application to strike guilty pleas.

The respondent failed to appear on January 28, February 4, and February 10, 2014, and most critically on March 10, 2014, despite a court order compelling her attendance on a pre-emptory hearing date.

The court found the respondent guilty of criminal contempt in the face of the court, finding that her conduct demonstrated reckless indifference to her obligations to the court and her client, despite her claims of illness.

The court imposed a fine and referred the matter to the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The accused brought numerous pre‑trial motions in a prosecution alleging forgery‑related offences, money laundering, and income tax fraud arising from a business producing false identification cards.

The motions included challenges to the Crown’s addition of counts under s. 574 of the Criminal Code, Charter claims concerning warrantless seizure of telephone subscriber information and production orders, delay under ss. 11(b) and 7 of the Charter, applications for particulars, certiorari to quash the committal, and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of process.

The court held that the Crown lawfully added additional charges disclosed by the preliminary inquiry evidence and rejected the Charter challenges to subscriber information and production orders.

Delay claims were dismissed because most delay was attributable to inherent case complexity and defence availability rather than the Crown, and no significant prejudice was shown.

The court also rejected allegations of abuse of process and prosecutorial misconduct, finding they lacked an evidentiary foundation and did not justify an evidentiary hearing.

The accused was originally charged in 1987 with offences arising from a series of home invasion sexual assaults but was discharged at a preliminary inquiry in 1989.

In 2010, after advances in DNA technology linked him to the crime scenes, a new indictment was preferred.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, finding that the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated by including the 21-year 'gap' period in the delay calculation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the accused was not a 'person charged with an offence' during the gap period when he was unaware of any ongoing investigation, and therefore s. 11(b) was not engaged during that time.

A police sergeant was charged with sexual assault for conducting a strip search of a detainee in police custody.

The detainee, arrested for public intoxication, became violent and assaultive during a pat-down search, kicking and injuring a female cellblock attendant.

The sergeant subsequently cut off the detainee's shirt and bra using safety scissors while she was restrained on the floor.

The Crown alleged the strip search was retaliatory and conducted without lawful authority.

The defence argued the search was justified by exigent circumstances and conducted for valid law enforcement purposes.

The court found the search was justified under section 25 of the Criminal Code based on the constellation of exigent circumstances, including the detainee's violent and assaultive behaviour, the need to complete the search for weapons and contraband, and the practical impossibility of waiting for another female officer.

The charge was dismissed.

The respondent was convicted at trial based on overwhelming circumstantial evidence.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court (SCAC) ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to consider a second police officer's evidence regarding the respondent's broken zipper, which the SCAC judge believed supported the respondent's alibi.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the SCAC judge, not the trial judge, had misapprehended the evidence.

The trial judge had properly considered the evidence and rejected the alibi.

The convictions were restored.

The Crown applied to cross-examine the accused, a police officer charged with sexual assault, on testimony he previously gave as a Crown witness in a related prosecution.

The Crown argued the prior testimony was voluntary because the accused was not under a court-issued subpoena, but rather an internal police notification.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused was compelled to testify in the prior proceeding due to his statutory duties under the Police Services Act and the internal police subpoena.

Therefore, his prior testimony was protected by section 13 of the Charter and could not be used to incriminate him or impeach his credibility.

The Crown brought a motion seeking a ruling permitting cross-examination of a police sergeant on his prior testimony given at a separate trial where he testified as a Crown witness.

The sergeant was subsequently charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the sergeant's prior testimony was compelled and therefore protected by section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court held that the testimony was compelled both because the sergeant was a compellable witness called by the Crown and because he was statutorily compelled to attend court under the Police Services Act and police policy.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that section 13 rights are diminished for police officers and dismissed the Crown's application.

The Crown appealed a 19-month sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and disproportionate to the gravity of the harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was lenient, the trial judge had carefully considered all aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sentence did not amount to a marked departure from the acceptable range.

Following conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code, the sentencing court considered constitutional challenges to the mandatory minimum in s. 95(2)(a)(i).

The court held that the three-year minimum was grossly disproportionate on the facts and therefore violated s. 12, and further held the hybrid structure created arbitrariness contrary to s. 7 because of the one-year summary maximum and three-year indictable floor.

The infringements were not saved under s. 1, and the proper remedy was a declaration of invalidity under s. 52 rather than a constitutional exemption or mandamus.

Applying ordinary sentencing principles once the minimum was removed, the court imposed a one-year sentence with credits, resulting in five months to be served conditionally in the community.

The young person appealed convictions for robbery and related offences arising from a home invasion by four masked men.

The sole issue at trial was identification, based entirely on the complainant's eyewitness testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to address the evolving details and increasing level of confidence in the complainant's identification evidence, which were crucial to evaluating its reliability.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof on a section 8 Charter application and erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make a breathalyzer demand.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct burden of proof when the reasons were read as a whole.

The Court also held that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of the circumstances, including a civilian report of erratic driving, the occurrence of an accident, and the accused's physical indicia of impairment.

The convictions were restored.

The applicant was convicted of disobeying a police officer directing traffic under the Highway Traffic Act after failing to immediately stop for an officer who clocked her speeding at 143 km/h.

The conviction was upheld on appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the lower courts misinterpreted the preconditions for an officer's discretion to direct traffic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the proposed grounds did not meet the high threshold for leave under the Provincial Offences Act, as they raised no significant issues of statutory interpretation or appellate review.

The accused was charged with defrauding his employer.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, finding that the Crown breached the accused's section 7 Charter rights by failing to provide a full and independent forensic audit covering his entire employment period, and noting potential section 11(b) delay issues.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the right to make full answer and defence does not impose a duty on the Crown to investigate possible defences, and that the delay was largely institutional and not unreasonable.

The accused was acquitted of multiple charges, including robbery and sexual assault, arising from attacks on sex-trade workers.

The trial judge found the identification evidence of three victims to be unreliable and concluded the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed, arguing the evidence was overwhelming and the trial judge erred in his approach to similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's right of appeal is limited to questions of law alone, and the trial judge's assessment of the reliability and weight of identification and similar fact evidence is a question of fact.

The Crown appealed acquittals on multiple sexual offence counts involving two young complainants in a judge-alone trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the Crown's purpose in seeking to rely on the evidence on each count as similar fact evidence across the indictment, wrongly characterizing the purpose as an attack on credibility rather than proof of a pattern refuting coincidence and confirming the complainants' accounts.

The court further held that, in a non-jury multi-count trial where the evidence was already before the court, reasoning prejudice and moral prejudice carried little weight.

The proposed similar fact evidence was highly probative and should have been admitted.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an order quashing the validation of service ex juris on the respondent foreign corporations for summonses relating to fraud charges.

The Crown argued that mailing the summonses from Canada constituted service in Canada and that the Provincial Offences Act and Criminal Code authorized such service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that in penal proceedings, a summons cannot be served outside Canada without express statutory authorization, which neither the Criminal Code nor the Provincial Offences Act provides.