Christopher Webb

A contempt of court proceeding against defence counsel Gina DaFonte for her failure to attend court on multiple occasions in a domestic violence matter involving an application to strike guilty pleas.

The respondent failed to appear on January 28, February 4, and February 10, 2014, and most critically on March 10, 2014, despite a court order compelling her attendance on a pre-emptory hearing date.

The court found the respondent guilty of criminal contempt in the face of the court, finding that her conduct demonstrated reckless indifference to her obligations to the court and her client, despite her claims of illness.

The court imposed a fine and referred the matter to the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The accused brought numerous pre‑trial motions in a prosecution alleging forgery‑related offences, money laundering, and income tax fraud arising from a business producing false identification cards.

The motions included challenges to the Crown’s addition of counts under s. 574 of the Criminal Code, Charter claims concerning warrantless seizure of telephone subscriber information and production orders, delay under ss. 11(b) and 7 of the Charter, applications for particulars, certiorari to quash the committal, and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of process.

The court held that the Crown lawfully added additional charges disclosed by the preliminary inquiry evidence and rejected the Charter challenges to subscriber information and production orders.

Delay claims were dismissed because most delay was attributable to inherent case complexity and defence availability rather than the Crown, and no significant prejudice was shown.

The court also rejected allegations of abuse of process and prosecutorial misconduct, finding they lacked an evidentiary foundation and did not justify an evidentiary hearing.

A police sergeant was charged with sexual assault for conducting a strip search of a detainee in police custody.

The detainee, arrested for public intoxication, became violent and assaultive during a pat-down search, kicking and injuring a female cellblock attendant.

The sergeant subsequently cut off the detainee's shirt and bra using safety scissors while she was restrained on the floor.

The Crown alleged the strip search was retaliatory and conducted without lawful authority.

The defence argued the search was justified by exigent circumstances and conducted for valid law enforcement purposes.

The court found the search was justified under section 25 of the Criminal Code based on the constellation of exigent circumstances, including the detainee's violent and assaultive behaviour, the need to complete the search for weapons and contraband, and the practical impossibility of waiting for another female officer.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion seeking a ruling permitting cross-examination of a police sergeant on his prior testimony given at a separate trial where he testified as a Crown witness.

The sergeant was subsequently charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the sergeant's prior testimony was compelled and therefore protected by section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court held that the testimony was compelled both because the sergeant was a compellable witness called by the Crown and because he was statutorily compelled to attend court under the Police Services Act and police policy.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that section 13 rights are diminished for police officers and dismissed the Crown's application.

Following conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code, the sentencing court considered constitutional challenges to the mandatory minimum in s. 95(2)(a)(i).

The court held that the three-year minimum was grossly disproportionate on the facts and therefore violated s. 12, and further held the hybrid structure created arbitrariness contrary to s. 7 because of the one-year summary maximum and three-year indictable floor.

The infringements were not saved under s. 1, and the proper remedy was a declaration of invalidity under s. 52 rather than a constitutional exemption or mandamus.

Applying ordinary sentencing principles once the minimum was removed, the court imposed a one-year sentence with credits, resulting in five months to be served conditionally in the community.