Talman W. Rodocker

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol and failing to stop at the scene of an accident to avoid civil or criminal liability.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised a bolus drinking theory, arguing that the accused consumed a large quantity of alcohol immediately before driving, such that his blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of operation.

On the failure to remain charge, the issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the scene with intent to escape liability.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts, accepting his evidence regarding the timing and pattern of alcohol consumption and finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent in leaving the scene, particularly given his voluntary return within 35 minutes.

The accused, Derek Oppong, brought a Corbett application to prohibit the Crown from cross-examining him on his criminal record if he testified.

The Crown sought to introduce the full record for credibility.

The court applied the Corbett factors, balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, considering the nature and remoteness of convictions, similarity to current charges, and the defense's attack on the Crown witness's character.

The court ultimately edited the record, prohibiting cross-examination on assault and robbery convictions, but permitting it on theft under, fail to comply, and threatening death convictions, to avoid an unbalanced portrayal of the accused's character to the jury.

The Crown applied for two orders regarding witness D.H. in a criminal trial: to permit D.H. to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, and to admit D.H.'s video statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted both applications, finding that CCTV testimony was necessary due to an attempt by gang members to intimidate D.H. in the courtroom, which interfered with the proper administration of justice.

The court also found that admitting D.H.'s video statement was appropriate given D.H.'s age at the time of the offence and the short timeframe between the incident and the statement.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching arising from admitted sexual activity with a 13-year-old complainant.

The only live issue was whether he honestly believed the complainant was of age and whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted the mother's evidence that she had earlier phoned the accused and expressly warned him that the complainant was 14, and found the accused's denial neither credible nor reasonably doubt-raising.

Applying the contextual due diligence approach from the appellate authorities, the court held that the warning cried out for further inquiry and that no reasonable steps were taken.

Guilty verdicts were entered on all three counts.

Three inmates were charged with assault causing bodily harm to a fellow inmate at Maplehurst Correctional Centre on November 19, 2014.

The Crown sought to introduce video evidence of the assault with identification testimony from a correctional officer.

The court held a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence under the Leaney test.

The court found that while the officer had prior acquaintance with the accused and was in a better position than the trier of fact to make identifications, the threshold reliability of the identification evidence was not established because the Crown relied on a Historical Unit Assignment document that was demonstrably inaccurate.

The document showed 35 inmates in a unit with a maximum capacity of 32, and showed inmates in cells where they were not actually housed.

Without reliable evidence of which inmates were assigned to which cells, the officer's identification methodology—tracking blurry figures back to assigned cells—could not meet the reliability threshold.

The charges were dismissed.

Following the release of the court's written endorsement on the appeal, the appellant settled the issue of costs with several respondents.

The court ordered the appellant to pay the remaining respondent, Zanzibar Tavern Inc., costs of the appeal fixed at $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents for damages related to his HIV infection, which he alleged was linked to a sponsorship undertaking given to the federal government.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court declined to entertain new arguments regarding exceptions to the limitation period raised for the first time on appeal.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidence establishing a causal link between the government's actions and the appellant's infection.

The appellant was convicted of several counts related to a home invasion and sentenced to 10 years in custody.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his alibi and in accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness to establish identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings or consideration of confirmatory evidence, including fingerprints and the timing of the arrest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year sentence reflected the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's criminal record.

Pre‑trial motions concerning severance and the admissibility of similar fact evidence in a multi‑count indictment arising from four bank robberies and an attempted armoured truck robbery.

The Crown sought to rely on evidence from separate robberies as similar fact evidence to establish identity, motive, and intent.

The court held that evidence of the second, third, and fourth robberies was admissible count‑to‑count on the issue of identity for one accused due to significant similarities and linking evidence, but evidence from the first robbery was not sufficiently similar.

The court further ruled that the bank robbery evidence was not admissible as similar fact evidence to prove motive or intent regarding the attempted armoured truck robbery.

Applying the severance factors in R. v. Last, the court ordered the armoured truck counts severed from the bank robbery counts and also severed the first robbery from the remaining robbery counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that his videotaped confession was involuntary and obtained in breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights, and that the Crown's failure to disclose police background checks of prospective jurors caused a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in admitting the confession, as the police reasonably believed the appellant had spoken to counsel and the statements were voluntary.

Furthermore, applying the Yumnu test, the Court held that although the Crown improperly failed to disclose the jury vetting results, there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have been differently constituted.

During a sentencing hearing for fraud convictions arising from advance-fee or “grandparent” scams targeting elderly victims, the Crown sought to introduce evidence from 21 additional alleged victims.

The Crown relied on s. 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, arguing the additional frauds formed part of the circumstances of the offences.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence governing when uncharged conduct may be considered at sentencing, including the requirements of temporal proximity and connection demonstrating a system or pattern of conduct.

The court held that the proposed evidence would effectively allow the Crown to split its case by presenting additional complainants who could have testified at trial.

The application was dismissed, though the court left open the possibility of limited interpretive evidence from a police investigator regarding seized notebooks.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms offences, breaches of weapons prohibitions, and assault on police.

He argued the trial judge made unreasonable findings of fact and misapprehended evidence in rejecting his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had overwhelming grounds to reject the appellant's evidence and that any misapprehension of evidence related to peripheral matters.

The sentence was also upheld as fit given the aggravating factors and the need for consecutive sentences.

In a first-degree murder trial involving alleged street gang members, the Crown sought to clarify and maintain the admissibility of certain evidence following a pre-trial ruling.

The court reconsidered the admissibility of a YouTube video after correcting a factual misapprehension about its contents, ruling it remained highly probative of gang affiliation and motive.

The court also permitted the Crown to adduce a composite audio recording for voice identification, provided no visual component was shown.

Finally, the court held that numerous handwritten documents and rap lyrics seized from the respondents' apartment were admissible without further redaction, as their probative value regarding gang membership and animus toward rival gangs significantly outweighed their prejudicial effect as bad character evidence.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, challenged the admissibility of two statements made to police and sought the exclusion of derivative evidence (cell phone records and a witness) under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the first statement involuntary due to the Crown's failure to account for a significant period of the accused's custody, but ruled the second statement voluntary.

The court also found breaches of the accused's s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter rights during his initial investigative detention.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the derivative evidence, finding the breaches were not serious, the impact on the accused's rights was minimal, and the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.

In a pre-trial voir dire in a murder prosecution, the Crown sought to prove the voluntariness of an utterance allegedly made by the accused to police during a brief encounter in an apartment building.

The defence argued the statement should be excluded on the basis that it was not proven to have been made by the accused and that it was obtained during an arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter, seeking exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court held that the statement was voluntary and that circumstantial evidence, including self-identification, physical description, and a distinctive tattoo, established on a balance of probabilities that the speaker was the accused.

Applying the framework from Grant, the court further concluded that the encounter did not constitute a detention, as it was brief, non-coercive, and part of general police patrol activity.

The accused’s application to exclude the statement was dismissed and the Crown’s application was granted.

The accused applied for an order requiring YouTube to remove approximately 75 videos associated with a street gang until the completion of a murder trial, arguing that jurors might view the material online despite judicial instructions and thereby jeopardize the fairness of the trial.

The court refused leave to bring the application due to failure to comply with the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice, including the absence of proper notice and evidentiary foundation.

The court further held that the application had no reasonable prospect of success because it relied on an incorrect statutory provision, lacked evidence of a real and substantial risk to trial fairness, failed to consider alternative measures, and sought an order affecting third‑party Charter expression rights without notice.

The judge also raised concerns about territorial jurisdiction given that YouTube operated outside Canada.

Leave was denied and the application summarily dismissed.

The Crown applied to call a police detective as an expert witness on street gangs in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the expert was biased and the proposed evidence, including rap videos, letters, and graffiti, was highly prejudicial.

The court found the expert evidence necessary and the detective qualified.

The court admitted most of the videos, letters, and graffiti, finding their probative value in establishing motive and the existence of a criminal organization outweighed their prejudicial effect, but excluded evidence of the accused's prior convictions and certain letters.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown brought a pre-trial application seeking to qualify a forensic document examiner as an expert in handwriting analysis to assist in establishing authorship of seized writings.

One accused opposed the application, arguing the proposed expert lacked sufficient qualifications and that her work had not been peer reviewed and used a different classification methodology than other forensic standards.

The court applied the test for admissibility of expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and held that the witness possessed the requisite specialized knowledge through education, training, and experience at the Centre of Forensic Sciences.

Concerns raised by the defence related to methodology and review processes went to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility.

The witness was therefore qualified to provide opinion evidence in handwriting analysis.

The accused was charged with possession of oxycodone, possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking, and failure to comply with his recognizance.

The accused pleaded guilty to the failure to comply charge but brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of the drugs seized by police.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained in violation of section 9 of the Charter and that the search of his person was unreasonable in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded the drug evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted on the first two counts.