Aaron Lorne Shachter

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for possession of cocaine after pleading guilty in the Ontario Court of Justice and receiving a $100 fine.

He argued that his plea should be set aside because he misunderstood the consequences, believing he would receive a conditional discharge rather than a conviction that created a criminal record affecting employment prospects.

The court reviewed the requirements for a valid guilty plea under s. 606 of the Criminal Code and the governing jurisprudence that a plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The record showed the trial judge conducted a plea comprehension inquiry confirming the accused understood the consequences and that sentencing remained within the court’s discretion.

The court held that dissatisfaction with collateral consequences, such as employment impacts, does not invalidate a properly entered guilty plea.

The applicant, charged with drug-related offences and possession of proceeds of crime, applied under ss. 462.34 and 462.341 of the Criminal Code for the release of $300,000 in seized funds to pay his legal expenses.

The court found that while the applicant had a possessory interest in the funds, he failed to prove he had no other means to pay his legal expenses.

Specifically, he failed to account for remaining bank balances, lines of credit, potential family assistance, and failed to apply for Legal Aid.

The application was dismissed without prejudice.

Two accused were charged with possession of cocaine, marijuana, and hashish for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at an apartment and discovered drugs and alleged trafficking paraphernalia hidden throughout the unit.

Both accused denied knowledge of the drugs and asserted that a third individual, who allegedly lived in the apartment and was known by the nickname “Stinky,” was responsible.

The court considered whether the Crown had proven knowledge and possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code through circumstantial evidence, applying the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

Given that the drugs were concealed, not in plain view, and that multiple individuals had access to the apartment, the evidence did not establish knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The testimony of the accused and supporting witness raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew of the drugs or trafficking activity.

The appellants were arrested in an undercover drug trafficking operation and experienced a delay of nearly two and a half years before trial.

They applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, which was dismissed by the application judge.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge erred in allocating periods of delay and failing to penalize the Crown for tactical decisions.

The Court of Appeal adjusted the delay calculations but found the total delay still fell within the Morin guidelines.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana found in a sock thrown from a holding cell at the Etobicoke Courthouse.

The Crown relied on security camera footage to establish identification, showing an individual in cell 2-27 throwing the sock containing the contraband.

The court found that while the video depicted the alleged offense and showed the individual throwing the sock, the quality and clarity of the footage, combined with the individual's obscured face (due to cell bars and a pulled-up hoodie), was insufficient to establish identification beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Toronto Pearson International Airport carrying 80 pellets of cocaine internally.

At trial, the accused testified that he had been kidnapped in St. Lucia and forced at gunpoint to swallow and insert the drug pellets, raising the defence of duress.

The court reviewed the elements of the common law defence of duress, including the requirement of a threat, reasonable belief in its execution, absence of a safe avenue of escape, and proportionality.

The judge rejected the accused’s testimony as inconsistent and implausible, finding multiple opportunities existed to seek help from authorities or airline personnel.

Concluding that the explanation of coercion was not credible and did not raise a reasonable doubt, the court inferred that the drugs were ingested voluntarily and intentionally imported into Canada.

The accused brought a bail review application seeking release after previously consenting to a detention order.

The proposed release plan included multiple sureties, virtual house arrest, and culturally appropriate addiction counselling through Aboriginal support services.

The court considered the application of Gladue principles at the bail stage, recognizing that decision-makers must assess the unique circumstances of Aboriginal accused persons when liberty is at stake.

Despite finding no concern on the primary ground, the court concluded the accused failed to show cause on the secondary ground due to an extensive criminal record, prior breaches of release conditions, and allegations of serious drug trafficking while already on bail and probation.

Detention was therefore confirmed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug and weapons charges, which followed the trial judge's exclusion of evidence seized from the accused's residence.

The police had obtained search warrants for the accused's restaurant and residence based primarily on information from a confidential informant.

The Court of Appeal found that while the warrant for the restaurant was validly issued, the information supporting the residence warrant was insufficient, as it lacked details about the informant's source of knowledge regarding drugs in the home.

The Court concluded that the search of the residence violated section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court upheld the exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2), noting that the police conduct in drafting the Information to Obtain was careless and misleading, rendering the breach serious.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug and weapons charges after the trial judge excluded evidence seized from his residence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police obtained search warrants for the accused's restaurant and residence based on a confidential informant's tip.

The Court of Appeal found the information to obtain (ITO) for the restaurant was sufficient, but the ITO for the residence lacked detail and failed to indicate the informant's source of knowledge.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the search of the residence violated s. 8 of the Charter and that the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2), noting the misleading and careless drafting of the ITO.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of production of marijuana and bribery.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's statements to police under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) due to the respondent's language difficulties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of evidence for the marijuana charge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the bribery charge, holding that the statements offering money to police constituted the actus reus of a new offence and did not flow causally from the Charter breaches.

A new trial was ordered for the bribery charge.

The applicant, Y, applied under section 17 of the Securities Act for disclosure of compelled and voluntary evidence obtained by the Ontario Securities Commission during an investigation.

Y sought the evidence to make full answer and defence to criminal fraud charges.

The Commission balanced Y's right to make full answer and defence against the privacy interests of the witnesses who provided the evidence.

The Commission granted disclosure for witnesses who consented or did not object, and for those who opposed but were on the Crown's witness list, subject to strict confidentiality terms.

Disclosure was denied for opposing witnesses not on the Crown's witness list.