Misha Alexander Feldmann

The appellants were convicted of breaking into a motel and robbing the occupants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding in-dock identification evidence, the use of a nickname, Vetrovec warnings for unsavoury witnesses, and a prior inconsistent statement.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury charge, noting that the instructions adequately warned of the dangers of in-dock identification and correctly applied the law on corroboration between Vetrovec witnesses.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault and breach of probation after attacking a man with a tire iron who intervened when the appellant approached his ex-wife.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment less pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by treating a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and by finding a high risk to reoffend without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge merely rejected remorse as a mitigating factor and reasonably inferred a high risk of reoffending from the appellant's escalating aggressive conduct.

Applicants charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence on the basis that police breached their rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicants were stopped by plainclothes detectives during a community policing patrol.

The court found that although the applicants were arbitrarily detained when police blocked their passage on the sidewalk and exited their vehicle, the Charter breaches were not sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The court admitted the evidence, finding that the detention was brief, the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest based on the smell of marijuana, and the reliable evidence was essential to the Crown's case.

The accused was acquitted at trial of two counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in law by taking a piecemeal approach to the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge did not fail to consider the evidence as a whole.

The Court clarified that a trial judge's assessment of evidence only constitutes an error of law allowing a Crown appeal from an acquittal in limited circumstances, such as when a reasonable doubt is tainted by a legal error.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder.

He argued that the trial judge improperly reversed the onus of proof and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly required the Crown to prove the NCR status on a balance of probabilities and that the reasons adequately explained the reliance on unchallenged expert evidence.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on two counts of sexual assault.

The trial judge had found that sexual intercourse occurred but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was without consent, basing this conclusion largely on isolated passages from a poem written by the complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the poem as a whole and in the context of the complainant's sworn testimony denying consent.

The Crown met its burden of showing the verdict would not necessarily have been the same but for the error.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.