ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
DAVID KEVIN GREAVES
Defendant
Kellie Hutchinson, for the Crown
Soban Ponnampalam, for the Defendant
HEARD: September 12, 2023
PUBLICATION RESTRICTION NOTICE
Pursuant to s. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, information that may identify any person described in these Reasons as a complainant may not be published, broadcast or transmitted in any manner.
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
CHARNEY J.:
[1] On August 15, 2022, David Kevin Greaves was found guilty by a jury of:
Count 1 - Recruiting L.F. for the purposes of exploitation, contrary to s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code;
Count 2 - Receiving financial or other material benefit knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under subs. 286.1(1) of the Criminal Code, contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code;
Count 3 - Exercising control, direction or influence over L.F. to offer or provide sexual service for consideration, contrary to s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code.
[2] On April 3, 2023, David Kevin Greaves pled guilty to and was convicted of the following charges:
Count 1 - Recruiting H.T., a person under the age of 18, for the purposes of exploitation contrary to s. 279.011 if the Criminal Code;
Count 2 - Receiving a financial or other material benefit, namely money, knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under subsection 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code, contrary to Section 286.2(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
[3] Mr. Greaves is now before me for sentencing.
Facts of the Offences
Facts Relating to Jury Verdict
[4] L.F. met Mr. Greaves in December 2018. They first communicated through text messages, but after about a month they met in person. In the text messages Mr. Greaves told the complainant that he wanted her to work for him. She understood that the work would be safe sex with clients.
[5] L.F. performed sex work for Mr. Greaves for about 12 days in January/February 2019, usually working on weekends. She worked primarily in motels in Mississauga and Brampton. Mr. Greaves took care of the business end. He posted ads on Craigslist. The rates charged were $80 for ½ hour and $100 for an hour. Mr. Greaves decided on the rates.
[6] The clients would contact Mr. Greaves by text message or phone, and he would arrange a time for the clients to meet the complainant. The complainant had no communication with the client until they came to her motel room. The complainant would meet the client in one room, and Mr. Greaves would stay in another room. He would text her to let her know when the clients were there and when the client’s time was up. Most of the time she would not know what services the client wanted until the client got to the room and they told her. She provided mainly sex and oral sex.
[7] The clients would pay the money to the complainant after the service was provided, and the complainant would give the money to Mr. Greaves. The money was split 60/40 after expenses, with 60% going to Mr. Greaves.
[8] The complainant also testified that Mr. Greaves threatened to kill himself if she did not work for him.
[9] L.F. initially agreed to work with Mr. Greaves because her financial situation was terrible, and it seemed like an easy way to get money. She was not planning on doing it more than a couple of times.
[10] Mr. Greaves supplied L.F. with alcohol and drugs. She testified that she was only able to do this kind of work because she was drunk and high.
Facts Relating to Guilty Plea
[11] The following facts were taken from the Agreed Statement of Facts which was made an exhibit to the Guilty Plea:
[12] In January 2018, 17-year-old H.T. met “Ross” on a dating site called Badoo. “Ross”, who used the on-line ID “Daking”, was in fact Kevin Greaves.
[13] H.T. told Ross her name was “Brooke”, and she was 19 years old. Her profile listed her age as 24 years old.
[14] As H.T. and Mr. Greaves spoke on-line, Mr. Greaves told H.T. that he wanted a relationship with her, and they could build a future together. As part of that future, Mr. Greaves suggested that H.T. should come work for him in the sex trade. Mr. Greaves said they would make lots of money together.
[15] H.T. agreed to meet with Mr. Greaves. On January 26, 2018, Mr. Greaves arranged for a taxi to bring H.T. to the Mississauga Gate Inn, where Mr. Greaves had rented two rooms.
[16] When H.T. arrived, Mr. Greaves asked H.T. for identification to confirm H.T. was 19 years old, as H.T. appeared younger than 18 years old. H.T. made an excuse as to why she could not provide identification. Mr. Greaves did not pursue the issue of age any further. It is agreed that Mr. Greaves was willfully blind as to the true age of H.T.
[17] Over the next four days, H.T. worked for Mr. Greaves in the sex trade.
[18] Mr. Greaves took H.T. shopping for lingerie.
[19] Mr. Greaves took pictures of H.T. in various states of undress. These photos were used to make on-line sex trade advertisements. Mr. Greaves’ phone number was used in the advertisements.
[20] When a potential client responded to the ads, Mr. Greaves communicated with the potential clients. He negotiated the services, time, and price.
[21] As time progressed, Mr. Greaves had H.T. respond to the clients instructing her on what to say.
[22] When clients attended, Mr. Greaves would wait in one of the two rooms, while H.T. provided sexual services in the other room. H.T. would turn over all the money she made.
[23] Mr. Greaves supplied H.T. with alcohol and drugs.
[24] H.T. saw approximately 5 clients per day.
[25] H.T. earned approximately $500 per day, turning almost all the money over to Mr. Greaves.
[26] H.T. believed Mr. Greaves had access to a gun. Mr. Greaves was aware there was a firearm at the hotel. H.T. was never threatened with a firearm.
[27] Mr. Greaves never threatened or hit H.T.
[28] After a few days of working for Mr. Greaves H.T. wanted to leave, however H.T. was afraid to leave.
[29] On January 30, 2018, Mr. Greaves left H.T. alone for the first time in the hotel with his phone. H.T. was supposed to see clients while Mr. Greaves was gone. H.T. saw a couple clients and then used the money she earned to leave the situation. H.T. never spoke to Mr. Greaves again. Mr. Greaves contacted H.T. by phone asking her to come back.
[30] It is agreed Kevin Greaves recruited and exercised direction over H.T.’s movements for purposes of exploiting her as defined in s. 279.04. Specifically, that by bringing her to an unfamiliar location with no monetary means to leave, and by being continuously present during the five days, he created an atmosphere which a reasonable person would be expected to provide a labour out of fear for her safety.
[31] It is agreed Kevin Greaves received a financial benefit from H.T.’s work in the sex trade.
Victim Impact Statement
[32] L.F. filed a victim impact statement. In it she discusses the significant negative impact that Mr. Greaves has had on her life. She has had messed up relationships because family members cannot believe what she had done, and they are worried about her every time she leaves the house. She is currently in therapy and on medication for her mental health needs.
[33] H.T. did not provide a victim impact statement.
Background of the Offender
[34] Mr. Greaves is 28 years old, but was 22 years old when these offences were committed.
[35] Mr. Greaves is a citizen of Guyana and a permanent resident of Canada. Though Mr. Greaves spent a portion of his childhood living in Barbados, he has no status in Barbados at this time.
[36] Mr. Greaves went to school in Barbados, and graduated from Barbados Community College with a degree in Biology and Chemistry in 2015.
[37] Since arriving in Canada in 2016, Mr. Greaves has worked as a tile setter and spray painter and has mastered multiple trades in construction. He has even started his own construction and renovation business while awaiting trial.
[38] Several members of Mr. Greaves’ family and friends have written letters in his support and to seek leniency in his sentence.
[39] These letters describe Mr. Greaves’ remorse and the important role Mr. Greaves plays in supporting his family (his parents and younger brother) and religious community. They describe how Mr. Greaves has made efforts to turn his life around since he was charged with these offences, and testify to his rehabilitative potential.
[40] Mr. Greaves also addressed the court during the sentencing submissions and apologized to his victims. His expression of remorse appeared genuine and he accepted responsibility for his actions.
Position of the Parties
[41] The Crown takes the position that the appropriate sentence for the offence relating to L.F. is 5 years, based on the following breakdown:
a. Count 1 (s. 279.01) = 5 years
b. Count 2 (s. 279.02) = 3 years (concurrent)
c. Count 3 (s. 286.3) = 3 years (concurrent)
[42] The Crown takes the position that the appropriate sentence for the offence relating to H.T. is 7 years, based on the following breakdown:
a. Count 1 (s. 279.011) = 7 years
b. Count 2 (s. 286.3) = 5 years (concurrent)
[43] The Crown’s position is that the sentences involving H.T. and L.F. should be served concurrently as the offences were part of a single commercial enterprise. As such, the Crown seeks a global sentence of 7 years less Summers credit.
[44] The Crown also seeks the following ancillary orders:
a. Section 743.21 order prohibiting communication with H.T. and L.F. while in custody;
b. SOIRA Order for 20 years;
c. DNA Order.
[45] In making these submissions, the Crown recognizes that the mandatory minimum sentence in s. 279.01(1)(b) (4 years for a victim over 18 years of age) and 279.011(1)(b) (5 years for a victim under 18 years of age) were found to be unconstitutional in other Superior Court rulings and is not seeking a ruling that this Court should not follow prior coordinate rulings in which the mandatory minimum was found unconstitutional: R. v. McEwan, 2023 ONSC 1608, at paras. 57 - 71.
[46] The Crown takes the position that convictions should be registered on all counts. Although there is a factual nexus between the counts, there is no legal nexus. Each offence addresses a different delict and targets a different public interest. As a result, the principle in R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729, 1986 CanLII 40, does not apply.
[47] The Defence takes the position that the appropriate sentence is a conditional sentence of two years less a day.
[48] This submission is based primarily on the immigration consequences to Mr. Greaves if he is not permitted to remain in Canada and is returned to Guyana, where he has not lived since he was a young child and where he has no remaining family connections.
[49] Defence submits that convictions for the charges in this case can ground a finding of inadmissibility and the issuance of a removal order against Mr. Greaves following an admissibility hearing before the Immigration Division.
[50] The removal order can then be appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD), but only if none of the convictions that led to the inadmissibility were punished by a term of imprisonment of six months or more. If Mr. Greaves is sentenced to six months of imprisonment or more for any individual offence for which he has been found guilty, he will become ineligible to appeal an inadmissibility and removal order before the IAD. Defence argues that this restriction can be circumvented by sentencing Mr. Greaves to a series of consecutive, rather than concurrent, six months less a day sentences since the ineligibility to appeal is based on the individual offence and not the total.
Principles of Sentencing
[51] The objectives of sentencing long recognized at common law have been codified in s. 718 of the Code. They are: the protection of society and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the denunciation of unlawful conduct; deterrence, both general and specific; the separation of the offender from society where necessary; rehabilitation; reparation for harm done to the victims or the community; and, promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done.
[52] Section 718.1 provides that the fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Section 718.2 provides that a sentence should be increased or decreased to account for any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It also requires that a sentence be similar to those imposed on similar offenders in similar circumstances.
[53] In this case, one of the victims was a minor. The Supreme Court has emphasized in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, that the sentences imposed for sexual offences against children in particular needed to be increased, with paramount consideration given to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. At para. 114, the Court states that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are “normal” and that upper-single digit and even double-digit sentences should not be “unusual or reserved for rare or exceptional cases”, see also R. v. B.M., 2023 ONCA 224, at para. 38.
Range of Sentence for Cases of Human Trafficking
[54] In McEwan, Di Luca J. reviewed a number of recent decisions relating to the range of sentence for the offence of human trafficking. He arrived at the following conclusion, at paras. 79 – 80, which I adopt:
In assessing the range of sentence revealed by the caselaw, it is important to recognize that ranges are not fixed and inflexible, they change over time. It would appear that despite the absence of a mandatory minimum, the range has been moving upwards in recent years.
In my view, the cases just referenced establish a range of four years to eight years, with a cluster of cases between five and six years. Cases at the lower end often involve the mitigation of a guilty plea and other significant mitigating factors. Cases at the higher end usually involve individuals with related criminal records and/or fact scenarios involving violence. Of course, there are also a few cases above and below this range. These outlier cases are marked by particularly unique factual circumstances.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
[55] In terms of aggravating factors, I note that the offences were motivated by greed. Mr. Greaves took most of the money earned by the complainants in the sex trade.
[56] There were two victims in this case. Since the Crown is not seeking consecutive sentences, the number of victims is an aggravating factor.
[57] Both complainants were introduced to the sex trade by Mr. Greaves.
[58] One of the victims was 17 years of age, which is an aggravating factor expressly referenced in s. 718.2 (ii.1).
[59] The offences were part of an organized scheme.
[60] Mr. Greaves exploited the victims’ substance addictions to control them.
[61] In terms of mitigating factors, Mr. Greaves was only 22 years of age when these offences were committed. He has no prior record. Mr. Greaves has a supportive family.
[62] Mr. Greaves has acknowledged his responsibility for these offences and has demonstrated real remorse for his actions. Given his age, his lack of prior record, his work record and his family and community support, he appears to be a good candidate for rehabilitation.
[63] Mr. Greaves pled guilty in relation to the second complainant (H.T.). While the guilty plea is a mitigating factor, the guilty plea was entered only after Mr. Greaves was convicted by a jury of the offences in relation to L.F.
[64] The Defence argues that I may consider as a mitigating factor Mr. Greaves’ evidence that he acted under duress when he committed these offences.
[65] At the jury trial, Mr. Greaves acknowledged committing the offences for which he was found guilty but testified that he acted under duress. He testified that a person named “Stunna” pointed a gun at him, kicked and punched him, and threatened to kill his family if he did not work for him in the escorting business. Mr. Greaves testified that he became involved in the sex trade business only because he believed that Stunna would act on his threat to kill his family, both in Mississauga and Barbados, if he refused to do what Stunna demanded.
[66] The jury clearly rejected Mr. Greaves’ evidence in this regard and rejected his defence of duress.
[67] Given this conclusion by the jury, duress will not be considered as a mitigating factor in this case.
[68] I also note the absence of aggravating factors that influenced some of the higher sentences given in some of the cases relied on by the Crown. In this case there was no physical violence or threats against the complainants and the exploitation of each complainant was for a relatively short duration.
Immigration consequences to Mr. Greaves
[69] As indicated above, convictions for the charges in this case can ground a finding of inadmissibility and the issuance of a removal order against Mr. Greaves. If he is not permitted to remain in Canada, Mr. Greaves will be returned to Guyana, where he has not lived since he was a young child and where he has no remaining family connections.
[70] With regard to immigration consequences, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that although “not, strictly speaking, aggravating or mitigating factors” a court can consider collateral consequences such as a defendant’s immigration status as a personal circumstance in imposing a fit sentence: R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, at para. 11. The Court stated, at paras. 14 – 16:
The general rule continues to be that a sentence must be fit having regard to the particular crime and the particular offender. In other words, a sentencing judge may exercise his or her discretion to take collateral immigration consequences into account, provided that the sentence that is ultimately imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
The flexibility of our sentencing process should not be misused by imposing inappropriate and artificial sentences in order to avoid collateral consequences which may flow from a statutory scheme or from other legislation, thus circumventing Parliament’s will.
These consequences must not be allowed to dominate the exercise or skew the process either in favour of or against deportation. Moreover, it must not lead to a separate sentencing scheme with a de facto if not a de jure special range of sentencing options where deportation is a risk.
[71] See also R. v. B.M., 2023 ONCA 224, at para. 33:
Disproportionate sentences cannot be imposed to avoid collateral immigration consequences which flow from other legislation …While these considerations may be taken into account, they cannot be applied in such a way as to result in the imposition of a sentence that is otherwise wholly inappropriate in the circumstances: Pham, at para. 15.
[72] In my view, the sentence proposed by the Defence (whether two years less a day, or a series of consecutive sentences of six months less a day) would be disproportionate and inappropriate, given the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Friesen and the range of sentences identified in the other cases reviewed above. These sentences would be designed to circumvent the collateral immigration consequences, contrary to the decisions in Pham and B.M.
Availability of Conditional Sentence
[73] A conditional sentence is only available for a sentence of less than two years (s. 742.1). Given the sentencing range identified by the Court in McEwan, I do not see how a sentence of less than two years could be appropriate in a case involving two complainants, one of whom was under 18 years of age.
[74] As to the potential availability of a conditional sentence, had a sentence of less than two years been appropriate, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. M.M., 2022 ONCA 441 indicates that even if the appropriate sentence were less than two years, a conditional sentence on the facts of this case would not be appropriate.
[75] In M.M., the appellant was convicted of possessing and making child pornography and sentenced to a 15-month conditional sentence. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred and that a conditional sentence should not have been imposed.
[76] Relying of the Supreme Court’s decision in Friesen, the Court of Appeal held, at paras. 15 – 16:
The Supreme Court’s instructions from Friesen could not be clearer: sentences for sexual offences against children must increase. There are no qualifications here. Sentences have been too low for too long. Denunciation and deterrence are of primary importance: R. v. Inksetter, 2018 ONCA 474, 141 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 3. Those who commit sexual offences against children must understand that carceral sentences will ordinarily follow.
Conditional sentences for sexual offences against children will only rarely be appropriate. Their availability must be limited to exceptional circumstances that render incarceration inappropriate – for example, where it gives rise to a medical hardship that could not adequately be addressed within the correctional facility. It would not be appropriate to enumerate exceptional circumstances here and we make no attempt to do so. Suffice it to say that no exceptional circumstances are present in this case. A sentence of imprisonment should have been imposed.
[77] Defence argues that this case is one of the “exceptional circumstances” in which a conditional sentence is appropriate. Mr. Greaves has “turned his life around” and is providing for his parents as they age.
[78] While these factors are commendable and relevant mitigating factors to consider in the context of sentencing, they do not, in my view, meet the “exceptional circumstances” contemplated by the Court of Appeal.
Kienapple
[79] I accept the Crown’s position that the Kienapple principle does not apply to s. 279.01 and s. 286. 3 and that a conviction ought to be registered for both counts.
[80] The Kienapple principle bars multiple convictions for two or more offences arising out of the same criminal act or transaction in circumstances where the essential elements of the offences are meant to cover the same wrong.
[81] However, the fact the two charges share common elements is not a basis to stay one of them. The Court must also consider whether there is an element of one offence which is distinct or additional from the other. Where there are distinct or additional elements, a judicial stay should not be imposed: R. v. Prince, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 480, at p. 498 – 499, 1986 CanLII 40.
[82] While there is some overlap between “procuring” and “human trafficking”, the two counts do have different elements and different statutory purposes. Procuring or recruiting is the precursor to human trafficking.
[83] Based on the evidence, Mr. Greaves introduced the victims to the sex trade. This supports the finding of guilt for the charge of “procuring” pursuant to s. 286.3. The offence of “human trafficking” commences at a later stage when the victims were actually engaged in the sex trade.
[84] Given the differences in the elements of the offence and the different purpose of each section, the Kienapple principle does not apply.
Time Spent in Pre-Trial Custody and on Restrictive Bail Conditions
[85] Mr. Greaves spent 29 days in custody prior to being granted bail. In accordance with R. v. Summers, he is to receive credit of 1.5 to 1 for this time period which works out to 44 days.
[86] Mr. Greaves also seeks a further 5 years credit in mitigation due to the time spent on restrictive bail conditions (house arrest) (Downes credit), which is basically a 1 to 1 credit. In the alternative, Mr. Greaves seeks credit of at least .5 to 1, which would equal 962 days, or approximately 32 months.
[87] The Crown takes the position that there is insufficient evidence to support any Downes credit in this case.
[88] In R. v. Downes, 2006 CanLII 3957 (ON CA), the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that time spent under stringent bail conditions must be taken into account as a relevant mitigating circumstance on sentence. While the amount of credit to be given for time spent on bail is within the discretion of the sentencing judge, a number of factors must be considered in the assessment. The Court did not adopt a rigid formula because there can be a wide variation in bail conditions.
[89] When an offender seeks credit for stringent bail conditions, the focus of the inquiry is on the impact of the conditions on the offender and whether they were punitive enough to be akin to punishment: R. v. Joseph, 2020 ONCA 733, at paras. 107 – 108; R. v. Schlaepfer, 2022 ONCA 566, at paras. 13, 20 – 21. The amount of credit to give is within the sentencing judge’s discretion.
[90] There is no mathematical way to calculate Downes “credit”, which is properly understood as a mitigating factor on sentence because stringent bail conditions are punitive and thus akin to custody. In assessing the appropriate weight of the mitigation to be given, factors to be considered include the amount of time spent on the bail conditions, the stringency of the conditions, their impact on the offender’s liberty and the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships, employment and activity: Joseph, at para. 108; R. v. Place, 2020 ONCA 546, at para. 2.
[91] A credit for any such time is not automatic and the cases recognize the reality that bail is not jail: R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, at paras. 36 and 37. That said, in cases where a person suffers a significant restriction of liberty due to onerous bail conditions, some credit is appropriate. Again, the courts have been clear that there is no rigid or mathematical formula fixed for making this determination.
[92] In considering whether a Downes credit is appropriate, I must consider the specific impact that the restrictive bail conditions had on Mr. Greaves.
[93] In this regard, Mr. Greaves’ bail conditions changed over time. The Crown has provided a helpful chronology that sets out Mr. Greaves’ various bail conditions at various times since his first arrest on February 24, 2018 (attached to these Reasons as Appendix “A”). On June 8, 2018, Mr. Greaves was under house arrest “daily between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.” unless in the presence of his surety or his mother or for employment purposes. On October 23, 2018 the conditions were made more restrictive but there was still an employment exemption “for regularly scheduled hours.” On September 30, 2020, the employment exemption was removed as the result of an alleged breach of his curfew. He was still permitted to leave his residence with his father, and his father indicated that he was able to accompany Mr. Greaves on some construction/renovation jobs.
[94] I do not have any affidavit evidence from Mr. Greaves regarding the impact of the bail conditions. His parents make some reference to this in their letters of support filed in these sentencing submissions, although those letters are not in the form of an affidavit.
[95] While the bail conditions in one form or another continued for a long period of time, I am not satisfied on the basis of the little evidence I have that they unduly interfered with his employment opportunities or relationship with his family members. Indeed, the letters of support from friends and relatives emphasize Mr. Greaves’ continued community and family involvement throughout this period.
[96] Still, the employment exemption was removed on September 30, 2020, and I accept the submission that this did interfere with Mr. Greaves’ ability to take on construction and renovation jobs because he had to be accompanied by his father, who was not always available.
[97] Given all these factors, I am satisfied that 3.5 months Downes credit is appropriate.
The Appropriate Sentence
[98] When I consider all the applicable principles, I come to the conclusion that a global sentence of 4 years incarceration is warranted in the circumstances of this case. In my view, this is the sentence that adequately reflects Mr. Greaves’ degree of moral responsibility while also considering his age at the time of the offences, his guilty plea, and his prospects for rehabilitation. I recognize that this sentence is less than the now invalidated statutory minimum for victims under 18 years of age.
[99] I would impose this sentence as follows:
[100] The Counts relating to L.F.
a. Count 1 (s. 279.01) = 4 years
b. Count 2 (s. 279.02) = 3 years (concurrent)
c. Count 3 (s. 286.3) = 3 years (concurrent)
[101] The Counts relating to H.T.
a. Count 1 (s. 279.011) = 4 years
b. Count 2 (s. 286.3) = 4 years (concurrent)
[102] The sentences for the counts relating to L.F. and the counts relating to H.T. are to be served concurrently.
[103] From the 4 year sentence, I deduct 44 days for pre-trial custody and a further 3.5 months as mitigation for time spent on restrictive bail conditions, for a total sentence of 43 months.
[104] I also impose the following ancillary orders:
a. A non-communication order under s. 743.21 of the Code prohibiting any communication with the complainants while in custody;
b. A DNA order as a primary designated offence; and
c. Mr. Greaves is required to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registry Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10, for 20 years as required by s. 490.013(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, which remains in force in accordance with the suspended declaration granted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38, at paras. 138-142.
Justice R.E. Charney
Released: October 10, 2023
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
DAVID KEVIN GREAVES
Defendant
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Justice R.E. Charney
Released: October 10, 2023
Appendix “A”
Chronology of Arrests / Releases
Date
Event
PTC
Release Terms
February 24,
2018
Greaves was arrested for a single charge of Advertising Under 18.
1 days PTC
February 24,
2018
Greaves was released on a recognizance.
There was a 72-hour temporary house arrest term.
After 72 hours, no curfew.
June 7, 2018
Greaves was arrested a second time for additional charges in relation to H.T.
2 days PTC
June 8, 2018
Greaves was released on bail
17 days PTC
House arrest except for employment.
Oct 2, 2018
(Peel charges)
Greaves was arrested in Peel on firearms charges.
October 18, 2018
(Peel charges)
Greaves was released on house arrest.
House arrest (Peel)
These charges were withdrawn Sept 8, 2020.
October 19, 2018
Greaves was arrested for the charges relating to L.F.
5 days PTC
October 23, 2018
Greaves was released.
House arrest except for employment.
September 5,
2019
Bail Variation on consent to allow Greaves to travel to court without his during.
September 28,
2020
(College Park)
Greaves was arrested for allegedly breaching his curfew.
3 days PTC
September 30,
2020
(College Park)
Greave was released on recognizance for charge from Peel, York and College Park.
House Arrest no employment exception.
The accused plead guilty on July 7, 2021.
Received C/D + 12 mths probation
September 23,
2021
(Halton)
Greaves was arrested for allegedly breaching his curfew.
1 day PTC
Sept. 24, 2021
(Halton)
Greaves was released on combined York / Peel charges.
House Arrest.
The charge was withdrawn as not in public interest on Sept. 20, 2022.