Kellie Hutchinson

The applicants, John Jansen and Britaney Hall, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 39 months and 13 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court deducted defence-attributable delays, including Jansen's explicit waiver of 2.5 months and Hall's 6-month delay due to a certiorari application and changes in preliminary hearing instructions.

After accounting for discrete unexpected events, the net delay for Jansen was approximately 35 months and for Hall approximately 27.5 months.

The court found the case to be moderately complex and applied the Jordan transitional exception, concluding that the Crown's reliance on the previous R. v. Morin framework was reasonable.

Both applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The defendant, Abdallah Mohamed, sought to quash his committal for trial on two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing insufficient evidence of knowledge and control.

The Superior Court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, applying the limited weighing of circumstantial evidence test from *Charenski*.

The court found that the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the legal principles and that the combination of the defendant's presence, the unzipped satchel's location, and witness testimony suggesting drug dealing was sufficient to support an inference of knowledge and control.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to four counts of impaired driving causing death and two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm after running a stop sign at excessive speed with a blood alcohol concentration nearly three times the legal limit.

The collision killed three young children and their grandfather, and injured two other family members.

The court weighed the offender's early guilty plea, lack of criminal record, and good character against the extreme gravity of the offence and high moral blameworthiness.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, the court imposed a total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment and a 12-year driving prohibition.

During a trial for sexual offences against a minor, the defence cross-examined a Crown witness about a previously withdrawn criminal charge for obstructing a court proceeding.

The Crown objected to this line of questioning.

The court ruled that cross-examination on the fact of a withdrawn charge is generally impermissible as it has no bearing on credibility, though the underlying facts may be explored.

The court directed a mid-trial instruction to the jury to disregard the fact of the charge, but permitted the defence to further cross-examine the witness on the underlying facts.

During a trial for sexual offences against a minor, the Crown objected to the defence's anticipated cross-examination of the complainant's father, arguing the defence failed to put its theories of fabrication to the complainant during his cross-examination, violating the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The defence conceded the violation but argued the complainant should be recalled to testify.

The court held that recalling the vulnerable 14-year-old complainant would subject him to an unreasonable burden and risk giving the evidence disproportionate attention.

Instead, the court ordered that a special instruction be given to the jury regarding the defence's failure to cross-examine the complainant on these issues.

The accused, a foster parent, was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code in relation to an alleged incident involving a complainant with severe cerebral palsy who had lived in his care from age three and a half to nineteen.

The complainant testified that the accused touched her inappropriately while assisting with her personal care.

However, during cross-examination and re-examination, the complainant significantly recanted and expressed doubt about her own recollection, suggesting the contact may have been incidental to her cleaning or care routine.

The court found the complainant was a credible witness despite contradictions in her evidence, but concluded that a reasonable doubt remained regarding the allegations.

The charge was dismissed.