Carlos F. Rippell

The appellant appealed her convictions for two counts of robbery with a firearm.

The appeal concerned the validity of "tower dump" production orders for cell phone records obtained from two cell phone towers near the site of a robbery.

The appellant challenged the production orders under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that an Information to Obtain contained material inaccuracies regarding witness statements about cell phone use by one of the perpetrators.

The motion judge denied the appellant's request for leave to cross-examine the affiant and dismissed the Charter application, finding that even after excising the inaccuracies, sufficient grounds remained to support the production orders.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the test for leave to cross-examine and no misapprehension of the evidence regarding the inference of cell phone use during the robbery.

The accused, charged with importing heroin, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 7 rights while in pre-trial custody.

The court found that the correctional facility failed to provide adequate medical care for a severe foot fracture, resulting in permanent injury, and unlawfully placed the accused in administrative segregation for 79 days without proper justification or review.

Concluding that the state's conduct was egregious and offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency, the court held that this was one of the clearest of cases where a stay of proceedings was warranted to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The accused, a transport truck driver, was charged with four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after colliding with multiple vehicles in a construction zone on Highway 401.

The Crown proved the actus reus, showing the accused failed to slow down despite clear signage and stopped traffic.

The defence argued the accused experienced a 'micro-sleep' due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and chronic renal disease, negating the mens rea.

The court rejected the expert evidence of a micro-sleep, finding the accused's prolonged inattention and failure to brake constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop on October 10, 2016.

The Crown presented evidence of dangerous driving patterns, physical signs of intoxication, and breath test results.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts, rejecting Charter arguments and finding that the officer had reasonable grounds for arrest and that any delay in providing rights to counsel was justified by safety concerns.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the accused on charges related to human trafficking.

The accused had booked hotel rooms used by co-accused to exploit a 16-year-old complainant.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors by failing to consider the totality of the circumstantial evidence and failing to draw reasonable inferences favourable to the Crown regarding the accused's knowledge of the exploitation.

The application was granted, the discharge was set aside, and mandamus was issued directing committal for trial.

The accused, charged with firearms offences related to importing a prohibited device via the 'dark web', brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 37 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

However, the court deducted 7.5 months of delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability following a conditional adjournment granted due to late-breaking electronic evidence.

The court found the net delay fell below the ceiling and, alternatively, that the case's technological complexity and transitional considerations justified the delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, restricted firearm following a search of his apartment pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge found that the Information to Obtain the warrant was facially insufficient and that section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

However, the trial judge refused to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding disclosure, cross-examination of the affiant, and the exclusion of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions and upholding the admission of the firearm evidence.

Crown's appeal of the acquittal of the respondent on charges of conspiracy to import a narcotic and importing a controlled substance (cocaine).

The respondent was jointly tried with a co-accused who was convicted of the conspiracy count.

The Crown raised two issues on appeal: whether the trial judge wrongly excluded evidence tying the respondent to the conspiracy, and whether the trial judge erred by imposing a reasonable doubt standard at step two of the Carter test for conspiracy membership.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of cannabis resin following a joint trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He appealed on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias based on remarks made by the trial judge in an unrelated sentencing proceeding; the trial judge's erroneous admission of a videotaped police interview as voluntary; and the trial judge's failure to conduct an inquiry into a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter when uncontradicted evidence revealed such a breach.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the bias claim and voluntariness determination were not independently fatal, the trial judge's failure to assist a self-represented accused by raising and inquiring into the Charter breach rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was arrested on a charge of importing cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and was detained in custody.

Following conviction by jury, the appellant filed an application for judicial interim release under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, alleging a change in circumstances.

The trial judge dismissed the application on the tertiary ground.

The appellant then brought an application in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking declarations regarding the court's jurisdiction to review bail and challenging the absence of a review mechanism as violating her Charter rights.

The Superior Court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that Parliament deliberately chose not to provide a review mechanism for trial judge orders under section 523(2)(a), and that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy in these circumstances.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of subsections 278.3(5) and 278.4(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant argued that requiring notice to a witness of an application for third party records (specifically, police occurrence reports regarding the complainant's boyfriend) would undermine cross-examination and violate sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court of Canada had already upheld the constitutionality of the Mills regime, which includes the impugned notice provisions, and that this regime applies to extrinsic police occurrence reports.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder by a jury, based primarily on the recognition evidence of the victim.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence and the victim's lack of credibility.

They also argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning, providing an insufficient jury charge on eyewitness identification, and admitting cellular telephone records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the verdicts reasonable, the jury instructions adequate, and the cellphone records properly admitted as voluntary statements.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after CBSA officers found the drug in food cans in his luggage.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit the accused's statements to CBSA and RCMP officers as voluntary, while the accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude the statements and drugs due to alleged arbitrary detention, an unreasonable strip search, and sleep deprivation.

The court found the statements voluntary, noting that while keeping the accused awake was minor misconduct, it did not induce the statements.

The court also dismissed the Charter application, finding no detention during routine customs questioning and no unreasonableness in the brief strip search.

A mid-trial ruling also admitted a Certificate of Analyst.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearm offences following a high-risk takedown where police seized two loaded handguns.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by dismissing his Corbett application to exclude his prior firearms conviction, dismissing his stay application regarding a lost surveillance video, and improperly instructing the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion on the Corbett application given the defence's attack on police character, and correctly concluded the lost video did not amount to unacceptable negligence or a Charter breach.

The applicants, charged with bookmaking and criminal organization offences, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutional validity of the gaming and criminal organization provisions of the Criminal Code and related regulations.

They argued that the gaming provisions were ultra vires Parliament's criminal law power, that the regulation deeming gaming offences as 'serious offences' violated section 7 of the Charter due to overbreadth and gross disproportionality, and that the bookmaking prohibition violated freedom of expression and association under section 2 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provisions were a valid exercise of the criminal law power, did not violate the Charter, and in any event, would be saved under section 1.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for firearm offences.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in rejecting his testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge made one factual error, it was not material to the conviction.

On the sentence appeal, the Court agreed that the sentence for unauthorized possession should be concurrent, not consecutive, to the sentence for possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The Court upheld the trial judge's calculation of presentence custody credit, noting the appellant's poor conduct in custody negated the quantitative rationale for enhanced credit.

The total sentence was reduced from six to five years.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained during execution of a search warrant at a residence, arguing that police conducted an unlawful “no‑knock” dynamic entry contrary to common law principles and s. 8 of the Charter.

The issuing justice of the peace had declined to authorize a no‑knock entry, leaving the issue to be justified by exigent circumstances at common law.

The court found that police had reasonable grounds to believe a firearm was present, that the occupants had violent histories, and that safety risks and escape concerns justified a surprise entry.

The court held that the dynamic entry was reasonable and did not violate s. 8.

In the alternative, the evidence would have been admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

During a criminal trial involving allegations of conspiracy to traffic cocaine and firearms, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of other discreditable conduct.

The court considered whether count‑to‑count reasoning and comparator wiretap intercepts relating to unrelated drug transactions were admissible.

Applying the principles governing propensity and bad character evidence, the court held that certain evidence relating to drug trafficking could be used as contextual circumstantial evidence for possession of proceeds of crime and firearms, but not to infer guilt on unrelated firearm trafficking counts.

The court further ruled that comparator wiretap intercepts involving alleged drug dealings with third parties were inadmissible because their probative value was low and their prejudicial effect extremely high.

In a criminal trial involving charges of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and firearms and related firearm and proceeds offences, the accused brought a motion seeking to excise portions of intercepted wiretap communications before they were presented to the jury.

The court assessed the admissibility of various excerpts under the common law balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

While many portions were found highly probative of the alleged conspiracies—particularly discussions identifying a firearm, the motive for acquiring it, and relationships between alleged co‑conspirators—other segments containing inflammatory threats, gang‑related references, reckless conduct, or irrelevant personal remarks were ordered removed.

The court emphasized the importance of limiting prejudice while preserving context necessary for the Crown’s theory of conspiracy and firearms trafficking.

Numerous specified line ranges across several intercepts were ordered excised, while the remainder of the recordings were admitted.

On a severance motion in a multi-accused criminal prosecution involving conspiracy to traffic cocaine and firearms and possession offences, one accused sought to introduce a co‑accused’s police statement admitting ownership of seized cash or alternatively sought severance to compel the co‑accused’s testimony.

The statement had previously been excluded under s. 24(2) following a breach of the co‑accused’s s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The court held the statement was hearsay and its prejudicial effect—particularly the risk that a jury would improperly use it against the co‑accused—outweighed its probative value.

Applying the principles governing severance under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the framework in R. v. Savoury and R. v. Last, the court found there was a reasonable possibility the co‑accused would testify if trials were separated and that her evidence could materially assist the moving accused’s defence.

Balancing prejudice to the accused with efficiency concerns, the court ordered separate trials.