Carlos F. Rippell

During a criminal trial involving allegations of conspiracy to traffic cocaine and firearms, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of other discreditable conduct.

The court considered whether count‑to‑count reasoning and comparator wiretap intercepts relating to unrelated drug transactions were admissible.

Applying the principles governing propensity and bad character evidence, the court held that certain evidence relating to drug trafficking could be used as contextual circumstantial evidence for possession of proceeds of crime and firearms, but not to infer guilt on unrelated firearm trafficking counts.

The court further ruled that comparator wiretap intercepts involving alleged drug dealings with third parties were inadmissible because their probative value was low and their prejudicial effect extremely high.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained during execution of a search warrant at a residence, arguing that police conducted an unlawful “no‑knock” dynamic entry contrary to common law principles and s. 8 of the Charter.

The issuing justice of the peace had declined to authorize a no‑knock entry, leaving the issue to be justified by exigent circumstances at common law.

The court found that police had reasonable grounds to believe a firearm was present, that the occupants had violent histories, and that safety risks and escape concerns justified a surprise entry.

The court held that the dynamic entry was reasonable and did not violate s. 8.

In the alternative, the evidence would have been admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference based on the testimony of his sister, who was 19 at trial but testified about abuse that occurred when she was between 7 and 17.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made two principal legal errors: assessing the adult complainant's evidence as if she were a child witness, and characterizing an admitted exaggeration under oath at the preliminary inquiry as a 'badge of credibility'.

A new trial was directed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for robbery with a firearm and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically DNA found on bandanas and a police baton seized from the appellant's apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury's verdicts were not unreasonable.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed to make a two-year sentence for weapon possession concurrent rather than consecutive, reducing the net sentence to five years and four months.

The Crown appealed from a stay entered after a trial judge held that issue estoppel barred relitigation of possession of cocaine, based on a prior dismissal of a conditional sentence order revocation allegation.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the revocation judge had effectively decided the possession issue in the accused's favour, the revocation ruling was not a final decision capable of grounding issue estoppel in a subsequent criminal trial.

Revocation proceedings are sentencing proceedings, not trials determining guilt for a new offence, and extending issue estoppel to them would be inconsistent with the narrow criminal-law scope of the doctrine and its underlying policy objectives.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered on the possession for the purpose of trafficking count.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of proceeds of crime, and offering to transfer a firearm, which arose from an undercover police operation.

He argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the charges for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, failing to exclude evidence due to s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter breaches, misapprehending identification evidence, and rejecting his entrapment application.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the periods of delay and found that while the delay was significant, it did not violate s. 11(b) when balanced against societal interests and the lack of actual prejudice.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's findings that the search was consensual or minimally intrusive, the identification evidence was reliable, and the undercover officer's actions constituted legitimate investigation rather than entrapment.

The appeal was dismissed.

Four members of the Five Point Generals street gang were convicted of various offences including trafficking in cocaine and marihuana for the benefit of a criminal organization, conspiracy to traffic, and firearms offences.

The court considered the application of the Kienapple rule and found it did not preclude multiple convictions for the conspiracy and substantive trafficking offences.

The court sentenced the offenders to total terms ranging from 5.5 to 9 years imprisonment, after accounting for pre-sentence custody and the principle of totality.

The appellant appealed his sentence of seven years' imprisonment for possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm and other firearms offences.

He challenged the constitutionality of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 95(2)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code for a second or subsequent offence.

The Court of Appeal held that the mandatory minimum sentence violated s. 12 of the Charter as it would be grossly disproportionate in reasonable hypothetical scenarios, and could not be saved under s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force and effect.

However, the appellant's seven-year sentence was upheld as fit given his extensive criminal record and the gravity of his offences.

During a jury trial involving alleged drug trafficking and criminal organization offences, the defence sought to call two expert witnesses to challenge the Crown’s interpretation of coded language in intercepted communications.

One proposed expert, a journalist, intended to testify about hip hop culture and marijuana terminology, while the other, a former police officer, had previously testified as an expert on drug-related street language but had not maintained his expertise.

Applying the admissibility framework from R. v. Mohan as refined by R. v. Abbey, the court found the proposed evidence either irrelevant, unnecessary, or offered by witnesses who were not properly qualified experts.

The court further held that admitting the evidence would provide minimal probative value while risking significant delay and prejudice to the trial process.

Both proposed experts were therefore excluded.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and possession of a weapon (shotgun) for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The offences arose from a planned drug robbery in which the accused arranged the sale of marijuana and lured the victim to the rear of an apartment building where masked associates robbed him.

One of the associates shot the victim, causing a serious gunshot wound to the right forearm.

The accused was not the shooter but admitted to being wilfully blind to the possibility that his associates would use a firearm.

The court imposed a 9-month custodial sentence on the aggravated assault charge (with a 3-month credit for time on house arrest), followed by a 12-month conditional sentence on the weapons charge, and a 12-month probationary term.

The court also imposed a DNA collection order and a 10-year firearms prohibition.

Pre‑trial Charter motions considered the admissibility of evidence arising from a police detention and search conducted in connection with a firearm investigation and search warrant.

The court found the Information to Obtain contained inaccurate, misleading, and incomplete information, and that police exceeded the lawful scope of investigative detention by questioning the accused and conducting searches for evidentiary purposes.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter and the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held that the seriousness of the Charter breaches and their impact on the accused’s liberty and privacy interests favoured exclusion of evidence obtained from the accused in the parking lot.

However, the accused failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment searched under the warrant.

As a result, the firearm and ammunition recovered from the apartment were admissible, while the key, drugs, cash, and related utterances obtained from the detention were excluded.

The applicants sought an order for costs against the Crown following a stay of criminal charges for breach of their Charter s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

They argued that costs were justified due to late and illegible disclosure, alleged misconduct by the investigating officer, and alleged failures by the Crown in addressing inaccurate evidence given by a police witness.

The court reviewed the governing principles that costs may be awarded in criminal proceedings only for Crown misconduct or in other exceptional circumstances where fairness requires relief.

The court found that disclosure problems were attributable to the investigating officer and police administration rather than the Crown, and that the Crown neither participated in nor knowingly tolerated misconduct.

The court further held that the circumstances were not exceptional enough to justify a Charter remedy of costs.

The applicant applied for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault, arguing there was no admissible evidence identifying him as the shooter.

The victim had identified the applicant in a photo line-up but testified at the preliminary inquiry that the applicant was not the shooter, though he acknowledged his memory was better at the time of the line-up.

The reviewing court held that a trier of fact could disbelieve the victim's in-court denial and conclude he had adopted his prior statement, meaning there was 'some evidence' of identification.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in finding his evidence not credible.

The trial judge's primary reason for rejecting the appellant's credibility was a finding that the appellant deliberately failed to disclose his complete criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found this was not a fair basis for rejecting the evidence, as the incomplete record was due to an inadvertent error by both Crown and defence counsel, and the appellant readily admitted the missing convictions during cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The insurer brought a motion to stay the arbitration proceedings because the applicant failed to attend scheduled insurer's medical examinations with a physiatrist and a psychiatrist under section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that the requested examinations were reasonable and necessary to assess the applicant's ongoing claim for income replacement benefits past the 104-week mark, especially given a newly disclosed potential psychological component.

The applicant failed to provide a reasonable excuse for non-attendance.

The arbitrator ordered that the arbitration be stayed unless the applicant makes herself reasonably available for the examinations.

The applicant, a 66-year-old pedestrian, was struck by a motor vehicle and suffered a fractured leg.

She applied for statutory accident benefits, including non-earner, attendant care, and housekeeping benefits.

The insurer denied the non-earner benefits and disputed the quantum of the other benefits.

The arbitrator found that the applicant suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life and awarded non-earner benefits.

The arbitrator also awarded increased attendant care and housekeeping benefits, finding the applicant was substantially unable to perform her pre-accident activities.

Furthermore, the arbitrator ordered the insurer to pay a $6,000 special award because it unreasonably delayed the payment of attendant care and housekeeping benefits and unreasonably denied non-earner benefits.