Daniel A. Stein

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing his full criminal record before the jury and by finding the arresting officer did not use excessive force.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's detailed reasons or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was abandoned and also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide the issue because a new trial was ordered in a companion appeal.

The court noted the appellant could seek a new Rowbotham order at his new trial.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 after his trial counsel was removed from the record by an application judge due to unpaid legal fees.

The appellant was forced to represent himself for the remainder of the trial.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in removing counsel absent a fundamental disagreement, serious breakdown in communications, or ethical dilemma.

The removal violated the appellant's right to counsel, and actual prejudice was not required to order a new trial, though prejudice likely existed.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm found in the trunk of his car during a traffic stop.

The motion judge had ruled the search lawful, finding the appellant consented.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, as the police officer's threat to bring in a canine unit—which he had no lawful authority to do—vitiated the appellant's consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

At trial, the central issue was whether the complainant consented.

The trial judge instructed the jury that even if the complainant consented, the appellant could be found guilty if she lacked the capacity to consent due to intoxication.

However, the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal held that once the trial judge introduced the issue of capacity, fairness required instructing the jury on mistaken belief in consent, especially given the substantial alcohol consumption by both parties.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of 72 months' imprisonment for an offence involving the provision of ecstasy and a lack of consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of mens rea and mistaken belief in consent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the trial judge used inappropriate language regarding deportation, the 72-month sentence was appropriate given the serious nature of the offence and the appellant's prior record for a similar offence.

The appellant appealed his sentence for sexual offences against a ten-year-old child, arguing that the pre-sentence report contained improper, emotive language that tainted the sentencing process.

The Court of Appeal agreed the probation officer exceeded proper bounds but found no indication this affected the trial judge's careful and measured assessment.

Given the appellant's prior record for a similar offence and his continued denial, the sentence was deemed fit and necessary for the protection of society.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for sexual assault.

The complainant had attended a hotel party where she became highly intoxicated and lost memory of the events.

DNA evidence later linked the appellants to the assault.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, misapprehended evidence of intoxication, and misapplied the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and conclusions on capacity to consent were supported by the evidence.

On the sentence appeals, one appellant's two-year sentence was reduced by one day on consent for immigration purposes, while the other appellant's two-year sentence was upheld despite his lack of a prior record, given the gravity of the offence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing it was inconsistent with the parity principle compared to his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge had a basis to conclude the appellant's culpability was greater, as his identification was found in a bag containing weapons, drugs, and cash.

The appellant, who had a substantial criminal record including a previous ten-year sentence for bank robberies, appealed his effective sentence of thirteen years imprisonment for seven bank robberies and one attempted bank robbery.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit, noting the gravity of the offences and the expert evidence indicating a risk of re-offending.

The court held that the sentence did not offend the principles of proportionality and totality, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of marijuana production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity after police executed a search warrant at her residence.

The police breached the front door without knocking and announcing their presence, which the trial judge found violated s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the police acted in good faith and exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the evidence, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis.

The 15-month sentence was also upheld as fit for a large-scale grow operation.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a youth charged with possession of a loaded restricted firearm on school property.

The trial judge had excluded the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the youth was arbitrarily detained when police asked for his identification and questioned him about a knapsack.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in inferring psychological detention simply because a police officer requested identification.

The youth's confident conduct in approaching the officers was inconsistent with psychological compulsion.

As there was no detention, the subsequent search of the abandoned bag did not violate the Charter.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence following convictions for four counts of break and enter and sexual assault against elderly women.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his risk to re-offend, rejecting pharmacological treatment and community supervision, and failing to consider his age.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reliance on expert evidence that the appellant posed a substantial risk to re-offend and that his risk could not be reasonably managed in the community.

The appellants appealed their convictions related to a marijuana grow operation, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The trial judge found that both appellants knew the house contained a grow operation, secured the door upon leaving, and were present to care for the plants.

The appellants argued their presence might have been for general house maintenance, raising a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the maintenance theory and concluding the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his sentence for serious offences, including two violent robberies and attending a probation office with a loaded handgun.

He argued the trial judge erred in weighing his remorse and guilty pleas.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, holding that the sentence was within the appropriate range for the offences.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for counselling and mischief.

The Crown conceded that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the counselling charge without a proper election, rendering that conviction a nullity.

The Court of Appeal quashed the counselling conviction, leaving the Crown to decide whether to proceed de novo.

The appeal regarding the mischief conviction was dismissed for lack of merit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm and possession of marijuana.

He argued for the first time on appeal that his right to an interpreter under s 14 of the Charter was violated because he was not provided with a Patois interpreter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground, finding the trial record demonstrated he understood the proceedings and could make himself understood.

However, the Court found the verdict on the gun charge unreasonable, as there was insufficient evidence that the appellant knew the gun was under the passenger seat of a communally used car.

The Court also quashed the marijuana conviction, as the Crown conceded the provision creating the offence was of no force and effect at the time the appellant was charged.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to making and distributing child pornography after creating a sexually explicit collage of his 15-year-old former girlfriend and sharing it online.

He was sentenced to two years in a penitentiary.

On appeal, he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the plea was valid and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, with the court finding the two-year term excessive for a youthful first-time offender whose actions were an immature response to a breakup.

The sentence was reduced to time served of eight months.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to fairly outline the position of the defence in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the charge was perfunctory, the failure to detail the evidence did not amount to reversible error.

The case turned entirely on credibility, as the evidence of the appellant and police officers were diametrically opposed, and the trial judge gave a proper W.D. instruction.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly weighed all relevant factors, including rehabilitation, and appropriately emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The court concluded there was no error in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.