Daniel A. Stein

The applicant, who was on full parole after being convicted of child pornography offences, sought bail pending appeal to modify a parole condition restricting his access to computers.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under s. 679 of the Criminal Code because a person on full parole is not in 'custody'.

The Court of Appeal held that full parole is a form of custody sufficient to engage the court's jurisdiction under s. 679.

The court granted bail pending appeal and modified the conditions to allow the applicant to use computers and the internet for employment purposes.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the complainant's prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not adhere to model jury instructions and made a factual error regarding a cell phone, the instructions as a whole made it clear how the jury could use the prior inconsistent statements to assess credibility, and the error was not prejudicial.

The appellant appealed his convictions, challenging the trial judge's dismissal of his application under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter and her handling of a juror's reaction during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings regarding police testimony and her conclusion that no Charter violations occurred.

The Court also found that the trial judge's mid-trial instructions were a suitable response to the juror's conduct, noting that defence counsel had not sought a mistrial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his wife, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence of prior domestic abuse and failing to caution himself about collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the similar fact evidence was admissible to show the history of the relationship, motive, and to assess credibility.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the collusion issue, noting the appellant did not testify and the Crown had a strong case.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for robbery, extortion, assault, and uttering threats.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework, treated the case as a credibility contest, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly instructed himself on the burden of proof, did not decide the case wholly on demeanour, and reasonably relied on corroborating evidence.

The verdict was found not to be unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility based solely on demeanour and applying a different standard to his evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and was entitled to conclude the appellant's evidence was scripted, tailored, and lacked the ring of truth based on implausible explanations.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an offence involving a machete.

The trial judge made several errors regarding self-defence, including reversing the burden of proof.

However, the Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso, finding that the errors did not affect the verdict because the trial judge accepted the Crown's version of events, under which self-defence did not arise.

The appeal from conviction and disposition was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in handling the complainant's delayed disclosure and in treating a witness's testimony as corroborative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered whether the witness's evidence was confirmatory of the complainant's evidence under the Vetrovec standard.

The court also held that the trial judge adequately addressed the delay in disclosure and inconsistencies in the evidence.

The young person appealed their conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapplied the standard of reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the verdict and that the trial judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt despite expressing himself inappropriately.

The police responded to a 911 call regarding a domestic assault.

The complainant fled her home in pyjamas and the police accompanied her back to retrieve her belongings and protect her property.

The respondent blocked the bedroom doorway and refused to move, leading to his arrest for obstructing a peace officer and resisting arrest.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge acquitted the respondent, finding the police lacked authority to remain in the home.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the police entry and subsequent conduct were lawful under their common law and statutory duties to preserve the peace and protect property.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction on three grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge's jury charge on reasonable doubt was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the charge did not strictly comply with Lifchus, the jury would not have misunderstood the standard of proof given the W.(D.) instruction on the alibi defence.

The court also found no merit to the argument that cross-examination was improperly curtailed.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the court should have appointed counsel after he was denied Legal Aid.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the appellant's failure to cooperate with his initial lawyer or provide required financial information to Legal Aid.

The trial judge had appointed counsel to cross-examine the complainant and provided appropriate assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the admission of expert evidence on aboriginal healing practices and other evidentiary rulings.

The appellant pleaded guilty to frauds involving credit card information that resulted in losses of $317,000 to banks and $2,121 to Future Shop.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence and probation, along with a restitution order of $52,121.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's consideration of the relevant factors, including the appellant's role, ability to pay, and the total loss suffered, and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The young person appellant and an adult co-accused were charged separately with murder.

The appellant was compelled to testify at the adult's preliminary inquiry, during which the Crown extensively questioned him about his own involvement, leading to self-incriminating statements.

This compelled testimony was then used to elicit incriminating evidence from another witness, who later testified at the appellant's trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown's predominant purpose at the preliminary inquiry was to build a case against the appellant, violating his section 7 Charter rights against self-incrimination.

The derivative evidence should have been excluded.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and hashish and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, improperly turned the trial into a credibility contest, and failed to properly answer a jury question regarding reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge or the recharge on reasonable doubt.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the seven-year sentence for importing 2.13 kilograms of cocaine and 1 kilogram of hashish was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed convictions for three counts of fraud under $5,000 and sought leave to appeal sentence.

He argued that the original trial could not properly proceed by summary conviction, despite defence consent, and challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence and the fitness of sentence.

The court held that s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code is procedural and authorized the mode of proceeding adopted, with no resulting jurisdictional defect.

It further held that the evidence supported the convictions and that the sentence was fit.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.