Lisa Joyal

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault against a young child and was sentenced to a penitentiary term with a lifetime section 161 prohibition order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence and pre-sentence custody credit, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation.

However, the Court found the lifetime section 161 prohibition order unfit and reduced it to 10 years.

The appellant communicated in an internet chat room with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl.

Believing he was communicating with a child, the appellant transmitted a video of himself masturbating.

He was convicted of communicating for the purpose of facilitating the exposure of his genitals to a child under s. 172.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he argued that the offence was impossible to complete because the officer was not actually a child, and that the exposure offence required the parties to be in the same physical location.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused's belief about the victim's age was sufficient for the inchoate offence, and that the exposure offence applies to images sent over the internet.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, challenging the trial judge's exemption of the respondent from provincial sex offender registry requirements, the refusal to order forfeiture of a computer, and the failure to make mandatory DNA and SOIRA orders.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to exempt the respondent from the provincial legislation and erred in failing to make the requested DNA and SOIRA orders, as the respondent did not establish that the impact would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The court upheld the trial judge's decision not to order forfeiture of the computer.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his five-year-old daughter.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to appreciate inconsistencies in the child's testimony, and applied a stricter standard of scrutiny to his evidence, thereby reversing the onus of proof.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension of evidence and held that the trial judge properly assessed credibility based on principles applicable to child witnesses.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young person appealed her convictions and sentence for assault and aggravated assault.

The victim suffered significant injuries, including broken bones of the eye socket and bleeding around the brain.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly consider sentencing options under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered alternatives to custody and the various custodial gradations, concluding that a sentence of real custody was proportionate to the seriousness of the violent offence.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including aggravated sexual assault and overcoming resistance by choking, arising from two separate brutal attacks on two different women approximately five weeks apart.

He was sentenced to a total of 22.5 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the counts, failing to give a propensity instruction, and imposing a sentence that offended the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in his severance ruling or jury instructions, and that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was fit given the callous nature of the offences and the appellant's lack of remorse.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault involving employees of his business.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction on similar act evidence, misdirected the jury on the exercise of authority vitiating consent under s. 265(3)(d) of the Criminal Code, and that the Crown made improper comments during closing arguments regarding jury selection.

The Court of Appeal agreed with all three grounds, finding the errors prejudicial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on his passive demeanour and lack of eye contact to reject his testimony, and by allowing the Crown to cross-examine him on why the complainant would lie.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reliance on the appellant's demeanour was legally flawed and vitiated the conviction.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepson, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her findings of guilt and in rejecting expert psychiatric evidence that suggested his risk could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly assessed the risk management evidence and was entitled to conclude that the community supervision plan, including the Circles of Support and Accountability program, lacked the necessary resources to safely manage the appellant's risk.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly treated the trial as a credibility contest and engaged in improper propensity reasoning based on the appellant's criminal record, contrary to the requirements of R. v. W.D. The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The police responded to a 911 call reporting individuals with handguns in a strip club parking lot.

Officers set up a roadblock at the exit and stopped the first vehicle to leave.

The occupants, who matched the general description of the suspects, were asked to exit the vehicle.

One occupant fled, was apprehended, and found to possess a loaded handgun.

The other occupant was subsequently searched, and a loaded handgun was also found on him.

The trial judge admitted the evidence, but the Court of Appeal excluded it, finding violations of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the initial detention and subsequent searches were justified under the common law police powers and did not violate the Charter.

The appellant appealed her convictions for aggravated assault and failing to provide the necessaries of life relating to severe injuries sustained by her premature infant.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction for failing to provide necessaries, finding insufficient evidence that a short delay in seeking medical attention permanently endangered the child's health.

The Court also ordered a new trial on the aggravated assault charge, holding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for party liability by suggesting that mere knowledge of the abuse, rather than an intention to aid or encourage the principal offender, was sufficient for a conviction.

The Court also provided guidance on the application of the 'deemed consent' defence in the context of normal child care.

The Crown brought a motion in an appeal and sought to withhold the motion materials from the self-represented appellant.

Recognizing the unique and difficult nature of the Crown's request, the Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal and directed the appointment of state-funded counsel for the appellant under s. 684 of the Criminal Code, with costs to be paid by the Crown, to assist with the motion.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a minimum secure unit.

He argued the Board lacked jurisdiction due to a delayed hearing, the detention order was unreasonable, and the Board failed to address the hospital's refusal to grant off-ward privileges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board retained jurisdiction despite the delay, the detention order was reasonable given the appellant's risk to the public, and the Board implicitly addressed the privileges issue by reducing his security level.

The appellant appealed the 10-year length of a prohibition order and sought a variation to permit him to attend proscribed public places in the company of an adult.

The Crown consented to the variation but opposed reducing the length of the order.

The Court of Appeal granted the variation, adding the exception for being accompanied by an adult over 18, but deferred to the sentencing judge's discretion regarding the 10-year duration given the serious nature of the offence.

The sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after attacking a young woman in her bed at night, causing severe injuries.

He was sentenced to two years and three months in the penitentiary.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's emphasis on denunciation and general deterrence, and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range given the serious circumstances of the attack and the appellant's prior record.

The police received a 911 call about black men with handguns outside a strip club and set up a roadblock to stop all vehicles leaving the parking lot.

The appellants, who did not match the descriptions provided, were stopped, detained, and searched, leading to the discovery of loaded handguns.

The Court of Appeal held that the roadblock stop was an unconstitutional exercise of ancillary police powers, resulting in arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure.

The handguns were excluded from evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the seriousness of the breaches and systemic police training failures, and acquittals were entered.

The appellants, who are Black, were convicted of robbery and related offences.

During jury selection, defence counsel were permitted to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial bias.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge's instructions to the triers on the challenge for cause procedure were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in his rulings regarding peremptory challenges when sworn jurors had to be replaced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions to the triers were sufficient and that, although the trial judge erred in law by initially granting extra peremptory challenges, the error caused no prejudice to the appellants.

The appellant appealed his sentence for driving offences involving high speed, street racing, and impairment, which resulted in serious injuries to his passenger.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by treating a prior case as determinative rather than applying its principles to the specific facts.

However, upon re-sentencing, the Court agreed with the Crown that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the aggravating factors.

The Court concluded that a one-year custodial sentence was appropriate and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing the trial judge inadvertently gave four-for-one credit for pre-trial custody instead of the intended two-for-one.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the intended sentence would have been 25 months.

However, recognizing the added hardship of re-incarceration after the respondent's release, the Court varied the sentence to 21 months, leaving a remnant of 14 months to be served.