Lisa Joyal

The appellants were convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to their three-year-old child, who was found to be malnourished and suffering from untreated open wounds.

They appealed their convictions and six-month sentences, arguing that a failure to provide medical attention does not constitute 'necessitous circumstances' under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that medical attention is a necessary of life and its deprivation can amount to necessitous circumstances.

The court found no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and upheld the sentences as fit given the serious breach of trust.

The applicant, an anesthesiologist convicted of sexually assaulting 21 female patients during surgery, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal against conviction.

He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender into custody, his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The grounds of appeal were deemed weak and unlikely to succeed, and the need for immediate enforcement of the judgment outweighed the need for review given the seriousness of the offences.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his mother, as well as his sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge by failing to put forward the defence of intoxication, inadequately instructing on discreditable conduct, and failing to properly instruct on the requisite intent for murder and the elements of manslaughter.

He also appealed the period of parole ineligibility as harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidentiary foundation for an intoxication defence and no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 14-year parole ineligibility period was fit for a brutal second degree murder in a domestic context.

The appellant, a designated dangerous offender, appealed the sentence of indeterminate detention.

The appellant argued that a lapse in hospital supervision demonstrated the disposition was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's ability to sexually assault a child during a brief evasion of supervision confirmed the appropriateness of the indeterminate detention disposition.

The court concluded there was no reason to believe the appellant could be controlled in the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against a young complainant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the appellant's credibility by relying on his brief answers to specific questions, misapprehended material evidence regarding the complainant's prior inconsistent statements, and improperly asked the appellant to comment on the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, resulting in the victim falling and suffering a severe brain injury.

At trial, the judge refused to leave the defence of consent to the jury, instructing them that consent is not a defence to aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred, as consent is only vitiated if the accused both intended to cause serious bodily harm and actually caused it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged child sexual offence convictions and an indeterminate sentence imposed following a dangerous offender designation.

The court held that one conviction had to be set aside because the trial judge misapprehended a child complainant’s videotaped statement on the central issue of who issued the alleged invitation to sexual touching, requiring a new trial on that count.

The remaining convictions were upheld, despite an error in using one complainant’s evidence as corroborative similar fact evidence, because the verdict on those counts would inevitably have been the same.

On sentence, the court found an error in overstating the facts underlying one prior sexual assault conviction, but held that neither that error nor the set-aside predicate conviction created any reasonable possibility of a different result on the dangerous offender issue.

The appellant appealed his convictions for threatening to cause the death of a fellow inmate and his parents if the inmate testified against him in an unrelated prosecution.

The appellant argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof, improperly used the absence of motive to lie to bolster the Crown witness's credibility, and unfairly intervened during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) framework, correctly considered motive in assessing credibility, and intervened within permissible limits to control the proceedings.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to incest, sexual assault, sexual interference, making and possessing child pornography, and a firearms storage offence arising from prolonged sexual abuse of the offender's child.

The main issue was whether the sentencing judge erred by refusing to view a disc containing child pornography and recordings of the abuse, and whether the resulting six-year global sentence was unfit.

The majority held that a sentencing judge may exclude otherwise relevant evidence where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value and found no reversible error in the refusal to view the disc in the unusual circumstances.

The majority further held that, although lenient, the six-year global sentence was not clearly inadequate and dismissed the Crown appeal; a dissenting judge would have increased the sentence to nine years.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

A majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to explain why certain factors did not raise a reasonable doubt regarding fabrication.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge erred in law by failing to give adequate consideration to whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact and reply evidence, and that the sentencing judge should have imposed a long-term offender order instead of a dangerous offender designation, given the potential use of anti-androgen medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge correctly concluded there was no reasonable possibility of controlling the appellant's risk in the community, given his life-long condition and the uncertainty of his long-term commitment to taking sex drive reducing medication.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence.

The victim had identified the appellant from a photo array using a photograph taken five years prior to the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the frailties of the identification evidence.

The court held that the verdict was reasonable, noting the victim's opportunity to observe the assailant, the photo array identification, corroborating cell phone records placing the appellant in the vicinity, and the appellant's failure to testify.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and appealed his sentence after having already served the custodial portion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement involving a 13-year-old neighbour.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the accused by assuming guilt to establish the complainant's credibility, and failed to adequately consider whether the evidence left a reasonable doubt even if the accused's testimony was rejected.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He claimed his Charter rights were violated when police detained him overnight until he was sober, rather than releasing him to a responsible adult.

The trial judge found a minor breach and granted a sentence reduction, but refused a stay of proceedings.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed his appeal.

The applicant sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed appeal lacked merit and did not raise issues of significance to the general administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof, failed to give reasons for rejecting his evidence, failed to self-instruct on a Vetrovec warning for his ex-wife's testimony, and erred in conducting an unassisted handwriting comparison.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or his cautious approach to the handwriting comparison.

The Crown's cross-appeal on sentence was allowed on consent, adding probation conditions and a SOIRA order.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for attempted murder and possession of a prohibited weapon, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his conditional discharge.

On appeal, fresh evidence was introduced showing that a Community Treatment Order (CTO) had been issued, requiring the appellant to take his medication.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the CTO was legally valid and that the appellant met the definition of a 'patient' under the Mental Health Act.

Concluding that the appellant no longer posed a significant risk to the public with the CTO in place, the Court allowed the appeal and granted an absolute discharge.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to multiple offences involving sexual assaults on a four-year-old child, making child pornography using that child, possession of a large volume of child pornography, and distribution over the Internet, including a live webcam transmission of abuse.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge overemphasized totality and failed to give sufficient weight to the overall gravity, interrelated nature, and extreme breach of trust inherent in the offender's conduct.

Applying the global sentence approach for connected child sexual abuse and child pornography offences, the court found the effective four-year sentence manifestly unfit.

Despite the respondent's release and fresh evidence of therapeutic progress, the sentence was so inadequate that re-incarceration was required.

The sentence was varied to seven years' imprisonment with credit for time served.

The accused was charged with multiple counts arising from two separate sexual assaults committed against different complainants approximately one month apart.

The trial judge denied the accused's pre-trial application to sever the counts.

The accused was convicted on all charges, and the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to properly balance the relevant factors for severance.

The Court held that the significant risk of prejudice to the accused, including the dangers of credibility cross-pollination and prohibited propensity reasoning, clearly outweighed any minimal benefits to the administration of justice in trying the counts together.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault against a young child and was sentenced to a penitentiary term with a lifetime section 161 prohibition order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence and pre-sentence custody credit, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation.

However, the Court found the lifetime section 161 prohibition order unfit and reduced it to 10 years.