Philippe Cowle

The applicant was convicted of operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit and received a 15-month driving prohibition and a $3,000 fine.

After his conviction was restored by the Court of Appeal, he sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and moved for a stay of his driving prohibition and fine pending the leave application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that under s. 320.25 of the Criminal Code, it lacks jurisdiction to stay a driving prohibition unless leave to appeal has already been granted.

Furthermore, the court found that even if it had jurisdiction, the applicant failed to meet the test for a stay on the merits.

The applicant brought a motion to re-open his conviction appeal and set aside the abandonment of his sentence appeal, after his appeal had been dismissed on the merits.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding his statements voluntary, that the appellate court erred in its reasons, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no real concern of a miscarriage of justice to warrant re-opening the conviction appeal, and concluding that the proposed sentence appeal had no prospect of success.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and other offences arising from a bar shooting, as well as his 17-year global sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on recognition evidence and rejecting exculpatory testimony, and failed to give sufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial identification evidence or his discretionary application of credit for harsh conditions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder after shooting his wife in a parking lot.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, made errors of law, and that he was prejudiced by self-representing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable and supported by ample evidence, including the appellant's own statements and eyewitness testimony.

The court also noted the appellant chose to self-represent and had the assistance of amicus curiae.

The offender was convicted of two counts of perjury for swearing false personal information forms submitted to the TSX and CNQ to take his company public.

He concealed his true identity and extensive criminal record for fraud and dishonesty.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors, including the offender's high moral blameworthiness, his position of trust, and the potential harm to the Canadian financial markets, against his health issues.

The court sentenced the offender to 3 years of imprisonment.

The accused, charged with making, circulating, or publishing a false prospectus contrary to s. 400 of the Criminal Code, brought a motion for a directed verdict after the Crown closed its case.

The accused argued there was insufficient evidence that she knew the prospectus contained a material misrepresentation regarding a $20 million private placement, or that she actively circulated it.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including her role as a founding member, her signing of the prospectus, and her failure to act when informed of severe financial discrepancies—was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt by a properly instructed jury.

The court held that the limited weighing of circumstantial evidence on a directed verdict motion does not permit the judge to resolve competing inferences, which remains the province of the jury.

The self-represented applicant, facing serious fraud-related charges in a lengthy jury trial, suffered a severe cardiac event during the trial.

Medical evidence from his cardiologists indicated a 100% blockage of a main artery and recommended two to three months of rest to avoid a potentially fatal heart attack.

The court granted the motion for a mistrial, finding that continuing the trial posed a serious risk to the applicant's health and his ability to make full answer and defence.

The applicant agreed to waive any s. 11(b) Charter arguments arising from the delay.