James Foord

The offender was designated a dangerous offender following convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault against a 10-year-old girl.

The Crown sought an indeterminate sentence, while the offender proposed a determinate sentence followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The court reviewed the offender's extensive history of refusing or unilaterally discontinuing treatment and medication for his pedophilic behaviour.

Finding that the offender lacked genuine insight and could not be trusted to manage his risk in the community, the court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

An indeterminate sentence was imposed.

The three offenders were convicted of firearms trafficking and related offences.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unconstitutional post-verdict delay.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the delay fell below the 5-month presumptive ceiling established in Charley after deducting defence delay and the discrete event of a constitutional challenge.

On sentencing, the court found the mandatory minimum under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code had been struck down and was inapplicable.

Saberi and Montgiraud, both youthful first offenders with lower moral blameworthiness, received conditional sentences of 20 months.

Bruce, who facilitated three separate transactions and possessed drugs for trafficking, received a custodial sentence of 22 months.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel from the record in a manslaughter retrial due to a potential conflict of interest.

Defence counsel had previously represented two key Crown witnesses, one of whom was convicted as the shooter in the underlying incident.

Despite the respondent's fundamental right to counsel of choice and proposed waivers, the court found that the potential need to cross-examine former clients created an appearance of unfairness.

The application was granted to protect public confidence in the administration of justice.

During a sentencing hearing for three offenders convicted of firearms offences, the Crown argued the court should conduct a fresh constitutional analysis of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code, despite previous Superior Court decisions declaring it unconstitutional.

The court held that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson, a declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act effectively removes the provision from the statute books.

Therefore, the previous declarations of invalidity are binding on courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and the mandatory minimum sentence is of no force and effect.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft of electricity under $5,000, admitting to stealing $4,999 worth of hydro by occasionally disconnecting the meter at his business.

The Crown sought to prove the theft exceeded $5,000 by relying on circumstantial evidence of average historical use compared to actual billings.

The court found that the variables involved in calculating the exact amount stolen were too numerous to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court accepted the guilty plea for theft under $5,000.

During pre-trial motions for a first-degree murder trial, the court addressed the accused's refusal to participate, the role of amicus curiae, and the admissibility of a police statement.

The court expanded the role of amicus curiae beyond making legal submissions to ensure a fair trial, given the accused's complete non-participation.

The court also ruled that the accused's statement to police was voluntary.

Although the court found a technical breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights due to a five-hour delay in facilitating access to counsel, the statement was not excluded under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith and the accused ultimately exercised his right to counsel before giving the statement.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol content over .08.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's evidence regarding the timing of events, finding him 'non-responsive in cross-examination', which was dispositive to the conviction.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial transcript and found that the appellant was not non-responsive, but rather argumentative and clear in his disagreements with the Crown.

The court concluded that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, which played an essential part in the reasoning process, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was stopped while driving on Highway 401.

The officer discovered the driver was suspended and using a false identity, leading to an arrest for obstructing a peace officer.

A subsequent search of the vehicle incident to arrest revealed a large quantity of cash and cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing lack of grounds for arrest, unlawful search, and failure to restate the right to counsel upon the discovery of drugs.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the arrest and search lawful, and entered findings of guilt on the drug and obstruction charges.

The Crown applied under Criminal Code forfeiture provisions seeking an order that $39,680 seized from a residence be forfeited as proceeds of crime following the respondent’s conviction for offences connected to a drug trafficking organization.

The respondent argued the funds belonged to his parents, who were innocent third parties, and sought the return of the money to them.

The court held that although circumstantial evidence could support an inference that the funds were proceeds of crime, credible testimony from the respondent’s parents provided an equally plausible explanation that the money represented long-term household savings.

The Crown therefore failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the funds were proceeds of crime.

The court found the parents were lawful owners and innocent of complicity and ordered the funds returned to them under s. 462.41(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence related to alleged bolus drinking and improperly took judicial notice of certain facts when assessing credibility.

The court reviewed the record and concluded that the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence and that no material misapprehension occurred.

The appellate court emphasized deference to trial judges on credibility findings and held that the impugned observations reflected common sense reasoning rather than improper judicial notice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for theft under $5,000 arising from the alleged failure to deposit restaurant proceeds at a bank night deposit.

The trial judge relied heavily on testimony from witnesses who had viewed surveillance video that was later destroyed and reported that the accused did not appear at the deposit chute.

On appeal, the court held that although secondary evidence of the lost recording could be admissible, the trial judge misapprehended central aspects of the evidence, including the surveillance camera’s limited capture intervals and the assumptions underlying the Crown’s theory.

The court further found concerns regarding the probative value and prejudice of the secondary evidence and issues related to the burden of proof under the W.(D.) framework.

The cumulative effect of these errors rendered the trial unfair.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content over 80 milligrams.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and in finding that her breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The summary conviction appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's characterization of the delay periods or his conclusion that the prejudice was minimal.

The court also upheld the finding that the breath samples, taken one hour and 36 minutes after the vehicle was stopped, were obtained within a reasonably prompt timeframe.

The appeal was dismissed.