K.N. Feldman

The appellant, who had a lengthy history of violent offences against intimate partners, was convicted of attempted murder and choking.

The sentencing judge designated him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge improperly presumed an indeterminate sentence was required and failed to adequately consider treatment options.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge engaged in a rigorous, individualized assessment of the evidence and properly concluded that the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community.

The appellant, a young Indigenous woman, pleaded guilty to importing cocaine.

The sentencing judge rejected her s. 15 Charter challenge to s. 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which precluded a conditional sentence for her offence, and imposed a 17-month custodial sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that s. 742.1(c) and (e)(ii) violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the provisions violated s. 15 by discriminating against Aboriginal offenders and s. 7 by being overbroad.

The provisions were struck down, and a sentence of time served was substituted.

The parties entered into a prenuptial agreement waiving spousal support and property rights.

After separation, the appellant husband sought equalization and spousal support, and requested the marriage contract be set aside under the Family Law Act.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent wife, finding the request to set aside the contract was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period in the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a request to set aside a marriage contract is a proceeding for a declaration where no consequential relief is sought, and is therefore not subject to a limitation period under s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act.

The underlying claims for equalization and support remain subject to their respective limitation periods.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following guilty pleas to sexual interference, child luring, and making child pornography.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence and in considering his history of domestic violence as part of a repetitive pattern of behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sexual abuse of a child involved the use of violence and inflicted severe psychological damage.

The court also admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitative progress but concluded it did not render the indeterminate sentence unreasonable given his high risk of reoffending.

The accused, a political worker during the 2011 federal election, was convicted under the Canada Elections Act for his role in a 'robo-calls' scheme that directed voters to false polling stations.

He was sentenced to nine months' incarceration and 12 months' probation.

Both the accused and the Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the sentencing judge properly balanced the mitigating factors of the youthful first-time offender with the need for denunciation and deterrence for an unprecedented electoral fraud offence.

The Court declined the Crown's request to establish a sentencing range of two to five years for electoral fraud.

The appellant settled a tort claim arising from a motor vehicle accident on the advice of her former lawyer.

Years later, after retaining new counsel for her statutory accident benefits claim, she obtained a psychiatric report indicating her injuries met the catastrophic impairment threshold.

Her new counsel advised her to sue her former lawyer for recommending an improvident settlement.

The former lawyer successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was not discoverable until the appellant received legal advice that the settlement was improvident, as her former lawyer had never advised her of any error.

The appellant, a plumbing subcontractor, registered general liens against two home development projects after the general contractor went bankrupt.

The general contractor's contracts with the owners stipulated that liens would arise and expire on a lot-by-lot basis.

The motion judge and Divisional Court discharged the general liens, holding that section 20(2) of the Construction Lien Act precludes a subcontractor from claiming a general lien when the main contract contains a lot-by-lot restriction.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this interpretation, finding that a subcontractor's right to a general lien flows from the main contract.

The Court also declined to apply the curative provisions of section 6 or treat the liens as excessive under section 35.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought its trial costs.

The parties agreed on most amounts but disputed a $32,025 disbursement for environmental assessment reports prepared prior to the litigation for the purpose of a possible property acquisition.

The Court of Appeal denied the disbursement, holding that the reports were not commissioned in contemplation of litigation and their use at trial did not alter their nature as non-litigation work product.

Trial costs were fixed at $237,364.86.

The respondent school board expropriated the appellant's property to build a new secondary school.

The board later authorized a land swap with the city to facilitate a joint development on the site.

The appellant argued this triggered section 41(1) of the Expropriations Act, requiring the board to offer the property back because it was no longer needed for the board's purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive appeal, finding the board had not abandoned its purpose of building a school and related amenities.

However, the court allowed the costs appeal, reducing the application judge's costs award to the partial indemnity amount originally sought by the board.