LaForme

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that their insurers had no duty to defend them in an underlying action regarding defective septic systems.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by applying the 'Your Work' exclusion after correctly identifying that the underlying pleadings raised the mere possibility of consequential damages.

Because consequential damages are not excluded by the 'Your Work' exclusion, the mere possibility of such claims triggered the insurers' duty to defend.

The appeal was allowed and a declaration compelling the insurers to provide a defence was granted.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences based largely on historical text messages obtained via a production order.

On appeal, he argued he had standing to challenge the order under section 8 of the Charter and that the police should have obtained a Part VI wiretap authorization instead of a production order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant lacked standing.

The Court further held that a Part VI authorization is prospective and not required for the search and seizure of historical text messages already in existence.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences based on text messages found on his co-accused's cell phone.

The appellant challenged the search of the co-accused's phone under s. 8 of the Charter.

The application judge held that the appellant lacked standing because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages once they reached the recipient's phone.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the sender loses control over the messages once received, thereby extinguishing any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences following a police investigation involving wiretaps.

He appealed his convictions, arguing he should not have been named as an 'other known person' in the initial wiretap authorization, and appealed his sentence of five years and seven months on the basis of the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the low threshold for naming a known party in a wiretap authorization was met and the global sentence was reasonable.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an underinsured taxi.

The plaintiffs and their insurer, the appellant, sued the respondent municipality, alleging it negligently failed to enforce its taxi licensing by-law which required $1,000,000 in liability coverage.

The trial judge found the municipality owed a duty of care but did not breach the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the municipality did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs, as the claim was for pure economic loss and lacked sufficient proximity.

Furthermore, the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding the municipality met the standard of care.

The plaintiffs commenced an action in Ontario seeking $400 million in damages and served the defendants in Guatemala, a non-Hague Convention state, in accordance with Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants appealed the validation of service, arguing that Rule 17.05(2) must be interpreted in accordance with customary international law and comity, which would require service to comply with Guatemalan law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that service under Rule 17.05(2) does not violate Guatemalan sovereignty or international law, and that the rule provides a clear choice of service methods that rebuts any presumption of conformity with foreign law.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of drugs and guns found in his girlfriend's apartment.

He challenged two pre-trial Charter rulings.

First, he argued that evidence from the apartment should have been excluded under s. 24(2) after the motion judge found a s. 8 breach due to the search warrant being executed at night without proper authorization.

Second, he argued his arrest was unlawful because the police lacked reasonable grounds, making the seizure of keys during the search incident to arrest unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the s. 8 breach was inadvertent and did not impact privacy interests, and that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was in joint possession of firearms.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granted to the respondent for unpaid invoices on a construction project.

The appellant argued it was entitled to set-off monies related to alleged deficiencies on unrelated projects under s. 12 of the Construction Lien Act or by way of equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 12 did not apply because no trust funds were retained, and equitable set-off was unavailable because the projects were entirely separate and unrelated.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences, including attempted murder and forcible confinement, arising from the abduction of the complainant at gunpoint.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the potential contamination of the complainant's identification evidence from a YouTube video and by misapprehending evidence regarding the attempted murder charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the potential contamination issue and properly relied on the extensive one-on-one time the complainant spent with the appellant.

The Court also held that the trial judge reasonably concluded, based on an objective assessment of the evidence, that the appellant pointed an operable firearm at the complainant's head and pulled the trigger with the expectation of shooting her.

The appellant appealed a conviction but failed to surrender into custody as required by the judicial release order.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant brought a class action alleging that Bell Mobility improperly collected unused funds from prepaid wireless accounts when customers failed to top up before the end of the active period.

The appellant argued that Bell breached its contract by claiming funds on the first day after the active period ended, and alternatively, that the Gift Card Regulation under the Consumer Protection Act prohibited expiry dates on prepaid phone cards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the contract clearly stipulated expiration at the end of the active period.

The Court also held that the Gift Card Regulation prohibits expiry dates on the future performance of an agreement, not on the duration of the service itself, meaning Bell fully performed its obligation by providing access to its network for the agreed-upon period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its defamation action following a Rule 21 motion.

The motion judge had held that the appellant's notices did not comply with s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act because they failed to sufficiently specify the matters complained of.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the notices clearly specified the statements and inferences from the internet broadcast and newspaper article, and were sufficiently specific to allow the respondents to know the essence of the complaint and decide how to respond.

The appellant tenant breached a commercial lease covenant to continuously operate its business and to restore the premises upon expiry.

The landlord affirmed the lease and later sued for damages.

The tenant argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the failure to operate the business was a continuing breach, giving rise to a fresh cause of action and a rolling two-year limitation period for each day of non-compliance.

The claim for failure to restore the premises was also brought within the limitation period, as it accrued upon the expiry of the lease.

The appellant, diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, appealed a decision confirming her incapacity to consent to treatment and her involuntary status.

The Consent and Capacity Board found she lacked insight into her condition and could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing antipsychotic medication.

The Superior Court upheld the Board's decision.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal found the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by the evidence, dismissing the appeal.

Two mining companies disputed access to chromite deposits in northern Ontario.

The respondent sought an easement over the appellant's unpatented mining claims to build a road.

The Mining and Lands Commissioner refused to dispense with the appellant's consent, interpreting the Mining Act as granting broad surface rights to unpatented claim holders on Crown land.

The Divisional Court overturned this, finding the interpretation unreasonable and dispensing with consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, confirming that surface rights are limited to what is necessary for mining activities on the claims themselves, and there was no evidence the road would interfere with such activities.

The appellant appealed his robbery convictions on the ground that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the frailties of eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that while it would have been better to give the cautionary instruction, no request was made at trial.

The Court applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding that the identification and circumstantial evidence against the appellant was overwhelming.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and importing cocaine, but the jury could not reach a verdict on a trafficking charge.

During deliberations, the jury asked if a guilty verdict on importing required a guilty verdict on trafficking.

The trial judge answered 'no' without further explanation, contradicting his earlier instructions that the key issue for all charges was whether a specific transfer of cocaine occurred.

The Court of Appeal held that this incomplete and unhelpful response compromised trial fairness and left the jury adrift to assess conflicting bases of culpability.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was detained by police investigating trespass and liquor offences.

An altercation ensued, leading to his arrest and the discovery of a handgun in his backpack.

At trial, the appellant argued his detention was arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, but the trial judge dismissed the application, finding the police had reasonable suspicion.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the s. 9 ruling.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, concluding that the totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion that the appellant was engaged in trespass or liquor-related offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a police search of a hotel bedroom was not a justified safety search and in excluding the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the officers had predetermined to conduct the search before arriving, which supported the trial judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable apprehension of imminent harm.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the exclusion of evidence, as the trial judge did not find the search was conducted in good faith.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for the death of his severely disabled brother, whom he had removed from a care facility to misappropriate his disability cheques.

The victim died from starvation and neglect after eight years of abuse.

The trial judge imposed a 20-year sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was beyond the established range and that the trial judge improperly treated a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the horrific aggravating circumstances justified a sentence outside the usual range.

However, the appeal was allowed solely to apply enhanced pre-sentence custody credit under Summers, reducing the net sentence to 14 years and 11 months.