Melvyn Green

The applicant brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in a child pornography case.

The applicant was arrested on May 14, 2015, with trial scheduled to conclude on April 13, 2017—approximately 23 months later, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the application for procedural non-compliance.

The court dismissed the Crown's motion and granted the applicant's section 11(b) application, finding that the delay was presumptively unreasonable and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption.

The court found that the Crown's failure to disclose critical forensic evidence until the eve of the preliminary inquiry constituted a breach of disclosure obligations that could not be excused as an exceptional circumstance.

A stay of proceedings was ordered.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from a police sergeant regarding the dangers associated with the production and consumption of cannabis concentrate ("shatter") as aggravating factors in sentencing for drug trafficking.

The defendant opposed the admission of this evidence.

The court conducted an admissibility voir dire and determined that the proposed expert evidence should not be received.

The court found that the evidence failed to meet the threshold requirements for admissibility under the Mohan test, particularly regarding relevance, necessity, and the qualifications of the proposed expert witness.

The offender pleaded guilty to attempted possession of child pornography.

He was a 57-year-old single parent of a 12-year-old adopted son with special needs, employed as a chartered accountant in the Ontario Public Service for 24 years.

At his workplace in May 2014, cyber security detected attempts to access pornographic websites, including some with references to minors.

A search of his home revealed chat logs of online conversations with sexual content involving children.

The Crown sought six months custody; the defence sought 30 days served intermittently.

The court imposed 37 days intermittent custody followed by three years probation with extensive conditions, considering the offender's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, low risk assessment, and the impact on his dependent son.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol concentration (BAC) after being stopped for speeding on the Gardiner Expressway.

The officer detained the defendant in the rear of a locked police cruiser for approximately fifteen minutes, ostensibly to spare him embarrassment during an admonishment for careless driving.

During this confinement, the officer detected an odour of alcohol emanating from the defendant, which formed the basis for a roadside screening demand and subsequent approved instrument demand.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the BAC readings on Charter grounds, alleging arbitrary detention in breach of section 9 and failure to inform of rights to counsel in breach of section 10(b).

The court found that the detention in the cruiser was arbitrary, not reasonably necessary, and violated the defendant's Charter rights.

The BAC evidence was excluded as a remedy under section 24(2), and the defendant was acquitted.

The Crown prosecuted two defendants for offences related to a marijuana grow operation discovered in the basement of a residential property at 50 Ravenscrest Drive in Toronto.

Arin Hwang was charged with producing marijuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of dried marijuana found in a suitcase, and theft of electricity.

Van Da Do was charged with producing marijuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity.

The court acquitted Do of all charges due to unreliable eyewitness identification evidence and insufficient circumstantial evidence linking him to the premises.

Hwang was convicted of simple possession of the dried marijuana found in the suitcase but acquitted of the remaining charges, as the Crown failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he exercised the requisite control over the basement grow operation.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol concentration (BAC) after registering a "Fail" on a roadside screening device at a RIDE stop and subsequently providing "over 80" Breathalyzer readings.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the Breathalyzer evidence on Charter grounds, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the defendant's body when making the initial roadside screening device demand, thereby violating section 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the odour of alcohol emanating from the vehicle combined with observations of nervousness and slurred speech, satisfying the statutory standard under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court also found that even if a Charter breach had occurred, exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) was not warranted.

The defendant was convicted.

The offender, a 40-year-old Aboriginal man, pleaded guilty to possession of approximately 300 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a maximum reformatory sentence of two years less a day, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation.

The defence sought a maximum intermittent sentence of 90 days followed by probation.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 30 months of probation, finding that the offender's Indigenous ancestry, significant rehabilitation efforts since arrest, cultural reintegration, and commitment to family, education, and employment warranted a non-custodial disposition consistent with Gladue and Ipeelee principles and restorative justice objectives.

An appeal from a conviction under provincial motor vehicle legislation.

The appellant, claiming Aboriginal status, argued that the Province of Ontario has no jurisdiction over Indigenous persons and therefore provincial laws do not apply to them.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences under the Highway Traffic Act and Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that provincial laws of general application apply to all persons within the province, including Indigenous persons, and that driving a motor vehicle on a public highway does not constitute an Aboriginal right protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The defendant was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand following a serious collision on Highway 400.

The Crown's case on dangerous driving relied on circumstantial evidence of excessive speeding and alcohol consumption.

The court found that while speeding alone on a multi-lane highway with light traffic, even combined with prior alcohol consumption, did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care required for criminal liability.

The court acquitted on the dangerous driving charge but convicted on the refusal charge, finding that the defendant's conduct in the ambulance—becoming silent, unresponsive, physically rigid, and locking his arms—constituted an implied refusal to comply with the lawful ASD demand.

The Attorney General of Canada sought forfeiture of a residential property at 15 Tamora Court in Toronto pursuant to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following the conviction of the respondents' adult son for drug trafficking offences.

The respondents, who were charged but had their charges withdrawn, claimed they were innocent of any complicity or collusion in the offences and that forfeiture would be disproportionate.

The court found the respondents appeared innocent under section 19(3) of the CDSA and ordered the property returned to them.

Alternatively, the court found forfeiture would be disproportionate under section 19.1(3) and revoked the restraint order.

The defendant was charged with assault with a weapon following an incident on February 27, 2014, in which the complainant alleged the defendant struck her with a rum bottle, causing lacerations to her left ear.

The defendant denied striking the complainant and testified that the injury resulted from an accidental fall onto broken glass during a struggle over the bottle.

The trial judge found that while the complainant's account was facially reliable, the physical evidence and forensic findings were more consistent with the defendant's version of events.

The judge concluded that reasonable doubt existed as to the defendant's guilt and acquitted him of the charge.

The offender was arrested carrying a loaded 32-calibre revolver in a public park after being threatened by an assailant at a shelter.

He pled guilty to possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace and unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The court imposed a sentence of 22 months, reduced to 6 months after applying 1.5:1 credit for 325 days of pre-sentence custody, followed by 18 months of probation.

The decision addresses the application of sentencing principles following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Nur striking down the three-year mandatory minimum for firearm possession offences, and provides extensive analysis of the mitigative effect of harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The defendant was charged with assault following an incident in a Toronto apartment.

Three independent witnesses observed from across the street what they described as the defendant repeatedly striking the complainant about the face and head.

The defendant and complainant testified that the incident involved only a heated verbal argument that escalated into brief physical contact, with the complainant pushing the defendant and the defendant restraining her without striking her.

The court resolved the credibility conflict by finding the three rooftop witnesses credible and reliable, concluding that their contextual remove from the parties enhanced rather than prejudiced their reliability.

The defendant was found guilty of assault, with the court rejecting any defence of self-defence as the force used was objectively excessive.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations that he sexually touched and propositioned a 15-year-old complainant on three occasions during the summer of 2013.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's testimony.

The defendant and his wife denied all allegations, and the defendant's niece provided corroborating evidence regarding one of the alleged incidents.

The court found material implausibilities in the complainant's account, particularly regarding her presence in the defendant's home on the evening of the Bellwoods Park incident and her return to the defendant's home on the Thanksgiving weekend despite prior negative experiences.

The court also found the defendant's niece to be a credible and persuasive witness whose evidence contradicted the complainant's account of the Canada Day weekend incident.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He was stopped at a RIDE checkpoint and registered a fail on a roadside approved screening device.

Following arrest and transport to the OPP Detachment, breath samples were taken approximately 76 minutes after the alleged offence, registering 150 and 130 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the Crown's reliance on the statutory presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii), arguing that cumulative police delays in transporting the accused and administering the breath tests rendered the samples not "taken as soon as practicable." The court found that the police acted reasonably throughout and that the presumption of identity applied.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and while having an excessive blood alcohol concentration after being found asleep behind the wheel of his parked car in an underground garage at the Rogers Centre.

The Crown conceded that the statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual care or control of the vehicle.

The court applied the analytical framework from R. v. Boudreault and found that while certain factors favored the Crown, the totality of circumstances—including that the vehicle was parked as the defendant's intended destination for sleeping, was not running, was in a fully reclined position, and the defendant had no reason to drive until after completing his next work shift—did not establish a realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was acquitted.

The applicant was charged with having a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration while having care and control of a motor vehicle.

He was arrested on September 28, 2013, with trial initially scheduled for December 11, 2014.

The trial was adjourned due to Crown failure to disclose the correct breath room videotape, and rescheduled to June 2, 2015.

The applicant brought a Charter application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) claiming the delay infringed his right to be tried without unreasonable delay.

The court found that the Crown's conduct was responsible for the adjournment and the subsequent delay, resulting in approximately 19.5 months of total delay, which exceeded the Morin guidelines.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with mischief, escape from lawful custody, assault causing bodily harm, obstructing a peace officer, and two counts of assaulting a peace officer with intent to resist lawful arrest, arising from an incident at Union Station where he attempted to board a departing GO Transit train.

The Crown abandoned the mischief charge mid-trial.

The court found that the defendant's arrest was unlawful because the transit officers lacked reasonable grounds to believe he had committed mischief.

The court rejected key aspects of the officers' testimony as unreliable and contradicted by video evidence.

Finding the arrest unlawful, the defendant's physical resistance was justified, and he was acquitted of all charges.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand after being pulled over for speeding and suspected impaired driving.

Despite multiple opportunities and instructions, the defendant was unable to produce an adequate breath sample, resulting in arrest.

The Crown sought conviction under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court acquitted the defendant, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally failed to comply with the demand.

The court adopted the Lewko/Soucy formulation of mens rea, requiring proof of intentional non-compliance rather than mere knowledge or recklessness.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand after being pulled over for a suspected Highway Traffic Act violation involving excessive rear seat passengers.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the initial detention and the ASD demand on Charter grounds, arguing the stop was arbitrary and pretextual.

The court found the initial detention was lawful based on a legitimate seat belt investigation, that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on detecting an odour of alcohol on the defendant's breath, and that the defendant clearly and repeatedly refused the ASD demand.

The defendant was convicted.