Melvyn Green

The defendant was charged with production of marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking following a break-in at a licensed medical marijuana grow operation.

The defendant, employed as a security monitor and cleaner, called 911 to report the break-in and cooperated fully with police.

He claimed he honestly believed the entire operation was authorized under the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) based on production licenses displayed at the facility and assurances from his employer.

The Crown argued either that the defendant knew the operation exceeded authorized limits or, alternatively, that any mistaken belief was one of law rather than fact.

The court found the defendant's belief in his immunity from criminal liability was honestly held but constituted a mistake of law, as the licenses authorized only 30 plants while over 1,500 were present.

The defendant was convicted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with common assault and failing to comply with a probation order after allegedly pushing an elderly woman down stairs at a shopping mall.

The Crown presented testimony from the complainant and two independent witnesses who claimed the defendant pushed the complainant down the stairs.

The defendant testified that he made only incidental contact with the complainant's arm while gesturing to allow her to pass.

The court reviewed CCTV footage of the incident and found that the video evidence supported the defendant's account of accidental contact rather than an intentional assault.

The defendant was acquitted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit (over 80) following a traffic stop in downtown Toronto.

The defendant conceded all factual elements of the Crown's case but challenged whether police complied with the Charter right to counsel of choice under section 10(b).

The defendant indicated a desire to speak with a friend he believed to be a lawyer, but police did not adequately facilitate this request before offering duty counsel.

The court found a breach of the defendant's section 10(b) rights and excluded the breath test evidence as the appropriate remedy under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal on the over 80 charge.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his residence pursuant to a telewarrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of the search warrant, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO), as redacted to protect a confidential informant, fell short of constitutional standards.

The ITO relied on information from an untested confidential source whose tip lacked sufficient detail and compelling information.

Police corroboration was limited to confirmation of innocent facts.

The court applied the "three Cs" test (compelling, credible, corroborated) and found significant deficiencies in all three areas.

Additionally, the court found the ITO lacked evidence of currency regarding the alleged ongoing drug trafficking.

The court also found the affiant's conduct in preparing the ITO fell toward the serious end of the misconduct spectrum due to selective disclosure of the confidential informant's criminal record, misleading characterization of the applicant's prior charges as "offences," failure to determine the status of prior drug charges, and lack of diligence in corroborating key claims.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the seized evidence, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The Crown's case relied on roadside screening device and Breathalyzer test results.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, alleging violations of section 8 rights to privacy arising from video surveillance of his use of a toilet while in police custody.

The court acquitted the defendant of the impaired driving charge based on insufficient evidence of impairment.

The court found a Charter breach regarding the video surveillance and excluded the Breathalyzer results under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in acquittal on the "over 80" charge as well.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a search warrant execution at a residential premise.

The Crown's case relied on two incriminatory statements allegedly made by the accused and circumstantial evidence.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the voluntariness of both statements.

The first statement was made in the basement during the warrant execution; the second was video-recorded at the police station approximately one hour later.

The court found both statements involuntary due to improper inducements offered by police regarding lenient treatment of the accused's pregnant wife in exchange for his confession.

With both statements excluded, the court assessed the sufficiency of the remaining circumstantial evidence and found it insufficient to support committal to trial.

The accused was discharged on both charges.

The defendant, Carolyn Burden, was charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000 arising from her employment at Max the Mutt Animation Inc., a Toronto-based animation school.

During her employment from mid-2010 to mid-2011, approximately $159,000 was electronically transferred from the company's account to the defendant's personal account.

The Crown alleged the defendant fraudulently obtained more than $100,000 in excess of her authorized compensation.

The defendant claimed all transfers were authorized by her employer, Maxine Schacker, either as salary or as payment for invoiced work performed at various hourly rates.

The court found the defendant guilty of both charges, rejecting her testimony and accepting the Crown's evidence that she had independent capacity to execute electronic transfers and that no invoices supporting her claimed additional work were ever produced.

The defendant was charged with two counts of assault arising from events on March 25, 2012, when police attended his Toronto apartment in response to his call requesting removal of an unwanted guest.

The complainant and defendant had engaged in an intimate affair; she arrived for a one-night visit that extended to four days.

Following heated arguments about her affair with another man and her refusal to leave his apartment despite repeated requests, physical altercations ensued.

The defendant was arrested despite being the one who called police.

The Crown alleged multiple assaults; the defendant claimed self-defence and defence of property.

The trial judge found the complainant's testimony highly unreliable and internally inconsistent, with multiple material contradictions across her three different accounts.

The defendant's evidence regarding a single defensive restraint incident was substantially corroborated by the complainant's own testimony.

The judge acquitted the defendant on both counts, finding reasonable doubt as to guilt and establishing an air of reality for both self-defence and defence of property claims.

The offender pleaded guilty to four counts of trafficking in heroin committed between October 2012 and January 2013.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of two and a half years, while the defence sought a non-custodial disposition.

The court found the offender to be a low-level, addiction-driven trafficker who had made extraordinary rehabilitative efforts post-arrest, including successful completion of addiction treatment, mental health counselling, and community service.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day for the first offence, followed by two years of probation, with suspended sentences for the remaining three offences and concurrent probation orders.

The decision emphasizes the importance of rehabilitation for addict traffickers and the flexibility required in sentencing to achieve just results in exceptional circumstances.

The defendant was charged with voyeurism under s. 162(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and mischief under s. 430(1)(c) for photographing nude women at Hanlan's Point, a public clothing-optional beach in Toronto.

The Crown alleged the defendant surreptitiously recorded nude persons in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The defendant was acquitted on both counts.

The court found that the defendant's conduct was not surreptitious as it occurred openly on a public beach, and that nude beachgoers at a public clothing-optional beach do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy against being photographed.

The court also found the defendant did not commit mischief as his conduct did not objectively interfere with the lawful enjoyment of the beach property, and he lacked the requisite mens rea.

The defendant was charged with stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act and with failing or refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant conceded guilt to the stunt driving charge but contested the breath demand charge.

The court found the defendant guilty of stunt driving but acquitted him of the breath demand charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the failure to provide a suitable breath sample resulted from the defendant's knowing misconduct or from defects in the operation of the ASD device.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, following a rear-end collision in Toronto.

The Crown relied on breath test results and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence advanced Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the breath demand, the adequacy of the right to counsel advisement, and the reliability of the expert evidence.

The court found the breath demand lawful, admitted the breath test evidence despite a s. 10(b) breach, and convicted the defendant on both charges based on the expert evidence establishing impairment and excessive BAC at the time of driving.

The Crown applied under section 117.05 of the Criminal Code for an order forfeiting firearms and ammunition seized from the respondent and prohibiting him from possessing firearms.

The respondent, who had been apprehended under a Form 1 psychiatric assessment in September 2008 following concerning behaviour at a functional restoration program, opposed the application.

The court found that while the respondent's conduct on September 11, 2008 raised clinical concerns, the assessment must be made at the time of the hearing.

Considering the respondent's lack of criminal record, absence of violence, proper storage of weapons, and his family physician's opinion that he poses no danger to himself or others, the court declined the Crown's application for forfeiture and prohibition orders.

The defendant brought a Charter s. 11(b) motion challenging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with excessive blood alcohol concentration and speeding.

The defendant was arrested on May 18, 2012, released on a Promise to Appear, and the Information was sworn on June 7, 2012.

The trial was not scheduled until September 3, 2013—nearly 15 months later.

The court found that approximately 10 months of delay was attributable to institutional factors and a further 2 months to Crown conduct.

The defendant suffered actual prejudice to his security interests, including anxiety, depression, and medical intervention.

The court concluded that the delay exceeded permissible guidelines for simple cases and granted a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving following an incident on the 401 highway in north Toronto on March 7, 2012.

The complainant and defendant provided directly conflicting accounts of the driving behaviour, each accusing the other of reckless and dangerous conduct.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility in cases of testimonial conflict.

While the complainant's evidence was found to be more persuasive, the court determined that the defendant's account could reasonably be true and that a reasonable doubt existed as to the defendant's guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code after being pulled over on Highway 401 on January 28, 2012.

The defendant claimed he was attempting to follow the officer's instructions and never refused to provide a sample.

The Crown proved that the defendant made multiple failed attempts to provide a suitable breath sample and ultimately stated "I will not blow." The court found the defendant guilty, holding that the defendant both failed and unequivocally refused to provide a suitable roadside-screening sample.

The court also addressed the defence argument regarding the ASD calibration issue, finding that where there is a categorical refusal to provide a breath sample, the Crown need not establish that the approved screening device was tested and ready to accept a sample.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol concentration after failing a roadside screening test.

The defendant's BAC readings were more than twice the legal limit.

The defence argued that the arresting officer's seven-minute delay in making the approved screening device demand violated the defendant's Charter section 8 rights to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that the delay did breach the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, rendering the searches and seizures unreasonable.

However, applying the section 24(2) analysis from R. v. Grant, the court determined that the evidence should be admitted as the balance of factors favoured admission.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in trial.

The defendant was arrested on December 2, 2011, for mischief to property, causing a disturbance, and assault causing bodily harm arising from an incident at a Toronto bus station.

The trial was scheduled for July 2-3, 2013, approximately 19 months after the Information was sworn.

The court found that the Crown and police were responsible for approximately 14 months of delay through incomplete disclosure, failure to respond to defence counsel communications, Crown non-attendance at scheduled proceedings, and inconsistent positions on procedural requirements.

The court granted the stay, finding a violation of the defendant's right to trial within a reasonable time.

The Crown charged two defendants with assault causing bodily harm to Christopher Marcos, who was savagely beaten outside a nightclub in Toronto's Entertainment District on June 18, 2011.

The victim recalled little of the incident and could not identify his assailants.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the testimony of four Toronto Police Service officers who claimed to have witnessed the assault.

The sole issue was the identity of the perpetrators.

The defendants did not testify.

The court found that while the police witnesses may have observed an assault, their evidence fell short of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction due to significant inconsistencies in their accounts, the problematic manner in which their notes were prepared collaboratively, and the absence of any blood evidence on either defendant despite the victim being severely bloodied.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop in Toronto.

Police observed the defendant driving at excessive speed in a residential zone, making a rolling stop, and exhibiting signs such as bloodshot eyes and an odour of alcohol.

Upon exiting his vehicle, the defendant appeared to have difficulty.

However, video recordings of the defendant at the police station approximately 20 minutes after arrest showed no signs of impairment.

The court found that while the Crown established the defendant had consumed alcohol, the totality of the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his ability to drive was impaired.

The defendant was acquitted.