Nancy Ann Laton

The accused was arrested for impaired driving following a motor vehicle accident on Highway 401.

At the police station, during the booking process, a police officer directed the accused to remove the drawstring from his pants as a safety concern.

When the drawstring could not be removed without damaging the pants, the accused's pants were removed, leaving him in his undergarments.

The accused remained in this state of undress throughout his time at the police station, including during the breath testing procedure, where he subsequently refused to provide a breath sample.

The court found that the removal of the accused's pants constituted an illegal strip search conducted without reasonable and probable grounds, in a public area, in the presence of multiple officers, and while being videotaped.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy, finding that proceeding with the trial would be harmful to the integrity of the justice system.

The defendant was charged with alcohol-impaired driving and driving with an excessive blood alcohol concentration following a motor vehicle collision on Highway 401 in Toronto.

The Crown dismissed the impaired driving charge at the close of its case.

The court found that the defendant's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were breached by an unreasonable arrest and an unlawful breath demand made without reasonable grounds to believe.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant to determine whether evidence obtained through the Charter breach should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court excluded the toxicology report and Intoxilyzer readings, resulting in acquittal on the excessive BAC charge.

The defendant was charged with alcohol-impaired driving and driving with an excessive blood alcohol concentration following a two-vehicle collision on the 401 highway in Toronto.

The Crown closed its case on the impaired driving charge.

The defendant sought to exclude the breath alcohol concentration readings and toxicology evidence on the grounds that her arrest violated her Charter rights against arbitrary detention (s. 9) and that the breath demand violated her right against unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8).

The court found that while the officer detected an odour of alcohol and the defendant admitted to consuming alcohol and marijuana earlier in the day, the totality of circumstances did not objectively establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the defendant had committed an impaired driving offence.

The court determined that the evidence supported only a lower standard of reasonable suspicion, sufficient for a roadside screening demand but not for arrest or an Intoxilyzer demand.

Accordingly, the defendant's Charter rights were violated.

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown did not dispute the accuracy of the breathalyzer readings but argued they should be admitted despite Charter breaches.

The court found two Charter violations: a section 10(b) breach due to failure to explain rights in the accused's language (Cantonese), and a section 8 breach due to the officer's failure to follow OPP protocol regarding potential sources of false positives on the approved screening device.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused.

The defendant was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand following a serious collision on Highway 400.

The Crown's case on dangerous driving relied on circumstantial evidence of excessive speeding and alcohol consumption.

The court found that while speeding alone on a multi-lane highway with light traffic, even combined with prior alcohol consumption, did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care required for criminal liability.

The court acquitted on the dangerous driving charge but convicted on the refusal charge, finding that the defendant's conduct in the ambulance—becoming silent, unresponsive, physically rigid, and locking his arms—constituted an implied refusal to comply with the lawful ASD demand.