C. Tomusiak

The accused, Johnathan Townsend, brought an application under section 8 of the Charter to exclude computer evidence, specifically Skype chat logs and internet searches, in his first-degree murder trial.

The court found that the police search of the computer breached Townsend's Charter rights due to insufficient judicial authorization regarding the scope and timing of the data analysis.

However, applying the R. v. Grant test, the court determined that the evidence should not be excluded, citing the technical nature of the breach, the good faith of the police, the principled search methodology, and the overwhelming societal interest in the highly probative and essential evidence for the first-degree murder prosecution.

The Crown brought a motion for a finding that the accused's video statement to police was voluntary and admissible.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a lack of operating mind, inducements/trickery related to his parents, and the cumulative effect of these factors.

The court found the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that police conduct did not amount to trickery or inducement, and the accused possessed an operating mind, demonstrating nuanced decision-making despite his Asperger's condition and recent psychiatric care.

The statement was deemed admissible for the upcoming trial.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand after being pulled over for speeding and suspected impaired driving.

Despite multiple opportunities and instructions, the defendant was unable to produce an adequate breath sample, resulting in arrest.

The Crown sought conviction under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court acquitted the defendant, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally failed to comply with the demand.

The court adopted the Lewko/Soucy formulation of mens rea, requiring proof of intentional non-compliance rather than mere knowledge or recklessness.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The Crown's case relied on roadside screening device and Breathalyzer test results.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, alleging violations of section 8 rights to privacy arising from video surveillance of his use of a toilet while in police custody.

The court acquitted the defendant of the impaired driving charge based on insufficient evidence of impairment.

The court found a Charter breach regarding the video surveillance and excluded the Breathalyzer results under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in acquittal on the "over 80" charge as well.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample on an approved screening device (ASD) on July 29, 2013, on Highway 401 in Toronto.

The Crown alleged the defendant intentionally failed to produce a suitable sample during six attempts over five minutes.

The defendant testified he attempted to comply with the officer's instructions.

The court acquitted the defendant, finding that the Crown must prove the defendant intended to fail to provide a sample, not merely that he knew of the failure.

Additionally, the court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the failure was caused by the defendant's conduct or by malfunction or improper administration of the ASD device.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving, driving with a BAC over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and driving while disqualified.

He brought an application under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) had been infringed.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, finding that while there was some Crown delay in disclosure (approximately 1 month 25 days), the total operative delay was only 15 days beyond the Morin guidelines.

The court found no actual or inferred prejudice to the applicant and concluded that societal interests in having the serious charges tried on their merits outweighed the Charter violation claim.

The application was dismissed.