T. Edmund Chan

The defendant, having been convicted of dangerous driving causing death, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The court found that the defendant had explicitly waived his section 11(b) rights regarding pre-trial delay during a judicial pretrial.

Furthermore, the court held that the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan applies from charge to verdict, not to the sentencing phase, which remains governed by MacDougall.

The net delay of 27 months and 21 days fell below the 30-month ceiling, and the defence failed to demonstrate that the delay was otherwise unreasonable.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control and driving with excess alcohol care and control following a dispatch report of an impaired driver.

An officer located the defendant's vehicle in her driveway with the defendant slumped over the steering wheel.

The defendant claimed she had entered the vehicle only to retrieve her purse after consuming two glasses of wine upon arriving home.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence and found she had entered the vehicle with intent to put it in motion.

The court also rejected a Charter s. 10(b) rights argument regarding a 20-minute delay before rights to counsel were provided, finding the delay justified by legitimate medical concerns regarding a possible diabetic emergency.

The defendant was convicted of both charges, with the excess alcohol charge provisionally stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple.

The accused, M.B., was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against C.S., then age 15.

The case proceeded as a blended lost evidence application and trial.

The defence sought a stay of proceedings due to missing audio from the complainant's police interview, alleging a Charter breach.

The court found unacceptable negligence by the police but no abuse of process or irreparable prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence, thus denying the stay.

On the merits of the trial, the court found the complainant's credibility highly problematic, particularly regarding a second alleged incident which was found to be fabricated.

The court also considered the defence of mistake of age for the first incident, finding that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove M.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all four counts, and M.B. was acquitted.

The defendant, Rakesh Patel, was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death after hitting a seven-year-old girl on her bicycle in a crosswalk.

The court found that Patel drove through a red light due to substantial inattentiveness and distraction, which constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable prudent driver.

Despite arguments that his actions were a momentary lapse due to stress, the court concluded that his prolonged inattention over 9-10 seconds, covering a significant distance, merited criminal fault.

Patel was found guilty of dangerous driving causing death.

The accused, M.B., applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) and s. 24(1) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in commencing and completing trial.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court calculated the total delay and deducted defence-attributable delay, finding a net non-defence delay of 27 months and 6 days, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The court determined that the defence did not demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings and that the case did not take "markedly longer" than reasonable, considering local circumstances and Crown efforts.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit.

He alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), seeking exclusion of breath test results and a stay of proceedings.

The court found no breaches of sections 8 or 10(b).

However, the court found a violation of section 9 Charter rights due to arbitrary detention after the breath samples were taken.

The court rejected a stay of proceedings and found insufficient nexus between the breach and the evidence to engage section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty, but entitled to a sentence reduction as a remedy for the section 9 breach.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The defence challenged the validity of the breath demand and the timing of the breath samples, arguing they were not obtained as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The court found that the officers acted reasonably and diligently throughout the investigation, including in administering the approved screening device, managing delays at the police station, and contacting duty counsel.

The court concluded that the crown had complied with the statutory requirements and was entitled to rely on the presumption of identity based on the breath readings.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The Crown conceded the impaired charge.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 10(b) rights regarding the right to counsel, arguing the accused was not afforded privacy during her telephone consultation with duty counsel in a hospital emergency room.

The defence also argued the first breath sample was obtained after two hours had elapsed from the time of driving, contrary to s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights and that the breath samples were obtained within the statutory time limit.

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample on an approved screening device (ASD) on July 29, 2013, on Highway 401 in Toronto.

The Crown alleged the defendant intentionally failed to produce a suitable sample during six attempts over five minutes.

The defendant testified he attempted to comply with the officer's instructions.

The court acquitted the defendant, finding that the Crown must prove the defendant intended to fail to provide a sample, not merely that he knew of the failure.

Additionally, the court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the failure was caused by the defendant's conduct or by malfunction or improper administration of the ASD device.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether the police violated the defendant's Charter right to counsel under section 10(b) by failing to facilitate access to private counsel and instead defaulting to duty counsel.

The defendant also challenged whether the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The court found no Charter breach, as the defendant was asked if he had a specific lawyer and clearly declined, subsequently agreeing to speak with duty counsel.

The court also found the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and having a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on two alleged breaches: (1) arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter for approximately 7.5 hours after breath samples were obtained, and (2) violation of reasonable expectation of privacy under section 8 of the Charter due to video surveillance of the accused using a toilet in a police holding cell.

The court found no arbitrary detention but found a serious breach of section 8 rights.

The court granted a stay of proceedings based on the egregious nature of the privacy violation and the systemic practice within York Regional Police that would continue into the future.

The court imposed a common law peace bond as an alternative remedy.