Dr. Jacques

The offender was convicted by a jury of manslaughter for the death of her mother, who died from external neck compression following a physical altercation in their shared home.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 8 to 10 years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court weighed the profound breach of trust and violence of the offence against mitigating factors, including the offender's lack of a criminal record, genuine remorse, and unusually harsh pre-trial custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court sentenced the offender to 6 years' incarceration, less enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, H.B., brought an application to withdraw his guilty pleas to charges of indecent assault, gross indecency, and sexual intercourse with his daughter, which stemmed from incidents between 1964 and 1980.

H.B. contended that his pleas were not voluntary, informed, or unequivocal due to his health issues, stressors, and financial situation, and that he did not understand the proceedings.

The court considered the evidence of H.B., his physician (Dr. Jacques), and his former counsel (Mr. Beckett).

The court found that H.B.'s plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, noting his active involvement in plea negotiations and his understanding of potential penalties, despite his claims of memory loss and confusion.

The application to withdraw the pleas was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and other offences following a shooting at his high school.

At trial, he was found fit to stand trial and did not raise a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

On appeal, fresh psychiatric evidence established that the appellant suffered from severe paranoid schizophrenia and was NCRMD at the time of the offences.

However, the appellant was too mentally ill to participate in his appeal or instruct counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal despite the appellant's incompetence, as the Criminal Code does not require an appellant to be fit to prosecute an appeal, provided procedural fairness is ensured.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted a verdict of NCRMD, finding that a new trial was unnecessary given the conclusive fresh evidence.

The administrators of two mental health centres appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board transferring a patient, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, from a maximum security facility to a medium security facility.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board applied the wrong legal test by using the 'least onerous and least restrictive' standard to determine the conditions of the patient's hospital detention under s. 672.54(c) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Board for a rehearing with directions to apply the correct legal test and obtain further information regarding the patient's previous transfer and the suitability of the medium security facility.

The applicant hospital administrators moved under s. 672.76 of the Criminal Code to suspend a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering the transfer of the respondent accused from a maximum to a medium secure hospital facility, pending their appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the accused was fourth on the waiting list for the medium secure facility and it was highly unlikely he would be transferred before the appeal was heard in 13 days, making the suspension order unnecessary.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from the killing of a close friend, arguing the jury charge inadequately addressed the alternative defence theory that mental disorder negated the mens rea for murder and manslaughter, and misstated the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly instructed the jury under the Hilton approach that evidence of mental disorder remained relevant to intent even if the not criminally responsible defence failed.

It further held that, read as a whole, the charge clearly distinguished the balance of probabilities burden applicable to the mental disorder defence from the Crown’s burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.