Court File and Parties
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
BARBARA CABALA Defendant
Counsel: J. Spangenberg, C. Douglas, for the Crown J. Snow, D. D’Alonzo, for the Defendant
SENTENCING: June 26, 2025, and October 17, 2025
BEFORE: Moore J.
OVERVIEW
1On January 24, 2025, a jury found Barbara Cabala (“Ms. Cabala”) guilty of manslaughter in relation to the death of her mother, Elzbieta (“Ela”) Cabala, following a three-week trial that began on January 6, 2025. This is her sentencing.
THE FACTS
2I begin by setting out the facts relevant to sentencing. In doing so, I am guided by the principles that govern fact-finding following a jury verdict.
3Section 724(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, requires me to “accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty.” It also permits me to make findings of fact disclosed by the evidence or to hear evidence presented by either party with respect to that fact. Where a factual implication is ambiguous, I should not attempt to follow the logical process of the jury but instead make my own independent determination of the relevant facts. I should only find the facts necessary to permit the imposition of a proper sentence. I must not accept as fact any evidence consistent only with a verdict that the jury rejected: R. v. Brown, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 518, at p. 523; R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at paras. 16-21.
Undisputed Facts
4The events giving rise to the charges unfolded over a short but chaotic period inside the residence at 392 Wilkins Street in London, Ontario, on the evening of July 7, 2021.
5The first account of what occurred came from Ms. Cabala herself. At approximately 7:24 p.m., she called 911 to report that her mother had attacked her, that she had defended herself, and that she did not think her mother was breathing. She claimed that both of them were covered in blood. The operator instructed Ms. Cabala to perform CPR. Ms. Cabala advised that she was weak, could “barely get there” and was having difficulty breathing. Although the operator repeatedly urged her to attempt CPR, Ms. Cabala advised that she was scared and could not do so. She then went silent and unresponsive. Shortly thereafter, the operator could hear emergency personnel arrive on scene and Ms. Cabala tell them to “help her.”
6Just before 7:30 p.m., the first responding police officer arrived to find Ms. Cabala alive, conscious and lying on her side on the foyer floor. She had no obvious signs of injury. Her eyes were open but unfocused. She pointed toward the back of the residence and said, “help my mother.”
7At the rear of the residence, the officer found Ela lying unresponsive on the floor facing the closed patio doors. She had no vital signs. Her eyes were open, and there was blood around her mouth. The officer commenced CPR. Other police officers, fire services and EMS arrived soon after. Authorities pronounced Ela dead at 7:44 p.m.
8The scene around Ela’s body evidenced a recent struggle. Police observed blood on the walls, broken flowerpots, dirt scattered on the floor and a plant stand knocked over nearby. The patio door was closed. Later, the forensic identification officer found what appeared to be blood on the outside of the patio door and door sill.
9Ms. Cabala did not move from the floor in the entryway as other officers arrived. Officers observed smeared, dried blood on her hands, arms and chest. Her clothing was soiled with blood and dirt. She initially appeared unresponsive. An officer used a sternum rub to rouse her before leaving to clear the residence. When another officer asked if she was injured, Ms. Cabala did not respond. An officer visually examined her body for major injuries and observed only a small cut, approximately three centimetres long, on her hand. It appeared recent and while it might have been bleeding, it was not gushing. When officers moved Ms. Cabala, they found a cellphone underneath her, still connected to 911. An officer disconnected the call.
10Police arrested Ms. Cabala on the scene. They initially arrested her for aggravated assault, placed her in a cruiser and advised her of her right to counsel and gave the usual caution. Police later re-arrested her for homicide. During the arrest process, Ms. Cabala made an utterance that she had been defending herself. She also inquired whether being arrested for homicide meant that her mother was dead.
11Paramedics assessed Ms. Cabala on the scene. She complained of dizziness, headache and neck pain. Other than the cut to her hand, she had no obvious signs of injury. Due to her complaint of neck pain, paramedics applied a cervical collar. She also reported nausea, blurred vision and back pain. She could stand and move from the police cruiser to a stretcher. Paramedics transported her to the hospital at approximately 7:57 p.m.
12Hospital staff conducted extensive testing on Ms. Cabala but identified no acute injuries requiring ongoing treatment. She underwent CT scans, x-rays, MRI, bloodwork and a physical examination. Medical staff sutured the cut on her hand. Ms. Cabala later testified that she believed she had sustained a concussion, based on having experienced one previously. Between tests, police observed her sleeping. While at the hospital, she spoke with duty counsel. Hospital staff administered a tetanus shot, medication for nausea, saline and three regular-strength Tylenol.
13Ms. Cabala was discharged from the hospital at 2:33 a.m. without prescribed medication or instructions for further medical follow-up. As Ms. Cabala left the hospital, she reported to an officer that she remained dizzy and said, “she hit me in the head with a pot.” She again reported dizziness while being booked into cells, although the transporting officer did not observe her swaying while standing.
14Photographs taken later that night documented Ms. Cabala’s physical condition. At the station, a forensic identification officer photographed Ms. Cabala on video. The photographs show a sutured cut on her right hand and bruising, redness, cuts, scratches and abrasions on her hands, arms, legs, feet and neck. Blood and dirt remained caked on her body and clothing. Ms. Cabala testified that she later developed additional bruising while in custody. She complained of soreness throughout her body, particularly on the left side of her head, her lower back and her left shoulder.
15Ms. Cabala provided a videotaped statement to police in which she described a strained and emotional relationship with her mother. She advised that she had moved in with her mother approximately one month earlier following the breakdown of her 13-year relationship and while searching for an apartment. She said the arrangement had not been going well. She and her mother had never gotten along. In fact, she never felt loved by her mother. She stated that after her mother separated from her father, her mother “went crazy.” As an only child, Ms. Cabala was often criticized and expected to be perfect. She described her mother as jealous, intimidating and prone to yelling. She claimed her mother took satisfaction in her recent separation and unhappiness. She reported that her mother had mental health issues but refused help.
16At the same time, Ms. Cabala spoke of closeness and dependency in their relationship. She told police that she loved her mother with all her heart, that they spoke often and that she went to her mother with all her problems. She said her parents were her only family in Canada, and that she spent holidays with her mother. While they would fight, their conflicts would generally blow over.
17Ms. Cabala placed the tragic confrontation in the context of an argument earlier that evening. She said that she planned to go to a bar to watch hockey. Her mother came downstairs yelling about her drinking alcohol and accused her of being an alcoholic. According to Ms. Cabala, her mother said that she could see why her partner had left and called her ungrateful.
18The argument escalated and turned physical. Ms. Cabala said that her mother struck her on the shoulder with an open hand and lunged toward her. While wrestling, they knocked over several objects around the room. She stated that her mother struck her with several items. She said she cut her hand while trying to stop her and remove the items from her grasp. A plant stand holding terracotta pots fell and smashed on the floor. Ms. Cabala said that she lost consciousness twice.
19Ms. Cabala claimed that she acted defensively. She stated that she could tolerate verbal criticism but would defend herself if physically struck. She said her mother hit her with a terracotta pot. Ms. Cabala did not know whether her mother later suffered a stroke or a heart attack and that, when she got away from her, she appeared fine.
20Ms. Cabala claimed her mother was alive when she sought help. She told police that when she called 911, her mother was either on all fours or lying on her side, possibly brushing dirt off herself. Ms. Cabala demonstrated her mother’s position to the officer. In her police statement, the officer confronted her about the fact that she admitted her mother was not breathing in the 911 call. Ms. Cabala advised that she made this statement out of panic. She did not believe it was true “because when I looked back at her, she was still up. So, if she wasn’t breathing, how was she still up?”
21Ms. Cabala described the fight as the culmination of a violent and longstanding history with her mother. She told the officer that her mother had beaten her as a child and had also beaten her father and the family dog. She stated that her mother had slapped her about two weeks before the incident and that she had reported it to the police. She said that this was the first physical incident since she was a teenager.
22Ms. Cabala claimed that she was not trying to kill her mother. She and her mother were pushing and pulling each other until eventually they fell to the ground. They were hitting each other and both bleeding, exhausted from wrestling. Ms. Cabala disclosed that she eventually got away by pushing her mother off her. She said she could not escape the fight and acted in self-defence. She described the fight as follows: “it wasn’t pretty, and we were strangling each other and like in full throttle and pushing each other’s faces and like it wasn’t pretty at all.” She emphasized that it was a real fight but maintained that she did not kill her mother and did not even hurt her all that much.
23Two days later, the medical evidence provided an account of Ela’s injuries. On July 9, 2021, Dr. Jacques, a forensic pathologist, conducted the post-mortem examination. On external examination, she noted blood and dirt on Ela’s clothing and body and leaves in her hair. Ela was approximately 75 kilograms in weight and 157 centimetres in height. Dr. Jacques observed petechial hemorrhages in Ela’s eyes, eyelids and mouth, with areas of confluence in the eyes. She noted congestion of the face and upper neck due to blood accumulation, as well as petechial hemorrhage to the right ear. She observed more than 55 bruises and abrasions to the neck below the chin. One abrasion was curvilinear and could have been caused either by the fingernail of someone performing a neck compression or by someone attempting to defend against that compression.
24The pathologist also identified additional surface injuries consistent with both blunt and sharp force. There were superficial sharp force injuries to the face and neck. Dr. Jacques explained that sharp force injuries are caused by an implement with a sharp edge or point and may appear as incised wounds or stabs. She distinguished this from blunt force trauma, which results from broad force and includes lacerations, abrasions and bruising.
25Internal examination revealed significant injury to the neck structures. Dr. Jacques observed hemorrhaging to the strap muscles, indicating injury and bleeding. Both the left and right horns of the thyroid cartilage of the larynx were fractured. While the fractures themselves were not fatal, they indicated the application of significant force to the neck through external compression. Dr. Jacques testified that overcoming the strength of the cartilage requires substantial force. She also observed bleeding in the vocal cords.
26Dr. Jacques documented extensive injuries across Ela’s body. She identified multiple incised wounds to Ela’s nose, the back of her neck, her shoulder, elbow, wrist and both hands, along with other blunt force injuries. There were two tears to the scalp, measuring 2.4 and 2.7 centimetres, with bleeding beneath the scalp but no skull fracture or brain injury. She observed abrasions to the forehead, cheek, right eyelid, chin, left ear and left side of the head, as well as bruising and abrasions to the back of the head. The torso showed bruises and abrasions with internal bleeding. There were rib fractures and an injury to the tongue, which may have resulted from medical intervention. On the upper extremities alone, Dr. Jacques identified 36 bruises and abrasions. One injury on the upper right arm was a patterned “tram-track” bruise, consistent with impact from a cylindrical or rectangular object. She documented 23 bruises or clusters of bruises and abrasions to the lower extremities, including the legs and thighs. Toxicology indicated the presence of quinine or quinidine, which was not prescribed and could be attributable to tonic water. X-rays revealed no fractures to the hands or wrists.
27Dr. Jacques explained the anatomical consequences of sustained pressure to the neck. She testified that the carotid artery and jugular vein run along each side of the neck beneath the strap muscles. The carotid artery supplies blood to the brain, while the jugular vein carries blood away. If the jugular veins are compressed while arterial blood continues to flow to the head, pressure builds and causes petechial hemorrhages. This finding is consistent with sustained external neck compression. If the carotid arteries are compressed, oxygen delivery to the brain is reduced.
28Based on her examination, Dr. Jacques concluded that Ela died from external neck compression. She testified that her findings were consistent with sustained compression of the neck. The mechanism of injury could include manual pressure, such as strangulation or pressure from a broad surface, such as a forearm. The mechanism of death was cerebral hypoxia or ischemia – a lack of oxygen or blood flow to the brain. She further opined that the injuries to Ela’s hands, forearms and wrists could be defensive in nature, although that could not be determined through pathology alone.
29Dr. Jacques clarified what she meant by “sustained”. She testified that the compression must have lasted long enough to cause petechial hemorrhages on the inner surface of the eye. She could not opine about the position of the bodies or the order of the injuries. She also agreed there could have been multiple episodes of neck compression.
30Dr. Jacques testified that the head injuries did not cause Ela’s death. They may have affected her consciousness, but that could not be determined on autopsy. She stated that the other injuries, unrelated to external neck compression, did not contribute to the cause of death.
31In cross-examination, Dr. Jacques acknowledged variability in how injuries present. She agreed that in a struggle where two people apply force to each other, they could apply similar force and sustain very different injuries. She also agreed that death from external neck compression can occur with minimal or no visible injury to the external neck, particularly where the injuries are internal. She further agreed that bruising can vary in appearance, timing and visibility, and that some bruises never surface.
32Dr. Jacques testified that less force is required to close off the jugular veins than the carotid arteries. She explained that complete closure of both carotid arteries can lead to loss of consciousness within seconds. She testified that irreversible brain damage may occur after four to five minutes of no blood flow or oxygen. In this case, she pointed to evidence that the jugular veins were closed off while arterial blood continued to flow, increasing pressure in the brain, resulting in congestion and petechial hemorrhages.
33Ms. Cabala testified in her own defence and largely repeated the account she gave to police. She testified that Ela relentlessly struck and strangled her, using her hands and terracotta pots. She said she tried to push her mother away, but the attack continued. She described being struck in the head with a terracotta pot and trying to grab the pots from Elzbieta’s hands to throw them aside. She said she attempted to stun Ela by striking her with a terracotta pot, but it had no effect. She testified that her mother grabbed at her face and neck to strangle her.
34Ms. Cabala testified that she used significant force only after tireless attempts to escape her mother’s attack. She said that while she was on her back on the ground, Ela pinned herself on top of her and had her hands around her neck and face, making it difficult to breathe. She said that because of their proximity and because Ela’s hands were on her neck, she could not protect herself in any other way than by grabbing her mother’s neck. She acknowledged using considerable force because her earlier efforts to stop the attack had failed. She testified that once Ela eased up, she pushed her to the side and escaped.
Disputed Facts
35The parties disagree about some of the facts that I am to rely upon for sentencing purposes. The Crown must prove any disputed aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The defence must prove any mitigating facts on a balance of probabilities: R. v. Holt (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 32 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 52, leave to appeal refused, [1983] S.C.C.A. No. 474.
36The Crown submits that it does not attempt to prove any aggravating facts. It does not take the position that the offence arose from a wholly unprovoked assault. Rather, the Crown accepts that the events were preceded by a verbal altercation and potentially a slap, as described by Ms. Cabala.
37The defence asks this court to re-examine the issue of self-defence at sentencing. It urges me to conclude that this defence can only be rejected on the basis of “reasonableness”. It asks me to find that this is a case in which Ms. Cabala applied a tad too much force during a mutual struggle in which both women strangled each other. The defence asks me to fully accept Ms. Cabala’s version of events.
38Respectfully, I decline to undertake a separate self-defence analysis. The jury rejected the defence of self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt. That is an exacting standard. The jurors were not required to agree on the specific basis for that rejection, and it is neither necessary nor appropriate for me to determine their precise reasoning. For sentencing purposes, it is sufficient that I find there was a physical altercation between Ms. Cabala and her mother that resulted in Ela’s unlawful death by external neck compression.
39The evidence permits only limited findings about the nature of that struggle. On the physical evidence and testimony at trial, I am prepared to find that both Ms. Cabala and Ela participated in a physical altercation. I accept that Ela may have applied some force to Ms. Cabala during that altercation. However, I am unable to determine the nature or degree of that force. Although Dr. Jacques acknowledged that there are scenarios in which a person could apply external neck compressions without leaving external marks or fractures, I cannot conclude that this was such a case. Dr. Jacques could not offer that opinion based on Ms. Cabala’s account, and no such conclusion can be drawn from the evidence before me.
40The medical evidence does not support a finding that Ela subjected Ms. Cabala to external neck compression. Dr. Jacques testified that x-rays or other testing would not necessarily reveal internal injury from external neck compression in a surviving person and suggested that such questions would be better addressed by an emergency physician or other treating specialist. The defence called no evidence at sentencing indicating that Ms. Cabala had internal injuries consistent with strangulation. The medical evidence at trial did not provide clear evidence that Ms. Cabala had been strangled or subjected to external neck compression. While Ms. Cabala complained of neck pain and exhibited some redness and markings to her neck and body, this evidence does not permit such a finding.
41Ms. Cabala’s account of critical events is internally inconsistent with the established cause of death. During police interviews, Ms. Cabala repeatedly insisted that her mother was alive, breathing, partially sitting up and moving her hand at the time of the 911 call. She demonstrated this position for the officer. That account cannot be reconciled with the medical evidence establishing that Ela died from external neck compression. This insistence on a version of events that cannot be true undermines Ms. Cabala’s credibility, reliability and the weight that I can place on other aspects of her account. In addition, Ms. Cabala reported blacking out on multiple occasions and had no recollection of the altercation extending onto the patio, despite evidence indicating that it did. This further undermines the reliability of her evidence.
42Ms. Cabala is not entitled to the most favourable interpretation of the jury’s path to conviction: R. v. S.P., 2024 ONCA 211, at para. 38, citing R. v. Nelson, 2014 ONCA 853, 318 C.C.C. (3d) 476, at para. 56.
43I am not prepared to find that Ms. Cabala and her mother were forcefully strangling each other and that Ms. Cabala used slightly too much force. Even on a balance of probabilities, the evidence does not support that conclusion. While such a scenario is possible in the abstract, the physical and medical evidence before me does not establish it. In rejecting self-defence, the jury necessarily concluded that it was not left in reasonable doubt by Ms. Cabala’s claim that she acted in self-defence and only used the force necessary to repel her mother’s attack.
VICTIM IMPACT
44The Crown filed three victim impact statements. Ms. Hoffman and Ms. Johnson read theirs aloud to the court.
45Ela’s brother and Ms. Cabala’s uncle, Andrzej Smolik, lives in Poland and described the profound impact of the offence on his life. He explained that his sister, Ela, served as his protector, role model and guide. They were very close. He was a child when Ms. Cabala was born, and they lived together in the same household. He said that the tragedy has forced him to reflect deeply on how he should conduct his own life and relationships to preserve family cohesion. He described the loss as a source of immense pain that has stripped much of the joy from what had once been a supportive family life. At the same time, he acknowledged the painful paradox that his niece, whom he also loves, has lost the closest person in her life.
46Gail Johnson, a neighbour of Ela, described her as a considerate and respectful homeowner. She explained that she carries guilt from the night of the offence, recalling that she believed she heard voices, yelling and lawn chairs being moved but did not immediately go outside to investigate. She continues to wonder whether earlier action might have allowed her to intervene and save Ela’s life. Ordinary noises around her home and looking out her back door now trigger memories of that night. She stated that Ela’s death and the manner of her death have heightened her awareness of the need to show love, care and respect toward her own mother.
47Pamela Hoffman, a friend and neighbour of Ela, expressed concern that the trial process “villainized” Ela in a way that did not reflect the kind of person she knew. She described Ela as kind, considerate, friendly, funny, helpful and as someone who embraced life. She said that she misses her conversations in Ela’s home and on the balcony, their laughter over the fence while clipping bushes, and Ela’s advice and frankness. She recalled that Ela welcomed her to the neighbourhood and made living there feel safe and welcome.
48She also described conversations she had with Ela about Ms. Cabala living in her home. She said that she encouraged Ela to ask Ms. Cabala to leave, as she observed that Ela appeared sad after Ms. Cabala moved in. According to Ms. Hoffman, Ela responded that Ms. Cabala had nowhere else to go, that she loved her daughter, and that she would never do that to her. Ms. Hoffman said that Ela spoke often of her unconditional love for her daughter and her hope that Ms. Cabala would receive help.
49Ms. Hoffman stated that Ela’s death has left her feeling guilty that she could not help her friend. She described experiencing recurring stress and a diminished sense of safety in her own home, which no longer feels like a refuge. She explained that seeing Ms. Cabala at the store where she worked, and where Ms. Hoffman’s employment required her to attend, caused her significant emotional distress. She had to avoid that location, which resulted in lost wages. She stated that, in a perfect and just world, Ela would still be alive and happily enjoying her retirement.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER
Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”)
50The PSR confirms that Ms. Cabala has no prior criminal record and outlines her history. She was born in Poland. Her parents, Jacek and Ela, fled Poland and lived as refugees in Austria while completing the process to become landed immigrants in Canada. The family moved to Canada when Ms. Cabala was seven years old. They first lived in Woodstock, Ontario, and later relocated to London, Ontario when Ms. Cabala was in tenth grade, as Ela completed her physiotherapy studies at a university in London.
51Ms. Cabala described a childhood shaped by family instability. She reported that her father struggled with alcohol addiction, which led to arguments and difficulties at home. She nonetheless described her parents as having a strong relationship marked by challenges and periods of reconciliation. They separated after 25 years together when Ms. Cabala was in university. She advised that she has reconciled with her father since his sobriety and that they have spoken regularly over the past year.
52Ms. Cabala described her relationship with her mother as close and evolving over time. She reported that during immigration and her early years in Canada, their relationship was positive and close, marked by discussions about personal matters, spirituality and intellectual topics. She said it became challenging when she assumed the role of emotional support while her mother struggled in her relationship with her father. After the separation, Ms. Cabala described her mother as her best friend. They lived near one another, spent holidays together and remained closely connected.
53Ms. Cabala experienced significant stressors in her adult life. Her 13-year relationship with her partner ended in January 2021. She described the relationship as generally good but “rocky” toward the end. There was no violence. Stressors included the death of the couple’s dog, the death of her partner’s father and Ms. Cabala’s medical challenges. One medical test revealed an umbilical-cord pregnancy that Ms. Cabala did not know about. Ms. Cabala is currently in a relationship of approximately three years and described her partner as very supportive.
54Ms. Cabala’s father provided his own perspective on the family dynamic. He told the author of the PSR that he attempted to encourage Ms. Cabala and her mother to avoid conflict but that disagreements were an “everyday occurrence.” He denied ever witnessing physical violence between them.
55Two additional individuals spoke to Ms. Cabala’s character and family relationships: Janina Pedzimaz, a close family friend, and Andrzej Smokik, Ela’s younger brother. Ms. Pedzimaz described Ela as a “very nice person, very polite [and] very stubborn.” Her family would vacation with the Cabala’s, and she described them as very close to each other. She said Ela was a very strong woman who was also “very clever, very careful and very controlled.” She advised that she had never seen Ms. Cabala behave in an aggressive or violent manner, though she knew of arguments between Ms. Cabala and Ela. She recalled teaching Ms. Cabala in Polish school as a child and described her as attentive and eager to do her best. Mr. Smokik, Ela’s brother, described Ms. Cabala in her youth as “independent, very calm and organized.” While he had less contact with Ms. Cabala as an adult, he knew that health problems had affected her. He advised that in his interactions with Ms. Cabala, she remained calm, did not shout or argue despite her mental health issues.
56Ms. Cabala described a history of educational and employment achievement followed by a decline due to health and circumstance. She reported performing well in school and earning a Bachelor of Science degree in university. She denied any learning disabilities but reported anxiety and panic attacks related to examinations. After graduating, she worked at a local factory as a shift technician and received a promotion to Quality Engineering Technologist in 2015. She left that job on a medical leave in 2017 and transitioned to long-term disability, eventually resigning in 2019. Due to financial pressures and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ms. Cabala later worked at multiple retail stores, including Dollarama and Canadian Tire. Her employment ended following her arrest. After her release on bail, she worked at a department store where she met her current partner, before being re-arrested in 2021.
57Ms. Cabala reported a history of alcohol use that fluctuated over time. She said she began drinking socially at age 18 or 19 and that her consumption increased during her prior long-term relationship. She and her former partner stopped drinking between 2018 and 2020. At present, she reported that she sometimes drinks to “get drunk” and would like to reduce her consumption. She reported periods of abstinence, days where she consumes a drink or two, and others where she drinks more. She has never attended counselling specifically for alcohol addiction.
58Ms. Cabala described a limited but stable social circle and a range of personal interests. She reported having many friends as a child and maintaining one childhood friendship, but not pursuing broader social relationships, relying instead on her former partner and mother for companionship. She reported interests including painting, drawing, gardening, hiking, camping, walking in nature, and reading/writing poetry. She described herself as spiritual and said she engages in Indigenous teachings, prayer and meditation.
59Ms. Cabala reported periodic engagement with mental health supports. She saw a counsellor at age 16 to cope with family-related issues and again during university. She sought psychiatric assistance at a hospital but was told “she was fine.” In 2022, she completed a 12-week outpatient “Track to Wellness” mental health program.
60Finally, Ms. Cabala described the emotional impact of the offence and its aftermath. She reported having many intense conversations with her mother after moving in with her, primarily about concerns for her wellbeing, expectations, and objections to her drinking alcohol or consuming marijuana. She expressed shock at the events of July 7, 2021, and her conviction. She stated that she lost her “best friend” and thinks about her mother every day. She is open to participating in therapy.
Medical Issues
61Ms. Cabala provided medical records to the court detailing longstanding and progressive spinal conditions. She also provided those records to the PSR author. The records include imaging from May 2018, which refers to a suspected intrauterine pregnancy and identifies spondylolysis and spondylolisthesis at L5-S1, with severe foraminal stenosis, degenerative disc disease and severe compression of the existing L5 nerve, worse on the left. Follow-up imaging in May 2025 reported interval progression at L5-S1, characterized by bilateral L5 spondylolysis, grade two to three spondylolisthesis, new bone-on-bone contact, adjacent bone marrow edema and slight worsening of bilateral severe neural foraminal stenosis with compression of the existing L5 nerve roots. The defence did not call a medical witness to explain these records. Based on the information before me, I understand that Ms. Cabala has significant back issues that have worsened since 2018.
62Ms. Cabala has a history of serious neurological issues. I understand that she had a brain tumour removed in 2017 and has a residual mass, likely meningioma, involving the superior sagittal sinus. Defence counsel submitted updated MRI reports. A February 2019 report indicated the lesion remained unchanged since July 2018 and had grown minimally since September 2017. An August 2019 MRI described the lesion as stable, with unchanged occlusion of the anterior third of the superior sagittal sinus and no acute intracranial abnormality. A June 2025 follow-up MRI raised concerns for an underlying demyelinating process, such as multiple sclerosis (“MS”), and recommended neurological consultation. Ms. Cabala had a neurology appointment scheduled for November 7, 2025. Defence counsel advised me that Ms. Cabala has since been diagnosed with MS.
Letters of Support
63I received a number of letters of support on Ms. Cabala’s behalf. Some were written by individuals who were also interviewed by the author of the PSR.
64Jacek Cabala, Ms. Cabala’s father, wrote a letter in support of his daughter. He described her as a compassionate and empathetic person who is a great asset to the community. He also wrote that she is very fragile. He was critical of Ela, his ex-wife, stating that she required therapy which she never pursued. He expressed the view that Ms. Cabala was a victim of her mother’s abuse.
65Janina Pedzimaz submitted a letter describing her friendship with Ms. Cabala and the time they spent together on vacation. She identified herself as one of Ela’s closest friends and stated that she remained in contact with Ms. Cabala while on bail. She indicated awareness of Ms. Cabala’s prior health issues. She described Ms. Cabala as selfless, kind-hearted and reliable.
66Sandra Maracle-Harder, a long-time friend of over 15 years and the sister of Ms. Cabala’s former partner, wrote in support of Ms. Cabala. She characterized Ms. Cabala as someone she could be honest with and as having a big heart. She further described her as kind, thoughtful, sweet and supportive. She noted that Ms. Cabala paid for her father’s funeral as a final gift. She described Ms. Cabala as mentally and emotionally intelligent and a strong and loving person.
67Tonya Andrews stated that she has known Ms. Cabala since eighth grade and spent significant time at the Cabala home growing up. She described Ms. Cabala as kind, caring and compassionate, with a strong passion for nature, wildlife, art and photography. She noted that Ms. Cabala developed a relationship with her children. She wrote that Ms. Cabala is a sensitive individual whose family always held her to high standards, which she consistently strived to meet.
68Ken Weaver, who worked as a Quality Assurance Manager at the same company as Ms. Cabala and supervised her work, described her as outgoing, friendly, punctual and dedicated. He wrote that she performed well when learning new tasks under mentorship. At the time of his retirement in 2015, he considered her a strong employee with a promising future at the company.
69Karl Williams, Ms. Cabala’s current partner, described meeting her while working at Loblaws. He wrote that Ms. Cabala could multi-task and took her work seriously. He described her as a dedicated employee who interacted positively with customers and colleagues. After six months, she moved laterally into part-time bookkeeping. He stated that Ms. Cabala has been open and forthcoming with him about her legal situation. He described them as “attached at the hip” over the past few years and enjoying many activities together. He also noted that Ms. Cabala maintains close contact with her uncle and father.
70Melanie Howard, a manager with the CMHA Justice and Court Team, submitted a letter describing an intake assessment conducted on May 12, 2025. The letter indicated that Ms. Cabala identified goals related to financial-assistance navigation, development of coping skills for mental health and participation in therapeutic and recreational programming, including an art-based group program.
71Ms. Cabala addressed the court and read a poem that she wrote to her mother. I accept that Ms. Cabala has genuine remorse over the death of her mother. She is deeply impacted by her mother’s death.
Pre-Trial Custody Conditions
72Ms. Cabala spent a significant period in pre-trial custody at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre (“EMDC”). Defence counsel filed EMDC records confirming Ms. Cabala’s detention from July 8, 2021, to October 22, 2021 (107 days), and again from November 24, 2024, to December 5, 2024 (12 days). Ms. Cabala returned to EMDC for 12 days in late 2024 after breaching bail conditions when her surety left the country.
73Her time in custody included periods of segregation, quarantine and lockdown. From July 9 to July 14, 2021 (5 days), Ms. Cabala was held in segregation while on “suicide watch.” From July 8 to July 18, 2021, she spent 18 days in COVID-19 related quarantine, including five days on the specialized care unit and the remainder on the regular unit. She spent an additional ten days, from October 6 to October 15, 2021, on the specialized care unit due to a COVID-19 outbreak, though not in segregation.
74During her time in custody, Ms. Cabala experienced 20 days of partial or full lockdown. For most of her detention, she was either alone or housed with one cellmate, except for a seven-day period from October 16 to October 22, 2021, when four inmates shared a cell.
75Ms. Cabala provided a detailed affidavit describing the conditions she experienced while detained. She attested that while housed on the specialized care unit, she was placed in an isolation cell approximately five feet by seven feet containing a concrete platform with a two-inch plastic mattress, a thin sheet and blanket, but no pillow. The cell included a combination toilet and sink. Because she was on suicide watch, guards monitored her every 15 minutes and woke her up if she fell asleep. She recalled being permitted out of her cell only twice that week, for approximately ten minutes each time.
76She described those conditions as psychologically distressing. She attested that she was not provided with books, paper or other materials, and that the hallway lights remained on at all times. She could hear constant screaming, as the specialized care unit also housed women with significant mental health issues or those withdrawing from drugs. She described the environment as terrifying and felt as though she were in an insane asylum. She said she had to ask for toilet paper, which she found humiliating, and attested that she received no psychiatric care while expressing suicidal ideations.
77Ms. Cabala also described restrictive conditions during quarantine and regular custody. She recalled being housed on Unit Seven during quarantine and not being permitted out of her cell except for showers, which sometimes occurred days apart. There was no access to outdoor time and no programming. After quarantine, she was moved to a two-person cell on the unit, which she stated offered no greater amenities than the specialized care unit.
78She described her overall custodial experience as “scary”. She witnessed drug use and violence, including violence perpetrated by her own cellmate. She stated that correctional staff were not always present or did not respond promptly to altercations, which made her feel unsafe and vulnerable.
79Ms. Cabala attested to unsanitary conditions and delays in medical care. She stated that she was required to clean “dirty water” resulting from clogged toilets and that the units and showers were generally unsanitary. Lockdowns frequently interfered with access to laundry. She described prolonged toilet clogs. She attested that she developed rashes and yeast infections. She would wait days for treatment after submitting a “green form”. She stated that she removed the stitches from her hand with her own teeth because she was not taken to a healthcare worker. She also developed an infection and was only given Polysporin.
80Ms. Cabala attested to limited access to programming and basic supports. She reported experiencing concussion symptoms for approximately one month but only received Advil or Tylenol. She stated that she was not provided with her glasses despite repeated requests, limiting her ability to see the television. This forced her to rely on the limited availability of books. The only regular programming available was chapel. A social worker attended infrequently but occasionally provided puzzles and colouring sheets. She reported being permitted outside only once or twice per week and exercised by doing push-ups, sit-ups and crunches due to the absence of equipment. She described the food in EMDC as unhealthy.
81These conditions took a toll on her mental health. The poor Zoom facilities for court appearances caused her stress and fear that she might miss important information or respond inappropriately. She reported that she did not have access to counselling or therapy while in custody. Mental health treatment was limited to medication, including anti-depressants, sleep aids and blood-pressure medication.
82Shortly before her release on bail in October 2021, Ms. Cabala was transferred again due to COVID-19. She was moved to the “Annex”, an area typically used for male inmates, where she had access to paper but no books. She remained on lockdown for most of the day. She subsequently returned to Unit Seven, where she shared a cell with three other inmates.
83Ms. Cabala also experienced distressing incidents during her second period of detention. When she returned to EMDC in November 2024, her cellmate had a breakdown, struck herself and repeatedly hit her head against the wall before being sedated. Ms. Cabala was moved to another cell but described the incident as traumatic.
Additional Materials
84The defence filed materials addressing systemic conditions in women’s correctional facilities. These materials included a copy of a report entitled “The Devil’s Playground: A Case Study of Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre (EMDC) Demonstrating the Systemic Failings of the Ontario Corrections Regime” by Nicole Kelly: (2021) 44:5 Manitoba L.J. 61. It also submitted excerpts from two reports of the Office of the Correctional Investigator: the 2020-2021 Annual Report, Chapter 2 entitled “A Review of Women’s Corrections: 30 Years since Creating Choices” and a chapter from the 2023-2024 Annual Report, entitled “Population Pressures in Women’s Institutions: Overreliance and Impacts of Interregional Transfers”.
85Defence counsel relied on these materials to situate Ms. Cabala’s custodial experience within the systemic context. Counsel pointed to portions of the reports describing increases in the number of federally incarcerated women and submitted that, three decades after Creating Choices, conditions within the federal penitentiary system have not improved and may have deteriorated. Counsel emphasized ongoing deficits identified in the reports, including limited programming, security concerns and inadequate access to medical and dental care.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Crown
86The Crown seeks a penitentiary sentence in the range of eight to ten years. It asks for a sentence of ten years incarceration, less credit for pre-sentence custody. Total pre-sentence custody amounts to 129 days, enhanced under s. 719 of the Criminal Code to 178.5 days. The Crown also seeks a DNA order given that manslaughter is a primary designated offence, and a weapons prohibition under s. 109 for ten years.
87The Crown submits that a sentence of ten years is the least restrictive sentence appropriate in the circumstances. It argues that denunciation and general deterrence must be given significant weight. The Crown submits that it is an aggravating factor that Ela permitted Ms. Cabala to move back into her home to help her get back on her feet, and that Ms. Cabala caused her mother’s death in her own home. It characterizes this as a significant breach of trust and relies on s. 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, which identifies offences committed against family members as aggravating. The Crown submits that the amendment to this provision reflects Parliament’s heightened emphasis on the seriousness of such relationships, beyond that found in older jurisprudence.
88The Crown also relies on the nature of the assault as aggravating. It emphasizes the medical evidence of sustained neck compression, the associated internal injuries, and the volume of Ela’s external injuries.
89The Crown submits that the offence had a profound impact on Ela’s family and friends. It acknowledges that Ms. Cabala has also been affected by her mother’s death.
90The Crown acknowledges that there was a fight in which the defence raised self-defence and the jury rejected it. It accepts that Ms. Cabala has no prior criminal record, is otherwise of good character, has support in the community and has positive employment history.
The Defence
91The defence seeks a conditional sentence of two years less a day to be served in the community, followed by three years of probation. It submits that the court could decline to credit pre-sentence custody and instead treat it as a mitigating factor.
92The defence argues that the sentencing range proposed by the Crown is incorrect. It submits that even in cases involving firearms, sentences for manslaughter may begin at four years imprisonment: R. v. Mandley-Byer, 2024 ONSC 6013, at para. 64. The defence argues that the parental relationship has always been treated as aggravating, and that the amendment to s. 718.2(a)(ii) is of no consequence. It submits that the relative absence of conditional sentence authorities for manslaughter reflects the unavailability of such sentences between 2007 and 2022. The defence further submits that the authorities relied on by the Crown are distinguishable, as they do not involve circumstances where the defence raised self-defence. It submits that its own authorities are more analogous and demonstrate that conditional sentences have been imposed in more aggravating circumstances than those present here.
93The defence submits that Parliament’s expansion of the availability of conditional sentences reflects an intention that they be used, including in serious cases, where appropriate, to reduce overreliance on incarceration. It relies on R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 22, in which the Supreme Court recognized that conditional sentences can be punitive and satisfy the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.
94The defence further submits that the conditions of incarceration and broader systemic concerns within federal penitentiaries weigh strongly in favour of considering reasonable alternatives to incarceration, including a conditional sentence.
95The defence points to Ms. Cabala’s consistent work history and significant medical conditions. It submits that her inability to work due to health issues has caused financial hardship and affected her sense of identity and self-worth. It refers to her struggles with mental health, including episodes following a miscarriage, the breakdown of her long-term relationship and suicidal ideations after arrest. The defence highlights her efforts to address those challenges through involvement with the Canadian Mental Health Association, the London Health Sciences outpatient program, counselling and credit counselling.
96The defence emphasizes the support available to Ms. Cabala. It points to her current partner as a significant and ongoing source of support, as well as her close relationship with her father and uncle. It submits that the character letters demonstrate her care for others and her otherwise good character, including her role in supporting her father with medical issues.
97Finally, the defence submits that Ms. Cabala shared a deep and loving bond with her mother, upon whom she relied and who relied on her in turn. It submits that Ms. Cabala must now confront her life, as well as her medical and psychological challenges, without her mother.
SENTENCING PRINCIPLES
98The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to “protect society and to contribute… to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives” as set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in the rehabilitation of offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community.
99In crafting an appropriate sentence, the guiding principle is proportionality. Section 718.1 requires that a sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Imposing a proportionate sentence is a highly individualized exercise; one that is tailored to the gravity of the offence, the blameworthiness of the offender, and the harm caused by the crime: R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327, at pp. 557-59.
100Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code directs sentencing judges to consider a number of other statutory principles, including: a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any mitigating or aggravating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender (s. 718.2(a)); a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances (also known as the principle of parity set out in s. 718.2(b)); and, courts should exercise restraint in imposing imprisonment (ss. 718.2(d) and (e)). In other words, all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders.
101Although all sentencing objectives are relevant, depending on the facts of the case, the court is entitled to give different weight to the various objectives. In manslaughter cases, deterrence and denunciation are generally paramount.
102In coming to a just sentence, the court must consider the aggravating and mitigating factors unique to each case. Sentencing is a highly individualized process that turns on the specific facts before the court. Individualization is central to the assessment of proportionality as it requires a focus on the individual circumstances of the offender: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at para. 12; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 58. In Lacasse, at para. 12, the Court observed that “[t]he more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender’s degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be.”
APPLICABLE RANGE
103The principle of parity requires that similar sentences be imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar conditions. Parity is not a separate objective of sentencing but a component of the broader principle of proportionality. While no two cases are identical, parity promotes consistency and fairness in sentencing while preserving the individualized nature of the exercise: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 30-32.
104Manslaughter carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. There is no minimum sentence. The offence encompasses a wide spectrum of moral culpability, ranging from near-accidental conduct to acts approaching murder. As a result, the range of sentences for manslaughter is exceptionally broad. This breadth reflects both the variety of ways in which manslaughter may be committed and the need to tailor the sentence to the circumstances of each offender: R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290, 173 D.L.R. (4th) 66, at para. 247; R. v. Carrière (2002), 164 C.C.C. (3d) 569 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 10.
105Both parties relied on sentencing authorities to assist the court in situating a proportionate sentence. The Crown provided several manslaughter cases resulting in penitentiary sentences ranging from eight to twelve years. The defence relied on six manslaughter cases in which the sentences ranged from 12 to 24 months incarceration or conditional sentences served in the community.
Crown Authorities
106The Crown relied on the following cases:
R. v. Kimpe, ONCA 812 (10 years less pre-sentence custody): the accused killed his common law partner by strangulation following an argument about his sexual performance. He choked her for approximately five minutes and then dropped her when he realized she was unconscious. He initially attempted to conceal the offence by setting fire to the house but later went to a hospital and told police that he had killed his wife and set the house on fire. The court noted the size difference between the victim and the accused, the disregard for the victim’s body and the highly personal nature of strangulation. The accused had strong character references and a dated criminal record. He pled guilty to arson and offered to plead guilty to manslaughter, but the Crown rejected his plea. He was convicted of manslaughter. In upholding the sentence on appeal, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the range of sentence for manslaughter with aggravating circumstances is 7 to 12 years.
R. v. May, 2025 ONSC 95 (joint submission of 11.5 years less pre-sentence custody): the accused caused the death of his domestic partner through sustained external neck compression and blunt force trauma. The court described strangulation at para. 39 as a “particularly cruel means of death.” After the killing, the accused attempted to avoid detection by dumping the victim’s body in a lake. The matter proceeded by an agreed statement of fact, as the accused had no memory of the offence. Aggravating factors included intimate partner violence, a serious breach of trust, a dated criminal record and a history of alcohol abuse. The court also noted the lasting and profound impact on the victim’s family. Mitigating factors included expressions of remorse, the absence of a contested trial, and the added harshness of pre-sentence custody.
R. v. Shevalev, 2021 BCSC 2050 (joint submission of eight years): the accused pled guilty to manslaughter in the death of his elderly father. He attended his father’s residence and placed him in a chokehold, rendering him unconscious, and left the house without calling for help. When he returned several hours later, his father had died. Evidence established that he had taken large sums of money from his father to support his cocaine addiction. After the offence, he attempted to avoid detection by staging the body before calling 911. The accused was 19 years old, pled guilty, had no criminal record, expressed remorse, took positive steps toward rehabilitation, had a low likelihood of reoffending and complied with strict bail conditions.
R. v. Sun, 2020 ONSC 3806 (nine years): the accused killed his wife, a Chinese immigrant, during an argument arising out of marital and financial difficulties at their restaurant. The victim expressed her intention to return permanently to China, and during the confrontation allegedly threatened the accused with a knife. A violent altercation followed, during which the accused inflicted fatal blunt force injuries and strangled the victim. The jury rejected provocation as a complete defence but convicted the accused of the lesser offence of manslaughter. The court identified aggravating factors including the breach of trust, the brutality of the offence and the “personal” element inherent in strangulation. The victim was vulnerable given her social circumstances and reliance on the accused, and the court noted the impact of her death on her family in China. Mitigating factors included the absence of a criminal record, positive character references, the presence of provocation, the accused’s out-of-character conduct, expressions of remorse, and the accused’s assumption of responsibility, including admitting during the 911 call that he had killed his wife.
R. v. McCormick, 2017 BCSC 145 (12 years less pre-sentence custody): the accused killed his 64-year-old mother following a brutal beating, after which he attempted to avoid detection by cleaning his shirt with bleach and discarding his jeans. The medical evidence was equivocal as to the precise cause of death, attributed either to pressure applied to the chest or to injuries sustained during the beating. The court identified significant aggravating factors including the breach of trust inherent in the parental relationship, the vulnerability and defencelessness of the victim, the accused’s prior record and the impact on the victim’s family and friends. Mitigating factors included the accused’s guilty plea, family support, history as a model prisoner and history of substance abuse. The court also considered that the offence occurred while the accused experienced a self-induced psychosis from drug use.
R. v. LaFantaisie, 2004 ABPC 106 (eight years): the accused strangled his mother to death during an argument that arose after he returned home from a drug binge. During the binge, he withdrew money from her account and an argument ensued about the missing funds. The accused strangled her with his bare hands and then attempted to conceal her body, though he later confessed to police. The court found a severe breach of trust, noting the victim’s vulnerability. She allowed the accused access to her bank accounts and shared her home with him for more than two years. Although there was a confrontation, the victim was not a physical threat to the accused. The court noted the offence’s impulsivity and the severe breach of trust. It also considered the accused’s early guilty plea, expressions of remorse (although the accused also blamed his drug addiction), cooperation with police and positive work history.
R. v. Lindsay, [1997] O.J. No. 5317 (S.C.) (ten years plus eleven months pre-sentence custody): the accused killed his 71-year-old mother by suffocating her with a pillow during an argument about finances after she refused to stop yelling. He then left the residence and stayed at hotels for several days. Six days later, he confessed to police. The court noted that, but for the confession, the cause of death would not have been determined. Aggravating factors included the breach of trust, vulnerability of the victim, the highly personal means of death, and the significant impact of the offence on the victim’s family. Mitigating factors included the accused’s guilty plea, a non-violent criminal record, the presence of provocation under the former legislative framework and his confession to police. The parties submitted a joint proposal in the range of eight to ten years.
Defence Authorities
107The defence provided me with the following cases:
R. v. Turcotte, [2000] O.J. No. 1316 (C.A.) (two-year conditional sentence): the court convicted the accused of manslaughter in the death of his 71-year-old mother, whom he killed by ligature strangulation during an altercation in their shared apartment. The accused and his mother were extremely close and lived together, caring for one another after the death of the accused’s father three years earlier. Both were heavily intoxicated at the time of the offence, and the accused was also under the influence of prescribed medication, which medical evidence later established caused him to be in a psychotic state resulting in total amnesia. The accused reported earlier that evening his mother confronted him with a knife, which he put away, and later attacked him with her bare hands. The victim was elderly, intoxicated and described by the court as truly defenceless inside the home, capable of only pleading for mercy. After the incident, the accused contacted family members before calling 911 and fully co-operated with police. The sentencing judge emphasized the breach of trust, but concluded the offence occurred under “very specific difficult conditions unlikely to ever reoccur”. The sentencing court placed significant weight on the accused’s sincere remorse, extensive rehabilitation, lack of risk to the community, strong family support and the need for uninterrupted treatment and counselling. The victim’s surviving children supported a community-based sentence. A majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the conditional sentence, though a strong dissent emphasized the gravity of the offence, the prevalence of domestic violence in the context of substance abuse and would have imposed a custodial sentence.
R. v. Managhaya, [1997] M.J. No. 267 (C.A.) (one year conditional sentence and three years probation): the accused, a nurse aid studying to become a registered nurse, pled guilty to manslaughter after fatally stabbing her niece during an impulsive confrontation in the family home. The offence occurred in the context of significant domestic turmoil, including an ongoing affair between the accused’s husband and the victim, who lived in the same household. Feeling trapped by her economic and family circumstances and subjected to physical and psychological abuse by her husband, the accused confronted the pair with a kitchen knife. In the ensuing fit of rage, she stabbed the victim, who died almost immediately. It was unclear whether the accused specifically intended to injure the victim or another person. The court identified the breach of trust inherent in the familial relationship and the fact that the offence occurred in the shared home but emphasized the impulsive and unplanned nature of the conduct. Mitigating factors included the accused’s unblemished criminal record, expressions of remorse, a strong work history, favourable PSR and “virtually no risk” of reoffending. The court also considered her status as an immigrant from the Philippines with three children and significant rehabilitative prospects.
R. v. O. (T.P), [1997] B.C.J. No. 3099 (18 month conditional sentence): the accused fatally assaulted the victim by striking him with a chair following a history of provocation. The victim, who had been married to the accused’s mother-in-law before their separation, had financial dealings with the accused and his wife, and the accused believed the victim had cheated them out of approximately $140,000. The victim had also sexually abused the accused’s wife. On the day of the offence, the accused attended at the victim’s residence to discuss the financial dispute. During that meeting, the victim taunted the accused about both the financial dealings and the sexual abuse, and the accused reacted by beating him with a chair. The court found that the assault was a brutal beating but emphasized that the accused did not attend the residence with the intention of becoming violent and that the force applied resulted from a split-second decision induced by provocation. The accused had no prior history of violence, expressed genuine remorse and his conduct was entirely out of character. He had significant support from family and the community.
R. v. Hanna, [2000] O.J. No. 3498 (S.C.) (18 months incarceration, three years probation): the accused and the victim were in a romantic relationship marked by significant difficulties and separated prior to the offence. The accused attempted to reconcile, but the victim was unreceptive and responded in a callous manner. During an argument, the victim became angry, asked the accused whether she wanted to kill him, handed her an exacto knife and invited her to do so. The accused punctured the victim’s shoulder and caused a minor cut to his left arm, then threw the knife on the ground and walked away. She later explained that she only intended to cut his jacket but accidentally severed an artery in his armpit. She immediately called 911 and sought help, but the victim bled to death. The court emphasized the domestic context, the strong element of provocation, the unintentional nature of the killing, and the accused’s immediate efforts to obtain medical assistance. It also considered her genuine remorse and the fact that the offence occurred during a period when she was emotionally exhausted and experiencing significant personal stress following the breakdown of a relationship.
R. v. Capistrano, 2001 MBQB 60 (two years conditional sentence, two years probation): the accused, a 32-year-old Indigenous woman, caused the victim’s death by striking him on the head with a small wooden baseball bat following a series of escalating interactions. The victim lived next door and had hosted a party earlier that evening. Although the parties had met only once before, the victim, who was heavily intoxicated, followed the accused to her backyard uninvited, made inappropriate sexual comments toward her, and later returned brandishing a pipe wrench before being disarmed by others. The accused then went to her apartment, obtained a bat, and later confronted the victim in his own home, striking him at least twice on the back of the head. After the incident, she expressed concern for his wellbeing but did not seek medical assistance. The victim was later found in a comatose state and died from his injuries. The court found that the assault was forceful and caused death. It noted the accused had a criminal record, including a prior assault conviction, though it was not extensive. At the same time, the court placed significant weight on extraordinary mitigating factors. The accused had endured a profoundly troubled life. She grew up in CAS care, experienced severe physical and sexual abuse, survived a violent rape that resulted in PTSD, struggled with addiction, and remained in an abusive adult relationship until her husband was deported. The court found the offence was not premeditated, occurred over a short duration, and that the accused never intended to seriously harm the victim, with her judgment clouded by emotional distress and intoxication. Although she had not fully acknowledged her wrongdoing, she had taken meaningful steps toward further rehabilitation, complied fully with bail conditions, avoided further criminal conduct and was an excellent candidate for rehabilitation. The court noted in R. v. Grammatikos, 2013 MBQB 44, at para. 39, that a similar sentence would not be possible today under current law.
R. v. Hutchinson, 2024 BCSC 878 (18 months conditional sentence): the accused, a university security guard, caused the death of a young person during a high-pressure encounter while responding to complaints about a disruptive individual on campus. The accused chased the individual, tackled him and placed him in a headlock when the victim resisted. Although the victim stopped moving, the accused did not release the hold. The victim went unconscious and later died in the hospital. The trial judge rejected self-defence, finding that while the accused’s initial actions were reasonable in the circumstances, they became unreasonable as time passed. The court emphasized the tragic nature of the death and the significant impact on the victim’s family and friends. Mitigating factors included the absence of any prior criminal record, the accused’s lack of intent to harm or kill, genuine remorse, and the fact that the incident occurred in a work-related situation where the accused feared for his safety. The court also noted the accused’s strong character, reputation as a hardworking and contributing member of society, a loving and supportive family, his deep concern over his own his actions and his intergenerational harm.
Additional Authorities
108I reviewed all of the cases provided in addition to some other relevant case law. I will summarize some of the additional cases that usefully informed my position:
R. v. Russell-Ewanation (19 November 2025), London, 25/365 (Ont. S.C.) (five years less pre-sentence custody): the accused, age 28 at the time of the offence, stabbed his father during an argument and pled guilty at an early opportunity to manslaughter after initially being charged with murder. He was a youthful first-time offender who had suffered a catastrophic workplace accident. He had depression and PTSD, prompting him to return to live with his parents for support. The accused used cannabis daily and occasionally used cocaine but abstained while travelling with his parents to Portugal. Shortly after returning, his maternal grandmother, to whom he was very close, passed away. The following day, the accused attempted to self-harm with a knife. When his father intervened to help him, the accused stabbed him multiple times and fled. Police apprehended the accused and formed grounds under the Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7. He admitted to stabbing his father. A psychiatric assessment concluded that he did not meet the criteria for an NCR finding. However, it did find that he experienced psychosis at the time of the offence arising from depression, cumulative stressors, the resumption of cannabis after abstinence, recent cocaine use, poor sleep and acute grief. The parties presented a joint position on sentence. The court considered the brutal nature of the offence, the fact that the victim was attempting to help the accused, the breach of trust inherent in the parent-child relationship and the accused’s failure to seek treatment prior to the incident as aggravating factors. As mitigating factors, the court considered the early guilty plea, the joint submission, the accused’s youth, the absence of any prior criminal record or history of violence, his extreme remorse and apology, his otherwise law-abiding and pro-social lifestyle, the aberrational nature of the offence, the strong support reflected in 34 letters to the court, continued family support, meaningful steps toward rehabilitation and addressing addiction and mental health issues, and the harsh pre-sentence custody conditions. The sentencing judge emphasized that taking another person’s life is the most serious of offences and that denunciation and deterrence remain paramount. However, she found no need for specific deterrence given the low risk of reoffending. She observed that “a life without his father is in its own way a life sentence for Mr. Russell-Ewanation, for which there is no parole or pardon.”
R. v. Fronczak, 2021 ONSC 219 (five years less pre-sentence custody): the court convicted the accused, age 82, of killing his 79-year-old wife by ligature strangulation and blunt force trauma in their home. Police found him at the scene with superficial injuries, and he was later diagnosed with major depressive disorder, though he was not found NCR. The court identified several aggravating factors, including breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the fact that the offence occurred in the victim’s home. It also considered mitigating factors, including the accused’s remorse, admission of facts, good character, community support, positive work history and mental illness at the time of the offence. The court acknowledged that there is considerable support in the case law for a sentencing range of 8-12 years where an offender kills a domestic partner, even where mental illness played a role. Defence counsel argued that the accused’s advanced age and mental health made imprisonment particularly onerous and rendered the case exceptional. The court accepted that sentences well below the usual 7–12 year range have been imposed where offenders are elderly, first-time offenders, and where mental illness contributed to the offence.
R. v. Banon, 2024 ONSC 581 (eight years less pre-sentence custody): the accused and the victim were intimate partners who became involved in an argument in their apartment. During the altercation, the accused assaulted the victim, including choking her with his hands or clothing. She later went to bed and died from her injuries. The offence involved domestic violence and occurred in the victim’s home. The victim was vulnerable due to her smaller stature and consumption of alcohol and drugs. The assault was vicious and prolonged, leaving the victim with multiple blunt force injuries. The court found that the accused’s anger appeared to have been fuelled by jealousy. He did not seek medical assistance for the victim and instead called his mother when he discovered her condition. The offence had a significant impact on the victim’s family. Mitigating factors included a guilty plea, severe remorse, acceptance of responsibility, the accused’s youth, lack of criminal record, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, a pro-social background and support available to assist with reintegration. Relying on Kimpe, the court confirmed that the usual sentencing range for manslaughter in a domestic context is 7-12 years, noting that while a range is not etched in stone, it remains a useful guide: Banon, at para. 60.
R. v. Charles Maltais, 2021 NBQB 90 (13 years for manslaughter and one year concurrent for arson): the accused pled guilty to killing his 71-year-old mother and then setting the house on fire to conceal the offence. He was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time. The court emphasized the callous treatment of the body, the degree of violence involved, and the vulnerability of the victim as a senior citizen. Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, the absence of significant planning and a limited criminal record, although the court noted that drugs and alcohol clouded the accused’s judgment.
R. v. Starostin, 2023 ONSC 3677 (five years less pre-sentence custody): the accused, who suffered from alcohol addiction, beat his 87-year-old father to death in a fit of rage after consuming a significant amount of alcohol. The victim was bedridden and defenceless. The accused’s mother witnessed the assault and called for assistance. The victim died the following day. The court found that alcohol was neither an aggravating nor a mitigating factor but faulted the accused for failing to seek help. The accused had a driving-related record, was educated, had previously owned his own business and entered a guilty plea.
109Taken together, the jurisprudence establishes that the killing of a parent will generally attract the same sentencing range as the killing of an intimate partner, namely 7-12 years incarceration, subject to individual circumstances: Kimpe, at para. 14; May, at para. 38; R. v. Wight, 2022 ONSC 5137, at para. 43; R. v. Suppiah, 2021 ONSC 3871, at para. 33; and Sun, at para. 108. Both types of offences involve a profound breach of trust within relationships defined by dependency and care. Parliament expressly recognized this heightened seriousness by identifying violence against both family members and intimate partners as aggravating conduct under s. 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code. As the court explained in R. v. Nishikawara, 2023 ONSC 5520, at para. 20, the aggravating nature of violence against family members flows from concern for their vulnerability and the breach of trust inherent in offences committed against them, particularly in their own homes. Consistent with these principles, cases involving the killing of a parent typically fall within this sentencing range unless truly exceptional circumstances are present.
110I have considered the defence authorities with care. Many of those cases turn on highly exceptional features including psychosis, extreme provocation (or provocation under the former statutory definition), abusive relationships, near accident or indigeneity. Several do not involve a breach of trust or involve it to a substantially lesser degree. While conditional sentences can, in appropriate cases, achieve denunciation and deterrence, I am not satisfied that a reformatory range is fit on the facts of this case. Such a sentence would inadequately reflect society’s condemnation of violent conduct resulting in death within a familial relationship, nor would it properly account for the sanctity of human life.
Mitigating Factors
111I find the following mitigating factors:
a. Ms. Cabala has no prior criminal record and lived a law-abiding life prior to this offence.
b. The parties accept that Ela Cabala may have initiated the physical altercation by slapping Ms. Cabala and that the incident escalated to a two-way physical altercation.
c. Ms. Cabala completed high school and post-secondary education and maintained a strong work history.
d. Ms. Cabala has strong support from her family and friends.
e. Ms. Cabala expressed remorse to the court for the death of her mother, and I find her remorse to be genuine.
f. Ms. Cabala has actively sought out counselling and treatment for her physical and mental health challenges.
g. Ms. Cabala spent portions of her pre-trial custody in particularly harsh conditions, including full or partial lockdowns, periods of segregation and overcrowding.
h. Taken as a whole, the evidence establishes that Ms. Cabala is a person of otherwise good character whose conduct on the night of the offence represents a tragic deviation from her prior life.
Duncan Mitigation
112In R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, our Court of Appeal recognized that unusually harsh pre-trial incarceration conditions may mitigate a sentence, separate from any enhanced credit pursuant to R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575. As discussed above, Ms. Cabala was incarcerated during the COVID-19 pandemic and spent time in segregation due to mental health concerns and health protocols.
113The Crown submits that these conditions attract only minimal mitigation. It argues that segregation was not punitive but instead imposed to address Ms. Cabala’s suicidal ideations and public health concerns during the height of the pandemic. The Crown also submits that Ms. Cabala already receives enhanced credit at a rate of 1.5:1 for her pre-trial detention.
114I do not accept that the impact of Ms. Cabala’s pre-trial custody was minimal. The evidence demonstrates that the conditions of her incarceration were significantly harsher than those typical in pre-sentence custody. The combination of isolation, uncertainty, limited access to programming and deteriorating mental health imposed a real and lasting impact on Ms. Cabala’s well-being. They warrant additional mitigation beyond the arithmetic credit applied under s. 719 of the Criminal Code.
Conditions of Incarceration and Individualized Impact
115I have considered Ms. Cabala’s evidence, along with the reports addressing the current state of women’s custodial institutions. It is troubling that many systemic issues identified more than three decades ago persist today and, in some respects, have worsened. I must consider the effect of those conditions on any offender, and particularly on an offender with Ms. Cabala’s individual vulnerabilities.
116The principle of restraint requires the court to impose the least onerous sentence appropriate. This principle carries particular force for first-time offenders. It also requires the court to consider whether an offender’s unique circumstances will make incarceration more punitive than it would be for others: R. v. Sousa, 2023 ONCA 100, 165 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 37.
117Ms. Cabala’s medical conditions are not mitigating factors, but they form part of her individualized circumstances. The evidence indicates that Ms. Cabala has been diagnosed with MS, previously underwent brain surgery, continues to be monitored for a neurological growth, experiences chronic back issues and struggles with her mental health.
118I find that Ms. Cabala’s health conditions, the serious hardships she endured in custody, and the additional hardship she will face while serving a penitentiary sentence are meaningful mitigating factors in this case.
119Ms. Cabala’s decision to proceed to trial is a neutral factor. It was her right. While she does not receive the mitigation associated with a guilty plea, it is not an aggravating factor that she exercised this right.
Aggravating Factors
120I find the following aggravating factors:
a. The most significant aggravating factor is the profound breach of trust inherent in the parent-child relationship. Ela took Ms. Cabala into her home when she had nowhere else to go. She did so out of love and concern for her daughter. The fatal argument erupted over Ela’s concern about Ms. Cabala’s drinking.
b. Ms. Cabala killed Ela in her own home, a place where she was entitled to feel safe and protected.
c. Ela was older than Ms. Cabala, smaller in stature and living with her own health challenges. She posed little physical threat to Ms. Cabala. While I acknowledge that Ela was not as vulnerable as the victims in some of the cases I reviewed earlier, she was nonetheless a vulnerable victim in the context of this confrontation.
d. The offence was violent. Ela died as a result of external neck compression, which courts have characterised as a highly personal means of death. In addition to the fatal external neck compression, Ela sustained numerous other injuries. The post-mortem findings revealed a violent struggle in Ela’s final minutes at the behest of her daughter.
e. Ela’s death profoundly affected her family, friends and neighbours.
Weighing the Factors and Position Within the Range
121Although the killing of a parent generally falls within the same sentencing range as the killing of an intimate partner, I must assess this sentence through the lens of the specific facts, the aggravating and mitigating factors and Ms. Cabala’s personal characteristics.
122This case lacks several aggravating factors present in many of the Crown’s authorities. In a number of those cases, the victims were particularly vulnerable due to extreme age or health. Offenders also attempted to conceal their crimes in a number of other cases. While some of those cases also involved guilty pleas, I nonetheless find that this matter properly falls at the lower end of the applicable range.
123Sentencing ranges are not straight jackets. However, they are useful aides to the court that promote parity and proportionality. Here, the sentencing range assists in confirming that a reformatory sentence would be inappropriate.
124I have considered the unique features of this case, including the evidence of mutual physical altercation and the possibility that Ela initiated the physical contact. I have weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors alongside Ms. Cabala’s personal circumstances. Denunciation and general deterrence must carry substantial weight in my analysis. At the same time, I must remain attentive to rehabilitation and restraint. My task is to craft a sentence that reflects both the gravity of the offence and Ms. Cabala’s moral culpability, while recognizing her genuine remorse, which supports prospects for rehabilitation.
125In arriving at the sentence to be imposed, I have factored in the pre-trial custody conditions experienced by Ms. Cabala as a mitigating factor and have applied Duncan credit in arriving at what I find to be a fit sentence.
126In my view, a sentence somewhat below the range articulated in Kimpe best achieves a balance of all the applicable factors in this case. I find that a penitentiary sentence of six years incarceration, reduced by credit for pre-trial custody under s. 719 of the Criminal Code, proportionately reflects the seriousness of the offence while accounting for Ms. Cabala’s individualized circumstances and mitigating factors.
Summers Credit
127Section 719 of the Criminal Code authorizes credit for pre-sentence custody at a rate of up to 1.5 days for each day served. In Summers, at para. 22, the Supreme Court explained that enhanced credit recognizes the absence of parole eligibility and limited access to rehabilitative programming in remand custody. Ms. Cabala spent 119 actual days in pre-trial custody, for which I grant credit of 179 days.
ANCILLARY ORDERS
128Manslaughter is a primary designated offence under s. 487.04(a) of the Criminal Code. Section 487.05(2) therefore requires a DNA order. Ms. Cabala shall provide bodily samples as reasonably required for forensic DNA analysis and inclusion in the national DNA database.
129I also impose a firearms prohibition pursuant to s. 109(1)(c). Ms. Cabala shall not possess any firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition or explosive substance for a period of ten years following her release from imprisonment. She is further prohibited for life from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device or prohibited ammunition.
130The parties made no submissions regarding the victim fine surcharge. Given the length of the custodial sentence, I am satisfied that imposing a surcharge would cause undue hardship. I waive it under s. 737 of the Criminal Code.
CONCLUSION
131Ms. Cabala, please stand.
132I understand that you shared a complicated relationship with your mother, and I accept that you carry sincere remorse for causing her death. I also recognize that this loss affects you deeply. No sentence this court imposes can bring Ela back to her family, friends or community. That is not the purpose of today. The sentence imposed today reflects the seriousness of what occurred, while acknowledging your path forward towards rehabilitation.
133Having considered all the circumstances surrounding the offence, the offender and the applicable sentencing principles, I sentence you to a period of incarceration of six years (2,190 days) less pre-sentence custody credited at 179 days, leaving approximately five years and six months (2,011 days) left to serve.
134In addition, you are subject to a DNA order and firearms prohibition as outlined above.
Justice P.J. Moore
Given orally on: April 20, 2026
Note: The written decision is the official decision in this matter.
Released: April 21, 2026