Andrew Eric Stastny

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to impose a detention order instead of a conditional discharge, arguing procedural unfairness due to lack of notice regarding the rejection of a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal found that a joint submission for conditional discharge did exist, despite the Crown's initial reservation and a dispute over a cannabis condition.

However, the court determined that the Board members' probing questions during the hearing provided adequate, albeit not ideal, notice that the joint submission was in peril.

Fresh evidence of the appellant's subsequent readmissions to hospital further supported the reasonableness of the detention order.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of a search warrant for his residence, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds and contained misleading information about him 'sheltering' his address.

The police relied on a confidential informant's tip and surveillance showing the applicant engaging in drug transactions after leaving his residence.

The court found that the affiant's assertion that the applicant was sheltering his address was not misleading, even though the applicant was on bail with a surety at a different address.

The court concluded that the issuing justice could reasonably have granted the warrant based on the amplified record and dismissed the Charter section 8 application.

The applicant applied for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges including kidnapping and extortion, arguing there was no evidence identifying him as the perpetrator.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, specifically the use of the applicant's details and file photograph during a foreign currency transaction with the victim's bank card.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the teller's standard practice of verifying identity against the file photograph provided sufficient evidence of identity to meet the threshold for committal.

Shadoe G. Moore pleaded guilty to robbery while armed with an imitation handgun and using an imitation handgun during the commission of an indictable offence.

The court considered the interplay between ss. 85 and 343 of the Criminal Code, rejecting the "double-dipping" argument and affirming Parliament's intent for consecutive sentences.

The court also addressed the "step principle" in sentencing, rejecting its strict application for Indigenous offenders, and discussed the application of "Summers" and "Duncan" credit for pre-sentence custody conditions, particularly harsh due to lockdowns and COVID-19.

The judge applied Gladue principles, acknowledging the profound impact of intergenerational trauma and systemic factors on the offender's moral culpability.

A global sentence of three years was imposed, reduced by 338 days for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a net sentence of two years and one month.

The accused was charged with robbery and second-degree murder after forcefully kicking the victim during a robbery, causing the victim to fall and strike his head on the pavement, resulting in fatal brain injuries.

The trial proceeded by judge alone on an agreed statement of facts.

The sole issue was whether the accused had the requisite specific intent for second-degree murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the accused had the subjective intent to cause bodily harm, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had subjective knowledge that the harm was likely to result in death.

The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder, but guilty of manslaughter and robbery.

The applicant, Andre Cunningham, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for charges including attempted murder and firearms offences.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace made two material errors in principle during the initial bail hearing: misapprehending evidence regarding the applicant's alleged gang affiliation and misinterpreting the mother's testimony about identifying her son in surveillance video.

Despite these errors warranting a new de novo bail hearing, the court conducted its own assessment of the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong, the proposed surety plan inadequate given the applicant's history of non-compliance while living with sureties, and the gravity of the offences.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic but found it did not override the primary considerations for detention, especially without evidence of an outbreak in the facility or the applicant's specific health vulnerabilities.

Consequently, the applicant was ordered detained on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for drug trafficking.

The trial judge had imposed a sentence based on a finding that the appellant had taken no steps toward rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, as the appellant had in fact taken significant steps toward rehabilitation both before and after his release on bail pending appeal.

The court allowed the appeal in part, varying the sentence from the trial judge's decision to eight months imprisonment while maintaining the probation term and setting aside the victim surcharge.

The appellant was arrested on a surety warrant that had been rescinded by an administrative judge over a month prior to the arrest, but the rescission was not recorded on CPIC.

A pat-down search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search yielded cocaine and marijuana.

The trial judge found the arrest lawful and the searches reasonable.

On appeal, the court found the arrest was unlawful because: (1) the surety warrant had been validly rescinded by the administrative judge; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest; and (3) the police failed to make reasonable inquiries when the appellant informed them the warrant had been dealt with in court.

The court also found the strip search violated section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and verdicts of acquittal were substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft from mail contrary to s. 356(3) of the Criminal Code.

Both the Crown and the appellant agreed that the guilty plea was uninformed because the appellant was not aware of the immigration consequences of a conviction for that offence.

The parties agreed that had the appellant been fully informed, he would have pled guilty to the lesser included offence of theft under $5,000 contrary to s. 334(b) of the Criminal Code.

On consent, the appeal was dismissed, the conviction for theft from mail was set aside, and a conviction for theft under $5,000 was substituted.

The sentence remained unchanged and had already been served.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime based on an agreed statement of facts.

He subsequently brought a motion to stay the charges on the basis of entrapment.

An undercover officer, with minimal training and no reasonable suspicion regarding the target, called a phone number obtained from a confidential source and immediately requested to purchase a specific quantity of crack cocaine.

The accused agreed and supplied the drugs.

The court found that the officer provided the opportunity to commit the crime without reasonable suspicion about the person or the phone number, and that the bona fide inquiry exception did not apply due to insufficient corroboration of the tip.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

A youth was charged with six offences relating to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm (.357 Smith and Wesson Magnum revolver) found hidden in a pillow in the basement games room of his residence.

The Crown alleged constructive possession based on circumstantial evidence, including the defendant's control of the games room, the presence of ammunition and clothing from suspects in his bedroom, and the defendant's admission of the suspects to the home following a violent robbery.

The defence argued that while the defendant may have allowed suspects to store some evidence in his bedroom, there were reasonable alternative inferences that the firearm was hidden without his knowledge, either by one of the suspects during the extended time they spent in the home or by a suspect at the moment police arrived.

The court found that while the evidence was highly suspicious and could support an inference of guilt, reasonable alternative inferences existed when the totality of the evidence was considered, including the possibility that a suspect hid the firearm without the defendant's knowledge.

The accused pled guilty to trafficking 0.24 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer for $60.00.

At the time of the offence, the accused was 18 years old with no criminal record.

He had been on bail with an 11 pm to 6 am curfew for nearly two years, breaching it once.

The Crown sought 90 days intermittent custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months' probation, considering the accused's youth, lack of record, single instance of trafficking a minimal quantity, positive rehabilitation efforts, and community service.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a surety warrant for arrest and the searches conducted following his arrest.

The applicant argued breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The court found that although the surety warrant was not properly executed through the required procedure (the accused did not go into actual custody), it remained validly in existence on the CPIC system and grounded a lawful arrest.

The court rejected all Charter arguments, finding no breach of section 9 (arbitrary arrest), no breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) for either the pat-down search or the strip search, and no breach of section 10 (right to counsel).

The evidence was admitted at trial.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking following an undercover drug purchase.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the identification of the accused as the person who sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer.

The officer had viewed a photograph of the accused at a briefing prior to the transaction and subsequently identified the accused at trial.

The defence challenged the reliability of the identification, arguing that the officer's prior exposure to the photograph tainted the identification process and that key identifying features were not recorded in contemporaneous notes.

The court found that while the officer had a good opportunity to observe the suspect and the conditions were favorable, the failure to record specific facial features at the time of the transaction, combined with the officer's expectation to see the accused, created a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the identification.

The accused was acquitted.

In a criminal trial for possession for the purpose of trafficking, the defendant alleged police planted drugs.

The Crown did not call Officer Dobbs, a search team member facing an outstanding assault charge (ABH) from an unrelated incident where a prior judge made negative credibility findings against him.

The defence sought to call Officer Dobbs and cross-examine him on the ABH charge details to impeach his credibility.

The court ruled that the defence could call Officer Dobbs and cross-examine him from the outset, citing the interests of justice and the Crown's strategic decision not to call him.

However, the scope of cross-examination on the ABH charge details was limited by the collateral fact rule and the principle against introducing prior judicial credibility findings (Ghorvei), preventing the jury from inferring guilt or prior disbelief.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance after police found him with crack cocaine in a bathroom of an apartment.

He appealed the convictions, arguing that the police violated his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) by unlawfully entering the apartment and detaining him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant lacked standing to assert a section 8 claim as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, and that his brief detention and subsequent arrest did not violate his section 9 or 10 rights.

The applicant, a passenger in a motor vehicle, was committed for trial on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession after police found 6.2 grams of crack cocaine on the vehicle's centre console.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the committal, arguing there was no evidence he had control over the drugs.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that mere proximity and opportunity to control the drugs did not amount to actual or constructive possession.

The court concluded that no reasonable jury could infer control from the evidence, and quashed the committal for trial.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm without a licence and possession while prohibited.

He was a passenger in a car that was shot at, and he briefly possessed and threw away the driver's loaded gun when police approached.

The court found his possession was fleeting.

Considering his guilty plea, relative youth, and the unique circumstances, the court imposed a global sentence of 21 months.

After credit for 17 months of pre-trial custody, he was sentenced to one day in jail and two years of probation.

The offender was found guilty of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a sentence of two and a half years' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's mental illness, lack of prior drug record, and the delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition.

The defendant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine on January 16, 2015, with two additional trafficking incidents read in on consent.

The Crown sought an intermittent custody sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court found exceptional circumstances existed based on the defendant's difficult background, including childhood trauma, abuse, and displacement, combined with demonstrated rehabilitation efforts post-offence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with a two-year probation term, finding that custody would jeopardize rehabilitation and that protection of the public was better served by a non-custodial sentence.