Jennifer Goulin

The court issued reasons for two rulings made during a criminal trial for sexual assault: the voluntariness of an accused's statement to police and an application for a mistrial due to the accused's inflammatory closing address.

The statement was found voluntary, and the application for a mistrial was dismissed, with the court providing a strong curative instruction to the jury instead.

The accused was charged with procuring two women to become prostitutes and exercising control, direction, or influence over the movements of one of them for the purpose of gain.

The court found that the accused manipulated and coerced the first complainant, a vulnerable young woman with significant debt, into stripping, performing 'extras', and escorting, while taking the money she earned.

The accused was found guilty of the charges relating to the first complainant.

However, the court found the second complainant was a strong, independent woman who made her own choice to dance for money without being procured by the accused, resulting in an acquittal on that count.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police administered the breath tests as soon as practicable following the arrest, as required by the Criminal Code.

The Crown established that the accused failed a roadside screening device test and was arrested.

The accused was transported to the police station where he exercised his right to counsel before breath samples were taken on an Intoxilyzer device.

The defence challenged whether the approximately 23-minute period between the accused entering the breath room and the completion of the first breath test was adequately explained.

The court found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable and convicted the accused.

The applicant sought a determination on the constitutionality of section 85(4) of the Criminal Code, which mandates consecutive sentences for using a firearm during an indictable offence, arguing it violates section 12 of the Charter by imposing cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that section 85(4) was unconstitutional, as its "stacking effect" would lead to grossly disproportionate sentences for the applicant and reasonable hypothetical offenders, and could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

The court declined to rule on the constitutionality of section 85(3), finding it severable.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery and multiple firearms offences related to a planned armoured truck robbery.

The accused testified that he believed he was participating in an 'inside job' where no firearms would be used and the guards would cooperate.

The trial judge applied the W.(D.) framework and rejected the accused's testimony as unbelievable, finding it inconsistent with common sense and the circumstantial evidence, including the presence of loaded firearms, disguises, and the lack of identification on the participants.

The court found the accused guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery and the firearms possession charges, but not guilty of altering a firearm's serial number due to lack of evidence.

Sentencing following conviction for attempted robbery committed in the course of a planned home invasion targeting a marijuana seller.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence were the paramount objectives, but also considered the offender's youth, limited record, stable employment, family support, and rehabilitative progress.

Although the offender had spent approximately four years and eight months on restrictive bail terms, the court declined to grant equivalent credit because sentencing had been repeatedly adjourned by the defence and no effort had been made to vary the recognizance conditions.

A sentence of 20 months' incarceration, followed by 12 months' probation, was imposed, together with ancillary weapons and DNA orders.

The moving accused sought severance of two firearm counts laid only against a co-accused from the remaining home invasion robbery and unlawful confinement counts.

Applying the interests of justice analysis under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the framework in Last, the court held the later-discovered revolver was sufficiently similar to the weapon seen in the surveillance evidence to make the May firearm evidence relevant and admissible on the October counts.

The court found a factual nexus between the counts, concluded any moral prejudice could be addressed by the trial judge, and held that separate trials would be inefficient where the evidence would be admissible in both.

The severance application was dismissed.

Two accused were jointly tried for the homicide of a young teenager.

The principal accused admitted causing the death but contested whether the killing constituted first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter.

The co‑accused was alleged to have participated in a plan to lure the victim to the residence and assist in the killing.

The trial involved numerous evidentiary rulings, including admissibility of a fictional story written by the co‑accused as potential motive evidence, disclosure and partial admission of the victim’s diary, admission of edited autopsy photographs, and applications concerning prior consistent statements under the Edgar doctrine.

The jury ultimately convicted the principal accused of first degree murder and acquitted the co‑accused.

The decision records extensive reasons on pre‑trial and mid‑trial evidentiary and procedural rulings made throughout the proceeding.