ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
NICKOLAS DESCHENES
Reasons for Sentence
Before Justice Davin M.K. Garg
Heard March 23 and April 8, 2026
Reasons released June 19, 2026
Jennifer Goulin............................................................... counsel for the Provincial Crown
Volodymyr Fedorchuk........... counsel for the Public Prosecution Service of Canada
Lauren Wilhelm................................................................ counsel for Nickolas Deschenes
GARG J.:
Overview
1Courts across Canada have repeatedly recognized the grave dangers of fentanyl and its devastating impact on communities. It has been described as a national crisis, one that continues unabated.
2Courts must now confront a new and potentially more perilous threat. Protonitazene is a novel synthetic substance that is emerging in the unregulated drug supply. This evolution towards increasingly potent drugs is driven by people prepared to traffic in substances that predictably cause profound societal harm.
3Mr. Deschenes chose to possess a substantial quantity of protonitazene, along with cocaine and MDMA, for the purpose of trafficking. He also possessed a semi-automatic handgun with two loaded magazines. My task is to impose a sentence that is proportionate to the severe gravity of these offences and Mr. Deschenes’ elevated moral culpability.
4For the reasons that follow, I would have imposed a global sentence of 15 years imprisonment. The global sentence could have been 18 years before considering the totality principle and the provincial Crown’s position. After credit for pre-sentence custody and an improper strip search, I sentence Mr. Deschenes to a further 11 years, 7 months, and 2 days of imprisonment.
Facts
5Mr. Deschenes acknowledged his guilt through an agreed statement of fact after I admitted the drug and firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.1 I then found Mr. Deschenes guilty of the following offences:
Possession of a benzimidazole, namely protonitazene, for the purpose of trafficking.
Possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
Possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking.
Possession of currency knowing it was obtained by crime.
Possession of a semi-automatic handgun with readily accessible ammunition.
Breaches of two weapons prohibition orders.
Circumstances of the offences
6The police executed search warrants for Mr. Deschenes’s residence, his storage garage, and the vehicle he was driving. In total, the police found the following controlled substances:
2,561 protonitazene pills weighing 1.535 kilograms. If sold at the low-price estimate of $35 per pill, the protonitazene was worth $89,635. If sold at the high-price estimate of $65 per pill, it was worth $166,465.
1.04452 kilograms of cocaine. If sold at the ounce level, it was worth $37,304. If sold at the gram level, it was worth $104,452. Some of the cocaine was stored in the centre console of the vehicle in separate baggies.
4.83966 kilograms of MDMA. If sold at the ounce level, it was worth $60,495. If sold at the gram level, it was worth $241,983.
3 kilograms of cannabis.
7At the ounce level or low-price estimate, the drugs were worth approximately $185,000. Mr. Deschenes also possessed over $230,000 in Canadian currency.
8The protonitazene pills were masked as oxycodone pills. The pills were branded with the wordmark TEC, which are a Percocet that would typically contain 5 milligrams of oxycodone.
9In the storage garage, the police also found a prohibited, semi-automatic 9-millimetre handgun. The gun was in a container with two loaded magazines. The ammunition in the magazines was compatible with the gun. The magazines were loaded with 21 rounds and there were four additional rounds stored loose in the container.
Nature and dangers of protonitazene
10Protonitazene is a derivative of benzimidazole and part of a group of non-fentanyl synthetic opioids called nitazenes. Nitazenes were developed as an opioid for pain management, but they are not approved for medical use in Canada and have been classified as a Schedule I controlled substance.
11In its pure form, protonitazene has a much higher potency than morphine or fentanyl. It can be up to 1000 times more potent than morphine and 20 times more potent than fentanyl. Due to its high potency, nitazenes are mixed with other substances, such as cocaine, to dilute the substance and make it tolerable for use.
12The risks associated with nitazenes are compounded by their variability. As relatively recent entrants into the illicit drug market, their potency is not standardized. A user cannot know the concentration of protonitazene within any given dose. As a result, the amount required to achieve a desired effect is unpredictable. Even pills that appear identical may contain different quantities of the active substance.
13This unpredictability is particularly dangerous given the presentation of these drugs. In this case, the protonitazene was pressed into pills resembling conventional oxycodone, inviting a false sense of familiarity. There is, however, no safe dose of protonitazene.
Circumstances of the offender
14Mr. Deschenes is 35 years old. The pre-sentence report describes his profoundly difficult early childhood. He was apprehended by the Children’s Aid Society at a very young age and spent his early years in foster care. His upbringing was marked by instability and trauma. These experiences form an important part of his personal context.
15Mr. Deschenes established a family life as an adult. He is married and has two young children, to whom he is described as devoted. The materials, including the letters of support, portray him as family-oriented, hardworking, and deeply committed to his role as a father. His wife and extended family have continued to support him throughout these proceedings. However, the materials also reflect a recurring pattern in which financial stress intersects with Mr. Deschenes’s self-described need to provide for his family, contributing to his involvement in criminal activity.
16The pre-sentence report identifies more recent stressors that Mr. Deschenes links to the current offences. These include a serious physical injury that limited his ability to work and ongoing pain management issues. The report notes that these factors contributed to his decision to engage in drug trafficking to address mounting financial pressures.
17Mr. Deschenes reports no history of alcohol or street drug addiction and was not consuming the drugs he possessed for the purpose of trafficking. Although he initially received prescribed pain killers following his injury, he subsequently obtained Percocet from the illicit market. Over time, he purchased a significant quantity, which led him to recognize an opportunity for financial gain.
18Mr. Deschenes has a prior criminal record dating back to his youth. His record includes convictions for drug trafficking, firearms offences, and breaches of court orders.
19Mr. Deschenes has a strong and committed support network awaiting him upon release. His conduct in custody has been exemplary, as evidenced by his participation in programming and steady work. Stationed in the jail’s kitchen, he has “consistently demonstrated a strong work ethic, reliability, and leadership in his role as cook’s helper. … He also helps maintain harmony among the workers and shows a strong example to fellow inmate workers”.
Positions of the Parties
20The positions of the prosecuting parties were inconsistent. The federal Crown sought a global sentence of 21 years with undefined reductions for totality and other credits. The provincial Crown, by contrast, sought a global sentence of 15 years after accounting for totality. The defence, for its part, sought a global sentence of 9 to 10 years. The defence position accounts for the various mitigating and collateral factors and is only subject to deductions for pre-sentence custody and the improper strip search.
Proportionality
21The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to impose a just sanction that protects society, contributes to respect for the law, and helps maintain collective well-being. I must impose a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offences and Mr. Deschenes’s moral culpability. “Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction”: R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 at para. 37.
Gravity of the offences
22The grave dangers of trafficking in “hard drugs” are well established: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at paras. 87–101. As Moldaver J. explained, this conduct causes both direct and indirect harm. The distribution of highly addictive substances drives dependency, accelerates physical decline, and results in fatal overdoses with alarming frequency. Those who profit from this trade are responsible for the foreseeable devastation it causes.
23The harm does not end with individual users. Drug trafficking fuels a broader ecosystem of criminality, including offences committed to finance addiction and the activities of organized crime. Even where the trafficking is not overtly violent, it cannot be divorced from the violence it predictably generates. The consequences ripple outward, destabilizing families, eroding communities, and inflicting intergenerational harm, particularly on children exposed to addiction.
24Synthetic opioids have intensified these dangers. As recognized in Parranto, substances such as fentanyl have transformed the drug trade by combining extraordinary potency with ease of distribution. A defining feature of these substances is the unpredictability of their potency and composition, which renders even small quantities potentially lethal and leaves users unable to gauge the risk they assume.
25Protonitazene must be understood within this framework. It can be significantly more potent than fentanyl. Its strength, the absence of any accepted medical use, and the lack of standardized production make it particularly hazardous. When mixed with other substances or pressed into counterfeit pharmaceutical pills, as occurred here, it creates a real risk that users will unknowingly ingest a fatal dose.
26The evidence establishes that protonitazene “can be” 20 times more potent than fentanyl, but I have no evidence on the specific potency of the pills in this case. It has not been proven to what degree, if any, the individual pills were more potent than fentanyl. That evidentiary gap does not diminish the gravity of the offence. The general potency of protonitazene is not in dispute. The danger lies in the uncertainty of the pills: trafficking in protonitazene exposes users to an unpredictable risk of harm and death. It is not necessary to assign a precise multiplier of potency as against fentanyl to recognize that this form of trafficking falls at the highest end of gravity: see R. v. Ribble, 2019 ONCJ 640 at paras. 59-60.
27The gravity of the offences is further aggravated by the scale and nature of Mr. Deschenes’ operation. He trafficked in multiple substances—protonitazene, cocaine, and MDMA—in significant quantities, accompanied by substantial cash. This was upper-level trafficking, not street-level activity. Consistent with the inherent connection between the drug trade and violence, Mr. Deschenes also possessed an instrument of death in the form of a semi-automatic handgun with multiple magazines.
Moral culpability
28Mr. Deschenes’s moral culpability is elevated. This was a deliberate and apparently successful commercial enterprise conducted on a significant scale. The quantities involved and the substantial cash seized establish sustained trafficking rather than isolated or opportunistic conduct. While Mr. Deschenes may have been motivated to provide for his family, his activities extended far beyond anything that could be described as subsistence-level earnings or modest supplemental income.
29Mr. Deschenes had lawful alternatives that he could have pursued to provide for his family. He was not an addict trafficker. He is an industrious and capable individual with the ability to earn income through legitimate means, as evidenced by his offer of employment upon release. His decision to engage in the drug trade was a matter of choice.
30Mr. Deschenes also has a related criminal record. He has four drug trafficking entries on his record (with a single disposition date). While the drug trafficking convictions are 13 years old, he was convicted of firearm possession not long before committing the current offences and received the equivalent of a nearly two-year sentence. His latest possession of a firearm also meant that he blatantly breached two weapons prohibition orders. His continued offending increases his moral blameworthiness: R. v. Gilmore, 2025 ONCA 517 at paras. 40, 44.
31There is no evidence that Mr. Deschenes knew about the heightened potency of protonitazene or that he was involved in masking the pills as oxycodone. Those circumstances are therefore not aggravating factors in this case. Their absence, however, does not diminish Mr. Deschenes’s moral blameworthiness. In my review of the jurisprudence, trafficking in novel substances has not been treated as less culpable simply because the trafficker may not have fully appreciated the risks to users: see e.g., R. v. Loor, 2017 ONCA 696 at paras. 43-44, 50. This is not a case involving a small or incidental quantity from which a lack of understanding might reasonably be inferred. Mr. Deschenes possessed over 2,500 pills, worth at least $89,000, along with an additional $230,000 in cash. In these circumstances, there is no plausible basis to infer that he was unaware of the nature and significance of his conduct.
Mitigating and collateral factors
32There are several mitigating and collateral factors that I must consider.
Remorse and accountability
33While Mr. Deschenes does not benefit from the mitigation of a guilty plea, he admitted his guilt on the merits after a focused Charter application. The conduct of the defence throughout the proceedings saved valuable court resources. Most importantly, Mr. Deschenes showed remorse and took accountability in the pre-sentence report and during his allocution. In his own words: “I take full responsibility for my decisions and understand the seriousness of the offences before the court and I know my choices were wrong, and I regret them deeply. … I let my wife down. I let my children down and my community down”. I find this sincere expression of remorse and accountability to be the most compelling mitigating factor in this case.
Family separation
34I accept that Mr. Deschenes’s family has suffered from his absence and will continue to suffer while he remains in custody. His wife expressed how his incarceration has caused “profound hardship” on their family, including their two young children. In her words: “The emotional, financial, and practical burden of raising two young children without my husband has been overwhelming. Every day has been a challenge, and every day our children continue to suffer from not having their father at home”.
35I must consider family separation consequences when evaluating the length of the custodial term: R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830 at paras. 44-45. Courts try to minimize the impact of sentencing on an offender’s family because “interfering with this foundational social institution … can endanger community safety and society’s well-being”: para. 46. However, I cannot allow these consequences to overwhelm the sentencing analysis or lead to the imposition of a disproportionate sentence. “[T]hese consequences are not an excuse to overlook the harm that the defendant’s criminal conduct caused victims of crime, or the importance of protecting those victims and society, or the need for denunciation and deterrence”: para. 43.
Harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody
36At the time of the sentencing submissions, Mr. Deschenes had been subject to 114 days of liberty restrictions while in custody, which were a mix of total lockdowns, partial lockdowns, and evening lockdowns. He had also spent 92 days triple bunked. It stands to reason that the housing conditions and liberty restrictions continued at a similar rate until the imposition of sentence.
37These conditions are a mitigating circumstance or collateral consequence that are relevant to fashioning an appropriate sentence: R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 at paras. 50-53. The lockdowns have exacerbated Mr. Deschenes’s feeling of isolation that comes from incarceration. I note that Mr. Deschenes, to his credit, has still been productive in custody through programming and work placements.
Pro-social skills and traits
38Mr. Deschenes has shown his ability to function as a pro-social member of our community despite his extremely difficult upbringing. He started working as a young teenager and has held various jobs during the meaningful gaps in his criminal record. He has also demonstrated his commitment to developing pro-social skills while in custody.
Charter breach
39I found that the police breached Mr. Deschenes’s s. 8 Charter rights. The ITO did not establish reasonable grounds to believe that evidence would be found in every building on the property that also contained the storage garage. The warrant could not have issued, and the warrantless search breached s. 8.
40I assign little mitigating weight on sentence to this Charter breach. The breach was limited to the storage garage—it had no bearing on the search of Mr. Deschenes’s home or car. While the impact on his privacy rights would not have been fleeting, I also found that the search was not invasive. Mr. Deschenes did not spend much time at the location. The affiant of the ITO was also reasonably diligent and mindful of his duty to make full and frank disclosure. The actual “harm or prejudice” to Mr. Deschenes from the breach is too minimal, in my view, to attract much mitigation at sentencing: see R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 at para. 54.
Sentencing objectives
41I choose to impose a sentence that emphasizes denunciation and deterrence. While I cannot overlook rehabilitation, it ultimately carries less weight in my analysis.
42The need for denunciation and deterrence is clear. I must impose a sentence that expresses “society’s abhorrence” of the toxic combination of guns and drugs: see R. v. Delchev, 2014 ONCA 448 at para. 20; R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817 at para. 36. As a member of this community, I am attuned to both the local realities and the public’s growing concern for the gun and drug crime that is plaguing the City of Hamilton: see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 48. The frequency of the crime is not an aggravating factor, but it raises the need for denunciation and general deterrence: Lacasse at para. 90; R. v. Lanktree, 2024 ONCA 506 at para. 12.
43What requires further explanation is my decision to deprioritize rehabilitation. Despite defence counsel’s able submissions, I disagree that Mr. Deschenes has exceptional rehabilitative prospects. Counsel highlights his remorse, insight, pro-social skills and traits, record of self-improvement, community support, and stated commitment to his family. I accept all those facts. They explain why rehabilitation must factor into my analysis.2
44Where the argument on rehabilitation breaks down is that Mr. Deschenes has been here before. He has been previously sentenced to custody for drug trafficking and, more recently, for firearm possession. Those sanctions did not achieve their intended deterrent effect. Rather, his offending has escalated in both scope and risk to the public. Mr. Deschenes has now combined guns and drugs into a single course of conduct at a significant scale, involving high-potency opioids and a semi-automatic handgun. In these circumstances, there is little basis to conclude that a sentence emphasizing rehabilitation will meaningfully change his future conduct.
45The present offences are also consistent with a recurring pattern. When confronted with financial pressure, Mr. Deschenes has turned to crime. In this instance, an injury limited his earning capacity. By the summer of 2023, he began trafficking drugs to address mounting bills, claiming that he could not otherwise provide for his family. The pre-sentence report identifies the same dynamic in his earlier offending. In 2021, he attributed his firearm-related conduct to “panicking at the pending birth of his child and having numerous debts.” His desire to provide for his family is noble. It has, however, consistently distorted his decision-making and driven him toward increasingly serious conduct.
46I am not satisfied that Mr. Deschenes’s circumstances have changed to justify placing greater weight on rehabilitation. Mr. Deschenes has previously had the benefit of familial support and legitimate employment opportunities. Those supports did not prevent his return to serious criminal conduct. The evidence establishes that financial stress operates as a consistent trigger for his offending behaviour. That stress will return upon his release. If not, then new stressors will inevitably arise. A sentence that gives primacy to denunciation and deterrence is required to impress upon Mr. Deschenes that criminal conduct will not be tolerated.
47I also assign little weight to the suggestion that Mr. Deschenes will now refrain from further offending because his continued relationship with his wife depends on it—she is giving him a final chance. Sentencing cannot rest on contingent personal relationships or expectations about how third parties may respond in the future.
Sentence Length
48I must respect the purpose of sentencing, apply the sentencing principles, and balance the aggravating, mitigating, and collateral factors. This complete analysis leads me to conclude that a global 15-year jail sentence is the lowest quantum that fulfills the fundamental principle of proportionality and accounts for totality.
49Both parties relied on Croll J.’s decision in R. v. Bernard, Ont. Sup. Ct. J., Toronto, No. CR-24-90000201-0000, January 23, 2026 (unreported). The offender in that case received a global sentence of approximately 11 years and 9 months.3 He and Mr. Deschenes possessed a similar mix of firearms, ammunition, and drugs. Whereas the offender in Bernard possessed two firearms, other drugs like oxycodone, and drastically more cocaine (13 kilograms), Mr. Deschenes possessed far more protonitazene pills (2,561 to 695), significant cash, and a large quantity of MDMA (approaching 5 kilograms). Neither offender pleaded guilty, although Mr. Deschenes ultimately admitted his guilt and took accountability for his conduct. Both offenders showed pro-social traits and enjoyed supportive families.
50A decisive point of distinction lies in the prior record. Mr. Bernard was a first offender. Mr. Deschenes is not. His recent and related record increases his moral culpability and heightens the need for specific deterrence. The absence of any prior record in Bernard supported a greater role for rehabilitation. These differences justify a meaningfully higher sentence for Mr. Deschenes.
51Other cases that support a sentence around 10 years for the protonitazene pills include R. v. Fabry, Ont. Ct. J., Kitchener, No. 4411-998-17-5536-00, July 11, 2018 (unreported). The offender possessed 859 fentanyl pills and 384 carfentanil pills. He was profit motivated. He pleaded guilty and had no prior criminal record. He was remorseful and otherwise pro-social. He did not possess a weapon. Epstein J. sentenced the offender to 8 years imprisonment. See also R. v. Hulme, [2018] O.J. No. 7265 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (7 years for 784 fentanyl and acetylfentanyl pills; the offender’s longest prior jail sentence was 45 days); and R. v. Solano-Santana, 2018 ONSC 3345 (8 years for nearly double the fentanyl pills but no weapons, no other drugs, and much less cash).
52In Parranto at para. 68, Brown and Martin JJ. set the range at 8 to 15 years; the offenders in that case were drug trafficking at the “wholesale” commercial level (para. 2). While the Crown did not use the “wholesale” term to describe Mr. Deschenes’ conduct, I am satisfied that the Parranto range applies. First, the majority in Parranto affirmed Mr. Felix’s 10-year sentence for fentanyl and cocaine trafficking where the fentanyl convictions related to six transactions involving 2,385 fentanyl tablets—comparable to the 2,561 protonitazene pills in this case. Mr. Felix also had no prior criminal record and was a successful owner-operator of a lawful business. Second, in fixing the range at 8 to 15 years, Brown and Martin JJ. referenced several cases at para. 68 with comparable facts to the case before me. I add that the 2,561 pills are not determinative on their own; they only represent a snapshot of what Mr. Deschenes possessed at a single point in time. Their significance must be assessed alongside the approximately $230,000 in cash and the substantial quantities of other drugs. Viewed together, these facts establish an upper-level, profit-driven, and ongoing commercial operation.
53I settle on an 11-year sentence for the protonitazene offence. That duration is the lowest quantum that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and Mr. Deschenes’s moral culpability. I cannot accept the federal Crown’s position of 15 years to the extent it was premised on that proposition that the specific pills in this case were dramatically more dangerous than a comparable dose of fentanyl. The evidentiary record does not permit such a finding.
54Turning to the possession of a handgun with ammunition, this is now the second time that Mr. Deschenes is being sentenced for possessing a firearm and breaching a weapons prohibition order. The appropriate sentence for offences of this nature ranges from 6 to 9 years: R. v. Dawkins, 2021 ONSC 4526 at para. 20; Graham at para. 39. I settle on a 7-year sentence, given the nature of the firearm and amount of ammunition.4
55The jurisprudence supports imposing consecutive sentences for the gun and drug offences: R. v. Owusu, 2024 ONSC 671 at para. 25; see also R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26 at para. 98. Consecutive sentences would lead to an 18-year global sentence. However, I must ensure that the total sentence remains proportionate and does not become unduly long or harsh: R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at 531.
56A global sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment best reflects the totality principle in this case. The provincial Crown advanced that position, and I accept it.5 Anything shorter would be insufficient because it would fail to reflect the combined gravity of the offences and Mr. Deschenes’s elevated moral culpability, even after considering the mitigating and collateral factors detailed earlier. Anything longer might be crushing and risk extinguishing any chance of reintegration, even if the rehabilitative prospects are limited: see R. v. Johnson, 2012 ONCA 339 at paras. 17-18; R. v. Hannora, 2020 ONCA 335 at paras. 9-11.
57The parties suggested giving concurrent sentences to achieve totality: see Bertrand Marchand at para. 99. I am satisfied that consecutive terms, after adjusting for totality, do not result in setting too low the individual sentences for the firearm or drug offences. I allocate 9.5 years to the protonitazene offence and 5.5 years to the firearm offences.6
58I conclude that a significant increase from Mr. Deschenes’s prior sentences is necessary: see R. v. Parker, 2024 ONCA 591 at para. 41. The present offences are demonstrably more serious. This is the first time that Mr. Deschenes has combined firearms and drug trafficking in a single course of conduct. Furthermore, while I do not know the specific substances involved in the prior trafficking offences, the sentences imposed compel an inference that they did not involve highly dangerous synthetic opioids such as fentanyl or protonitazene. The previous unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitative sentences now require me to take a different approach: see R. v. Ogbamichael, 2014 ONSC 1693 at paras. 15-16.
59“[P]ublic protection is part of the very essence of the purpose and principles governing the sentencing process”: R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31 at para. 33. The lengthy sentence here is necessary to protect the public. But it is also proportionate to Mr. Deschenes’s circumstances, which include his remorse and accountability and the impact of incarceration on his family: see R. v. Legere, 1995 CanLII 1551 (ON CA), 22 O.R. (3d) 89, [1995] O.J. No. 152 (C.A.) at paras. 38-39.
Disposition
60Mr. Deschenes has been in custody since August 22, 2024. He thus has 667 days of pre-sentence custody,7 which enhances to 1001 days.
61The parties have jointly recommended a further 8-month (244 days)8 deduction resulting from the collateral consequence of Mr. Deschenes being strip searched while in custody. Correctional officers had reasonable grounds to believe that dangerous contraband was in the area, that a strip search was needed to locate and recover it, and that a less intrusive search would not be effective. However, the search of Mr. Deschenes was not conducted in full compliance with regulatory and institutional requirements designed to ensure inmate privacy during the search.
Federal information
62On count 7, possession of a benzimidazole, namely protonitazene, for the purpose of trafficking: I would have imposed a jail sentence of 9.5 years (3,469 days). After deducting the 1,245 days of credit outlined above,9 the further jail sentence is 6 years, 1 month, and 2 days (2,224 days).
63On count 1, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking: 6 years concurrent.
64On count 3, possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking: 3 years concurrent.
65On count 4, possession of currency knowing it was obtained by crime: 3 years concurrent.
Provincial information
66On count 2, possession of a semi-automatic handgun with readily accessible ammunition: 5 years consecutive.
67On counts 3 and 4, breach of a weapons prohibition order: 6 months consecutive but concurrent to each other.
68In total, Mr. Deschenes is left to serve a further 11 years, 7 months, and 2 days.
Ancillary orders
69I impose a s. 109 order for life, make a DNA order, and waive the victim surcharge.
Released: June 19, 2026
Signed: Justice Davin M.K. Garg
Footnotes
- See R. v. Deschenes, 2025 ONCJ 630.
- See e.g., my analysis on totality later in these reasons.
- The judge gave a global 11-year sentence on top of the 288 days credit for pre-sentence custody.
- The 6-year sentence sought by the provincial Crown already reflected the totality principle.
- I raised whether R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37 could apply if I sought to impose a sentence equivalent to that proposed by the provincial Crown but arrived at through different means and attribution. Upon reflection, I am satisfied that Nahanee does not apply. The sentence that I am imposing is not harsher in its effect on Mr. Deschenes than what was submitted by either Crown.
- I do not accept a concern that a future sentencing judge would only see the final attribution on the criminal record and risk sentencing Mr. Deschenes on imperfect information. The parties could always provide these reasons to a future sentencing judge if the need arose.
- Inclusive of both August 22, 2024 and June 19, 2026.
- I calculated a year at 365.25 days and a month at 30.4375 days. I rounded up 243.5 to 244 days.
- 1001 days of pre-sentence custody and 244 days for the strip search.