Lauren Marie Wilhelm

This criminal trial involved three accused (Adeel Safdar, Shaheen Safdar, and Aatif Safdar) charged with various assaults and uttering threats against Sara Salim, Adeel's wife.

The central issue was whether Sara's extensive injuries were inflicted by the accused or were self-inflicted due to mental illness, as she initially claimed.

The court found Adeel Safdar guilty of two counts of aggravated assault related to breaking Sara's jaw and permanently disfiguring her ear, based on Sara's testimony corroborated by expert medical evidence.

Shaheen Safdar and Aatif Safdar were found not guilty of all charges due to reasonable doubt, as Sara's testimony against them lacked sufficient corroboration and suffered from inconsistencies.

A young person was convicted of sexual assault charges against his half-sister based on a two-witness credibility contest.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and rejected the appellant's denial, resulting in convictions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by treating credibility assessments as determinative of guilt without properly applying the legal framework for assessing burden of proof in credibility-based cases.

The court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a three-year sentence imposed after a guilty plea to production of marijuana and a concurrent six-month sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had rejected a constitutional challenge to the minimum punishment provisions under s. 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court of Appeal found that subsequent decisions in R. v. Vu and R. v. Tran rendered the trial judge's constitutional ruling incorrect.

The court reduced the sentence to two years, considering the appellant's pre-sentence custody, guilty plea, significant pre-trial release period including house arrest, and the sizable nature of the grow operation.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following a complaint made by his former partner approximately one year after the alleged incident.

The complainant alleged that the accused forced anal intercourse upon her in their bedroom between January 1 and February 29, 2016.

The trial proceeded on the basis of the complainant's evidence alone, as the Crown did not proceed with related assault charges.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to significant credibility concerns, including prior false statements made under oath to police, material omissions from her initial police statement that were later added at trial, and a clear motive to fabricate the complaint in the context of a custody dispute over their child.

The court acquitted the accused.

Four young men were charged with sexual assault and group sexual assault following an incident in which a highly intoxicated eighteen-year-old woman was driven in a car and engaged in sexual contact with three of the four defendants.

The Crown alleged the complainant was incapable of consenting due to extreme intoxication.

The defendants argued the sexual contact was consensual.

The court acquitted all defendants, finding that while the Crown's evidence was more compelling than the defence evidence, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant lacked capacity to consent, that she did not subjectively consent, or that the defendants did not honestly believe in consent.

The judgment emphasizes the high burden of proof in criminal trials and the particular challenges in sexual assault cases involving intoxicated parties.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the Crown's application regarding alleged violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Crown contended that the defence adduced evidence without first confronting Crown witnesses, particularly the complainant, Sara Salim, during cross-examination.

The court found four specific instances where the defence's failure to cross-examine on substantial matters constituted a breach of the rule, while dismissing the majority of the Crown's 16 alleged violations as either insubstantial or generally covered by the extensive cross-examination.

As a remedy, the court permitted the Crown to recall the complainant or other witnesses for reply testimony, declining the Crown's request for an adverse inference against the accused's credibility.

A 17-year-old youth pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two counts of breaching a Deferred Custody and Supervision Order.

The first robbery occurred on August 24, 2017, when the youth and an unknown accomplice robbed an escort of approximately $1,000 using violence.

The second robbery occurred on August 25, 2017, when the youth attempted to rob another escort using a knife, choking her and threatening her with a firearm.

The youth had been on a Deferred Custody and Supervision Order for a prior robbery of an 81-year-old woman committed on June 30, 2016.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 11 months less 4 months pre-trial custody (7 months remaining), with consecutive sentences on the two robbery counts and concurrent sentences on the breach counts.

A 2-year probation order with strict conditions followed release from custody.

Christopher Newton applied for severance of accused persons in a multi-count indictment, seeking to be tried separately from co-accused Shaquille Collins.

Newton argued that joinder would delay his trial beyond a reasonable time and confuse the jury due to different charges (second-degree murder for Newton, first-degree murder for Collins) and complex liability paths.

The Crown opposed, arguing the evidence was intertwined, separate trials would be inefficient, and juries are capable of following complex instructions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the 13-week delay was not significant enough to override the presumption of joint trials, and that jurors are capable of understanding complex legal instructions.

The appellants Collins and Newton were convicted of murder and attempted murder following a five-week trial before a judge and jury.

Collins was found guilty of first degree murder and attempted murder; Newton was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder.

Both appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to relate the evidence to the legal issues the jury had to decide, instead presenting evidence in a witness-by-witness format.

This error deprived the appellants of a fair trial.

The court rejected Newton's argument that his verdicts were unreasonable.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to a search warrant.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds and relied on an uncorroborated confidential informant tip.

He also argued the indictment violated the single transaction rule under s. 581 of the Criminal Code by combining drugs seized from his person upon arrest with drugs later seized from his vehicle.

The court dismissed the application, finding the ITO contained sufficient corroborated grounds to justify the warrant.

The court also held that the single transaction rule was not violated, as the seizures occurred on the same day and formed part of a continuous series of acts.

The accused was charged with Failing to Comply with Probation (x2), Break and Entry to a Dwelling, Threatening Death, Assault, Mischief to a Cellphone, and Assault Causing Bodily Harm.

The defence conceded the two probation breaches.

The Crown's case on the remaining charges rested entirely on the complainant's testimony regarding two incidents in November 2014 and February 2015.

The court found the complainant to be a reluctant but generally credible witness.

However, the court found significant inconsistencies in her account of the February 2015 incident, particularly regarding contemporaneous text messages that contradicted her trial testimony.

The court found the Crown had proven the probation breaches beyond a reasonable doubt but failed to prove the remaining counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference involving two young children.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury against using evidence relating to one complainant as propensity evidence for the other, and by admitting hearsay statements.

The Court of Appeal found no error in admitting the hearsay statements but held that the failure to provide a limiting instruction on cross-count propensity reasoning was a fatal error.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conditional sentence, and substituted a sentence of 12 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The respondent conceded the sentence was illegal, as the offence is a 'serious personal injury offence' under s. 752 of the Criminal Code, precluding a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month custodial sentence.

The Court granted one-for-one credit for the five months and ten days the respondent had already served under house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 12 months.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of luring and sexual assault.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused based on his belief that the 15-year-old complainant was 16, finding he took reasonable steps to determine her age by using an alternate internet profile.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by failing to conduct the required contextual and objective inquiry under ss. 172.1(4) and 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, and by failing to properly address the issue of consent under ss. 265(3) and 273.1.

The acquittals were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The Hamilton Spectator applied to unseal production orders and Informations to Obtain (ITOs) that had been sealed in connection with a fraud investigation involving allegations that the accused defrauded Citizenship and Immigration Canada of over four million dollars.

The court dismissed the application on jurisdictional grounds, finding that because one accused was awaiting trial in Superior Court and the mode of trial for the other two accused had not been determined, the application should be brought before a Superior Court judge rather than the Ontario Court of Justice.