Daniel Yudashkin

The condominium corporation sought an order for a tenant to vacate a unit due to persistent and dangerous antisocial behaviour, including property damage and threats, which continued even after an interlocutory compliance order.

The court granted the application, ordering the tenant's permanent removal, citing breaches of the Condominium Act and the condominium's governing documents, and emphasizing the need to ensure resident safety and uphold court orders.

The appellant hired the respondent for leasehold improvements and failed to pay the final invoice balance.

More than two years after the last payment, the respondent commenced a Small Claims Court action.

The trial judge found that a text message sent by the appellant constituted an acknowledgment of the debt under s. 13 of the Limitations Act, 2002, extending the limitation period.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the decision, finding the text message was a clear acknowledgment and that the unique identifiers of a cellular phone satisfy the signature requirement under s. 13(10) of the Act.

In supplementary reasons, the Divisional Court reviewed the respondent's bill of costs, which had been omitted from consideration in the original decision.

Although the bill of costs was reasonable, the court maintained its original decision to make no order as to costs because the respondent's delay in retaining counsel necessitated an adjournment and caused the appellant unnecessary additional expense.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to extend the time for service of a statement of claim.

The appellant became aware of the facts giving rise to the claim in December 2012, issued the statement of claim in March 2015, but deliberately did not serve it for three years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's refusal to extend the time, finding that the appellant's tactical decision to delay service beyond the rules' timeframe was a relevant and adverse factor.

The respondent was entitled to rely on presumptive prejudice from the expiry of the limitation period, and actual prejudice was demonstrated by the length of delay.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing her application for compensation for belongings allegedly removed by her landlords.

The Board found that the tenant failed to prove her damages and failed to mitigate her losses by refusing to retrieve her belongings, which were still on the property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board did not err in declining to address the landlords' alleged unlawful entry or in not compelling the landlords to testify, as the tenant's failure to prove damages was fatal to her claim.

The Court also held that the Board's conclusion on mitigation was an unappealable finding of fact.

The parties appeared before the Divisional Court and requested an adjournment of an appeal from the Landlord and Tenant Board concerning a $15,000 damages claim.

Citing proportionality and the inefficient use of judicial resources, the court proposed deciding the appeal on a written record rather than reconvening for oral argument.

The parties consented, and the court issued a procedural order setting a schedule for the exchange of written materials and costs submissions.

The appellant landlord appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding it only $660 of a $9,905 claim for cleaning and repair costs against former tenants.

The Deputy Judge had discounted the landlord's primary evidence, an invoice from a non-arm's length company owned by the landlord's spouse, finding it unreliable and inflated.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the factual findings and rejected the landlord's claim of judicial bias.

However, the court found the Deputy Judge erred in law by applying section 42 of the Residential Tenancies Act (abandoned property) instead of section 41 (vacated property) to the disposal of outdoor furniture.

The appeal was allowed in part, increasing the judgment by $120 to $780.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time for service of a Statement of Claim in a wrongful dismissal action.

The plaintiff deliberately delayed serving the claim due to a lack of funds.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff's deliberate decision not to serve the claim constituted intentional and contumelious delay.

The court also found that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendants.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion concerning a mortgage loan and possession of mortgaged lands.

The plaintiff, 2410488 Ontario Inc., sought costs after minutes of settlement were reached.

The defendant, Alex Aidan Fitzgerald Furney, argued the costs motion was premature due to an ongoing accounting, but the court found it timely.

The plaintiff requested costs on a substantial indemnity basis, but the court, applying the factors under the Rules of Civil Procedure, awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $11,782.77, to be added to the mortgage account with interest.

The defendant Charlotte Marino, having successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing for no costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01, found Charlotte Marino entitled to costs but deemed the time docketed by her counsel excessive.

The court awarded Charlotte Marino $30,000 plus HST for fees and $13,531.78 for disbursements, to be paid by the plaintiff.

The court declined to award costs against a non-party.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff alleged that she and her late husband gave the proceeds from the sale of two properties to the defendants in trust, and that these funds were used to purchase a condominium to be held in trust for the plaintiff.

The defendant argued the funds were legitimate payouts for discharged mortgages.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding the documentary evidence supported the defendant's position that the funds were mortgage payouts, not trust funds.

The court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the mortgages were shams designed to avoid creditors.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

Following a judgment declaring the respondent in breach of an agreement of purchase and sale and ordering the return of a $40,000 deposit, the successful applicants sought substantial indemnity costs based on a pre-litigation demand letter.

The court found the letter did not qualify as a Rule 49 offer to settle because it was essentially a demand letter with a one-day deadline.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the quantum at $14,000 after considering the principles of indemnity, the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, and the complexity of the proceedings.