Dora Konomi

A neighbourhood association sought to enforce restrictive covenants and by-laws against a property owner who proposed to add eight new windows to the exterior side wall of his townhouse following fire damage repairs.

The owner challenged the validity of the restrictive covenants as vague, uncertain, and ambiguous, arguing they lacked objective criteria and could be enforced arbitrarily.

The court upheld the restrictive covenants as valid and enforceable, finding they were part of a building scheme designed to preserve uniformity of the community's exterior appearance.

The court distinguished building schemes from developer's restrictive covenants, noting that under a building scheme all owners share similar burdens and benefits.

The court granted the association's application for a declaration that the covenants were valid and enforceable, and that the owner was in breach.

The appellant abandoned his appeal after the respondents filed responding materials and brought a motion for security for costs.

The respondents sought costs of the appeal and the moot security motion.

The appellant requested that no costs be ordered, citing personal circumstances.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise any discretion to order no costs, noting the appellant had put the respondents to expense and had substantial unpaid costs orders.

The court awarded costs of $20,000 to the Aziz respondents and $15,000 to the Mallot Creek respondents.

A non-lawyer, Stuart Murray, sought leave to represent the plaintiff corporation, Cowal Chalmers Inc., in this action.

The defendant opposed the motion, citing Murray's disbarment and alleged inability to represent the corporation effectively.

The court, applying Rule 15.01(2) factors, granted leave, finding that as the sole shareholder, officer, and director, Murray was intricately connected to the corporation and reasonably capable of representation.

The court also found the corporation was financially unable to retain counsel, emphasizing access to justice.

Arguments regarding Murray's disbarment and a potential conflict of interest due to a third-party claim against him were considered and dismissed as not precluding his representation.

The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), a judgment creditor of Vadim Tsatskin, brought a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a property solely owned by Tsatskin's spouse, Irene Bromberg.

The OSC alleged that Bromberg held a beneficial interest in the property in trust for Tsatskin, who had orchestrated a scheme to hide assets and avoid payment of a $5.3 million debt from fraudulent investment schemes.

Bromberg opposed, citing clean hands, delay, and prejudice.

The court granted the CPL, finding a triable issue for a resulting or constructive trust and that the equities favored the OSC, given the significant dissipation risk posed by Tsatskin's fraudulent history and the lack of substantiated prejudice from Bromberg.

The condominium corporation sought an order for a tenant to vacate a unit due to persistent and dangerous antisocial behaviour, including property damage and threats, which continued even after an interlocutory compliance order.

The court granted the application, ordering the tenant's permanent removal, citing breaches of the Condominium Act and the condominium's governing documents, and emphasizing the need to ensure resident safety and uphold court orders.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a property, alleging that the defendant Tong Zang was fraudulently hiding her interest in it by having her son, Lawrence John Roy, take title.

The plaintiff had previously obtained a judgment against Zang and other CPLs on different properties, and despite Zang's assignment in bankruptcy, the plaintiff obtained an order under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to continue the action.

The court found that the plaintiff had established a reasonable chance of proving its claims that Zang was the true beneficial owner or that Lawrence's title was fraudulent.

The motion was granted, and a CPL was ordered to be issued against the property.

The applicant, Michael Jeffrey Meade, sought a Norwich order against The Toronto-Dominion Bank to compel the disclosure of banking records for an account where funds from an overdue loan judgment were deposited.

The applicant had an outstanding judgment against the original debtors and required the records to trace the disappeared funds.

The court applied the established criteria for granting a Norwich order, finding that the applicant's claim was bona fide, the bank was the only practicable source of the information, and the interests of justice favored granting the order, especially with restrictions on the use of the disclosed information.

The order was granted.

The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) appealed a motion judge's decision to strike its fraudulent conveyance claims under section 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act.

The motion judge had found the pleadings insufficient to establish standing for subsequent creditors.

The Court of Appeal clarified that subsequent creditors can challenge a transfer if it was made with the general intent to defraud creditors, whether present or future.

The Court found the OSC's pleadings contained sufficient "badges of fraud" to support the claim, including the transfer of property for no consideration, a close relationship between parties, and an intent to avoid future business liabilities.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating the fraudulent conveyance claims regarding both the property transfer and subsequent payments.

The Plaintiff, a judgment creditor, sought leave to register Certificates of Pending Litigation (CPLs) on three properties, alleging that the judgment debtor, Ms. Tong Zang, had fraudulently conveyed her interests or held beneficial interests in these properties through a resulting trust to avoid paying a $369,072.61 judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff established a triable issue regarding both resulting trust and fraudulent conveyance, citing several badges of fraud.

The balance of convenience favored granting the CPLs to prevent the properties from being sold before a judicial determination.

This is a motion to quash an appeal on the basis that the order under appeal was interlocutory, not final, and therefore not properly before the Court of Appeal.

The motion judge had dismissed a motion to strike out claims for declaratory relief, holding that it was not plain and obvious the causes of action had no merit and were properly pleaded.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's order did not finally determine any issues between the parties, leaving them for the trial judge, and was thus interlocutory.

The Court concluded that only the Divisional Court had jurisdiction over such an order and quashed the appeal, awarding substantial indemnity costs to the moving parties.

The defendant brought a motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) granted ex parte to the plaintiffs over a condominium redevelopment property.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure by omitting a standard form agreement of purchase and sale and relevant emails.

The court found the plaintiffs complied with their disclosure obligations, as the inclusion of the standard agreement was a triable issue rather than a deliberate omission.

The court also found the property was unique to the plaintiffs under the Dhunna factors.

The motion to discharge the CPL was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) to strike the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief regarding express, resulting, and constructive trusts, as well as fraudulent conveyances.

The plaintiffs, who are judgment creditors, alleged that the defendants transferred properties to their spouses to defeat creditors.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to support their claims and that it was not plain and obvious the claims would fail.

The court also granted the plaintiffs' countermotion for a discovery plan.

The Lawyers (Parnes Rothman LLP et al.) brought a motion to consolidate two actions: a main action by mortgagees to collect mortgage debts and a lawyer action by mortgagors for contribution and indemnity from their lawyers.

The court granted the motion, finding that the actions shared common questions of law and fact, and consolidation would promote efficiency, avoid inconsistent findings, and facilitate common discoveries.

The court dismissed the mortgagees' argument that the motion was an abuse of process, noting that the Lawyers had not circumvented any procedure.