John W. Makins

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against the deceased's family physician following the deceased's sudden cardiac death.

The plaintiffs alleged the physician breached the standard of care by failing to elicit symptoms of coronary artery disease during a periodic health examination and by failing to send a referral for a stress test.

The court found the physician met the standard of care during the examination.

While the physician admitted breaching the standard of care by failing to send the referral later, the court concluded this breach did not cause the death, as the deceased would not have received treatment before his death due to specialist wait times, and the fatal arrhythmia was likely caused by pre-existing scarring rather than an acute ischemic event.

The action was dismissed.

In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiffs challenged the admissibility of evidence from a defendant cardiologist, Dr. Wong, concerning average wait times for stress tests.

Dr. Wong's testimony was based on patient records and a summary chart prepared by his office staff.

The plaintiffs argued this constituted inadmissible hearsay, as Dr. Wong did not personally verify all the underlying data.

The court ruled that Dr. Wong's evidence was admissible in its entirety.

It found that the patient records contained Dr. Wong's first-hand knowledge and served to refresh his memory, and the chart was a summary of this information.

Any weaknesses or limitations in the process of compiling the data were deemed to affect the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

The defendants in a medical malpractice action brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim under the Family Law Act, arguing she did not meet the definition of a spouse.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was brought too close to the scheduled trial date contrary to prior instructions.

Applying the principles from Hryniak, the court held that granting partial summary judgment would risk duplicative proceedings and was not in the interest of justice, as the spousal status issue could be efficiently determined at trial.

The respondent moved to vary a judgment of the Court of Appeal awarding $8,000 in costs to the appellant following a successful appeal to set aside an administrative dismissal.

The respondent argued that costs should not follow the event because it was not at fault for the delay, and that it had not agreed to the $8,000 quantum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the digital recording confirmed the respondent's counsel had agreed to the quantum, and found no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they wrongfully dismissed the respondent and engaged in shareholder oppression.

The trial judge ordered the appellants to purchase the respondent's shares valued as of September 30, 2005, and to pay him bonuses up to that date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent's conduct did not constitute cause for termination.

The Court also upheld the valuation date and bonus entitlement, noting the appellants' continued oppressive conduct and the ongoing benefits they received from the respondent's contributions.

The insured retained a public adjuster on a contingency fee basis to assist with a fire insurance claim.

The insured applied for a declaration that the adjuster's fees were a 'loss' under statutory condition 11 of the Insurance Act, and therefore subject to the appraisal process under s. 128.

The application judge agreed.

The insurer appealed, arguing that 'amount of loss' should be restricted to property damage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that economic losses were covered by the policy and the enhancer endorsement, and that any ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the insured.

The respondent worked as a commissioned salesperson for the appellant under an agreement that allowed either party to terminate without notice or penalty.

The trial judge found this provision unconscionable due to unequal bargaining power and awarded reasonable notice.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the trial judgment, finding no evidence of unconscionability, duress, or vulnerability.

The respondent understood the contract, which contained terms beneficial to him, and the termination provision was enforced.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits for 156 weeks.

The insurer terminated benefits, arguing the applicant's ongoing disability was due to pre-existing degenerative changes and that he was not continuously prevented from engaging in suitable alternative employment.

The arbitrator preferred the medical evidence attributing the applicant's chronic pain to the accident.

The arbitrator also accepted vocational evidence that the applicant lacked the education, training, and skills for the alternative jobs proposed by the insurer, and found the applicant was entitled to ongoing weekly income benefits.