Chet Wydrzynski

Puri Professional Corporation (Puri PC) sought coverage under an errors and omissions insurance policy from Lloyd’s Underwriters and The Sovereign General Insurance Company (the Insurers) for a client's negligence claim related to tax advice.

The Insurers moved for summary judgment to dismiss Puri PC's claim, arguing the alleged wrongful acts occurred before the policy's retroactive date.

Puri PC brought a cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking a declaration of coverage, arguing a clerical error in the application should be rectified.

The court granted the Insurers' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Puri PC's claim, finding the retroactive date exclusion clearly applied and rectification was not warranted as the alleged acts occurred well before the policy's retroactive date.

During a trial on liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while pitching in a school softball tournament, the plaintiff brought a motion to exclude the expert evidence of the defendant school board's proposed expert on student physical health and safety.

The proposed expert opined that the standard of care was strictly defined by the OPHEA Safety Guidelines, which did not mandate face masks for pitchers.

The court excluded the expert evidence, finding it was not necessary as the jury could understand the facts and assess the foreseeable risks without her assistance.

Furthermore, the court found the evidence would likely distort the fact-finding process because the expert acted as an advocate, rigidly adhered to an incorrect legal standard, and offered opinions beyond her expertise.

The plaintiff sued a fitness instructor and gym for injuries sustained when an air-filled medicine ball bounced and hit her in the chin during a 'slam ball' exercise.

The plaintiff alleged the instructor was negligent for providing a bouncing ball without proper instruction or warning.

The court found that the instructor met the standard of care, having provided adequate verbal and visual instructions, and that using an air-filled ball was consistent with industry standards.

The action was dismissed, with the court concluding the plaintiff was the author of her own misfortune.

The moving parties, two of the plaintiffs in a civil assault action, sought an order to relieve them from the deemed undertaking rule to use a security video, obtained through discovery, for a criminal prosecution against the individual defendants (security guards) and a police officer.

The court found that the deemed undertaking rule applied to the video as it was disclosed under compulsion, despite being provided early for tactical reasons.

The court further determined that the public interest in pursuing a criminal investigation did not outweigh the prejudice to the disclosing party (20 Vic Management Inc.) and its co-defendants, particularly the tactical leverage a concurrent criminal investigation could create in the civil action.

The motion was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion by the plaintiff for the production of an investigative and surveillance report, which the defendant had resisted on grounds of privilege.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendant sought set-off costs for a prior motion.

The court found the plaintiff entirely successful on the production issue, which involved a novel point of law.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff, a lawyer represented by counsel from his own firm, should not recover costs, deeming it speculative and inconsistent with cost award principles.

The court determined that the defendant's steadfast maintenance of privilege was the principal cause of delay and the necessity of the motions.

The plaintiff was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

In a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendants moved to compel the plaintiff to attend a defence medical examination by an orthopedic surgeon.

The plaintiff agreed to attend only if the defendants disclosed counsel’s letter of instruction to the expert.

The court held that litigation privilege protects the instructing letter at the time the examination is arranged and when the expert report is served under Rule 33.06.

However, if the party later elects to call the expert at trial, the privilege is subject to an implied waiver and the instructing letter must be produced as foundational information relating to the expert’s opinion under Rule 53.03.

The plaintiff was ordered to attend the examination without disclosure of the instructing letter at this stage.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to substitute two identified individuals carrying on business as a security automation service in place of a fictitiously named defendant, “John Doe.” The motion arose from water damage allegedly caused by a defective sprinkler head following inspection of the sprinkler system by contractors retained by a security company.

The proposed defendants argued that the amendment would improperly add parties after expiry of the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held the amendment constituted correction of a misnomer because the statement of claim clearly described the technicians involved in the inspection and the “litigation finger” was directed at them from the outset.

As no non‑compensable prejudice was shown and the action remained at an early stage, leave to amend was granted.

The insurer appealed a judgment for the insured in an action for benefits under a sickness and accident policy.

The trial judge instructed the jury that because the insurer had accepted the claim and made some payments, it bore the legal burden of proof to establish that the insured was not totally disabled.

The Court of Appeal found this instruction to be an error, holding that the insured bore the legal burden of proof.

However, the appeal was dismissed as the misdirection did not result in any substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The applicant in a statutory accident benefits dispute brought a motion to remove the insurer's solicitors from the record, alleging a conflict of interest involving a private investigator.

The applicant also summoned several lawyers from the insurer's firm.

The insurer moved to quash the summonses.

The applicant subsequently withdrew her motion.

The insurer sought its expenses for both motions.

The arbitrator found the applicant's motion was unnecessary and tended to prolong, obstruct, or hinder the proceedings.

The insurer was awarded $2,500 in expenses.