Alissa K. Mitchell

The accused was charged with human trafficking, procuring, unlawful confinement, and assault relating to her relationship with a 20-year-old woman with an intellectual disability.

The Crown alleged the accused forced the complainant into prostitution, controlled her finances, and physically assaulted her.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be internally inconsistent and unreliable.

The court concluded the complainant voluntarily engaged in prostitution and was not controlled or threatened by the accused.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was charged with possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after police responded to a 'check welfare' 911 call about a person slumped over a steering wheel in a parked car.

Police boxed in the vehicle, woke the accused, and searched her purse without consent, finding drugs.

The court found the detention was arbitrary and the search violated section 8 of the Charter, as there was no suspected criminal activity and the accused showed no signs of medical distress once awake.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the drug evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The applicant husband brought a motion to change a 2010 final order, seeking to terminate his spousal support obligations.

The respondent wife sought to increase spousal support.

The court found that the wife was intentionally underemployed, had a materially improved financial position, and had not contributed to the children's section 7 expenses.

Given the husband's substantial contributions to the children and debt repayment, the court terminated both spousal and child support effective January 1, 2016.

The accused was tried on two counts of sexual assault involving adult complainants who were sisters.

After the Crown closed its case, a non-suit application was granted on the first count, and the trial proceeded only on the second count.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the accused's evidence on consent credible and concluded the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity.

The accused was acquitted on the remaining count.

The applicant, charged with fraud and theft over $5000, sought a Rowbotham order for state-funded counsel after being denied Legal Aid.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to exhaust his Legal Aid appeals, was not indigent given his household income and discretionary spending, and that the straightforward nature of the charges did not necessitate counsel to ensure a fair trial.

The offender was convicted of incest and sexual assault against his 18-year-old biological daughter.

The offences occurred in the offender's home while the victim was residing there.

The court found significant aggravating factors, including breach of trust, unprotected intercourse, and profound psychological impact on the victim.

The offender showed no remorse and blamed the victim.

The court sentenced the offender to five years' imprisonment for incest and a concurrent three-year term for sexual assault, along with mandatory and discretionary ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his apartment and found cocaine, scales, dime bags, weapons, and ammunition.

The accused pleaded guilty to simple possession but denied the purpose of trafficking, testifying that the drugs and paraphernalia belonged to a guest who had left them behind.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's exculpatory testimony as incredible and illogical.

Relying on the expert evidence of a police detective regarding indicia of trafficking, the court found the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with making and possessing child pornography and luring a child after exchanging sexually explicit messages and images with a 9-year-old complainant on a dating website and messaging app.

The accused testified she believed the complainant was an adult, relying on the dating site's age restriction, the complainant's profile, and the mature nature of the conversation.

The court found the accused's evidence credible and held that, given the unusual circumstances of a child posing as an adult on an adult dating site, the Crown failed to prove the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging violations of his s. 8 rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) for a search warrant was drafted hastily and lacked sufficient grounds, and that police caused unreasonable damage to his property during the search.

The court found the ITO contained sufficient reliable evidence to justify the warrant and that the applicant failed to prove police caused unreasonable damage.

The application was dismissed, with the court noting that even if a breach had occurred, a Grant analysis would favour admitting the evidence.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident in Texas while driving a rental vehicle.

The at-fault driver was underinsured.

The plaintiffs settled their claims, leaving a priority dispute between two insurers providing OPCF 44R family protection coverage: Liberty (insuring the plaintiff's employer) and Unifund (insuring the plaintiff's spouse).

Liberty brought a motion for summary judgment arguing its policy did not respond.

The court held that under section 2.2.3 of OAP 1, the Liberty policy did not cover the rental vehicle because the plaintiff was an employee of the named corporate insured.

Consequently, Unifund was the sole first loss insurer.

The action against Liberty was dismissed.

The applicant, Rueben Russell Garcia, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his criminal matter to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 1,017 days (33 months and 16 days), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases under R. v. Jordan.

The court attributed 149 days of delay to the defense prior to the preliminary hearing and an additional 3 months for failing to consent to committal earlier, reducing the net delay to 25 months, which is below the presumptive ceiling.

The court also found exceptional circumstances due to the complexity of the joint marijuana extraction operation and the joinder of charges with a co-accused.

As a transitional case under the Jordan framework, the applicant failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite proceedings or that the delay markedly exceeded what was reasonably required.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment to declare an option agreement (OA) and an option amending agreement (OAA) valid and enforceable, and to dismiss the plaintiff's oppression and breach of fiduciary duty claims.

The plaintiff alleged the agreements were unenforceable due to lack of explanation, independent legal advice, and fresh consideration, and that the defendants engaged in oppressive conduct and breached fiduciary duties.

The court found the OA and OAA valid and enforceable, rejecting the plaintiff's arguments.

It also dismissed and struck the oppression and breach of fiduciary duty claims, finding them improperly pleaded and unsupported by evidence, and noting the plaintiff's failure to seek leave for a derivative action for corporate wrongs.

The plaintiff's wrongful dismissal claim was allowed to proceed.

The Crown applied to have Justin Primmer declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention.

Primmer sought dismissal or a determinate sentence with long-term supervision.

The court found Primmer met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation under two pathways, based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour, failure to restrain behaviour, likelihood of future violence, and persistent aggressive behaviour showing substantial indifference to consequences.

The court rejected arguments for a lesser sentence, including religious conversion, pro-social behaviour in custody, treatability, and the "burnout theory" citing his history of manipulation, lack of genuine remorse, and chronic dishonesty.

An indeterminate sentence was imposed to protect the public.

The appellant, J.M., appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by reversing the burden of proof on consent, failing to consider evidence holistically before applying the R. v. W.(D.) analysis, and misapprehending evidence.

Specifically, the trial judge incorrectly placed the burden on the appellant to prove consent and failed to reconcile material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, such as her moaning during the alleged sexual assault and her actions following the incidents.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, Leon Kofman, charged with drug and weapon offenses, sought to exclude evidence obtained from searches of two residential condominiums pursuant to a search warrant.

The applicant alleged a violation of his section 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure, arguing the Information To Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds to connect drug trafficking to the target locations and was misleading.

The court found the ITO deficient and misleading, concluding that the warrant could not have issued and the searches were unlawful, thus breaching the applicant's section 8 Charter rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct (reckless and negligent ITO preparation), the significant impact on the applicant's high expectation of privacy in his residences, and the societal interest in maintaining the repute of justice (despite the importance of the evidence to the Crown's case) favoured exclusion.

Consequently, all evidence seized from both condominiums was excluded.

Birani Homes Ltd. appealed an order from the Chief Building Official of the City of London compelling it and the homeowners to submit an engineering report and remediate an unsafe foundation.

Birani argued the City lacked jurisdiction and the order was unreasonable because Birani had no right of access to the property.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order as it was unreasonable to compel compliance when access was impossible, especially after a prior resolution acknowledged this inability.

The City was prohibited from issuing further orders against Birani requiring access to the property.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's claim in battery as statute-barred.

The claim arose from an incident on June 1, 2014, where the plaintiff alleged excessive force by police during his arrest.

The plaintiff was acquitted of criminal charges on February 17, 2016, and issued a notice of action on June 2, 2016.

The court found that the tort of battery, being an intentional act with immediate harm, was discoverable on June 1, 2014.

The plaintiff's arguments that the limitation period should run from his acquittal, his release from custody, or due to his alleged incapacity were rejected.

The court distinguished battery from negligent investigation/malicious prosecution claims, where discoverability is tied to the termination of criminal proceedings.

Consequently, the battery claim was dismissed as statute-barred, having expired on June 1, 2016, while the negligent investigation claim was allowed to proceed.

This costs endorsement addresses two motions brought by the applicant: one to compel answers to undertakings and refusals, and another to remove a solicitor due to conflict of interest.

The court partially granted the motion to compel answers and ordered the solicitor's removal.

The applicant sought $7,500 in costs, while respondents argued for no costs or a significant reduction due to divided success.

The court, applying the principles of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, awarded the applicant $5,500 in all-inclusive costs, allocating liability between specific respondents for each motion.

The defendant, Coachman Insurance Company, brought a motion to amend its statement of defence and, in the alternative, for leave to withdraw alleged admissions concerning the involvement of an unidentified motorist.

The plaintiff, Margret Kabutangana, opposed the amendments, arguing they constituted a withdrawal of admissions.

The court first granted the plaintiff leave to file additional affidavit evidence.

On the main motion, the court determined that the defendant's original pleading did not contain unambiguous and deliberate admissions, thus Rule 51.05 (withdrawal of admissions) was not applicable.

The court then granted the defendant leave to amend its statement of defence under Rule 26, finding no uncompensable prejudice to the plaintiff, especially given the plaintiff's prior knowledge of the defendant's position and statutory obligations regarding corroborating evidence for damages exceeding $200,000.

This corrigendum amends a prior ruling dated February 13, 2017, in a criminal proceeding.

It specifically corrects paragraph 23, which detailed trial scheduling and counsel availability for a s. 11(b) Charter application, and paragraph 71 ix., which addressed the calculation of institutional delay attributable to the preliminary hearing judge's reserved decision.