Kristyn Melanie Hutchinson

The accused, charged with sexual offences against a minor and drug trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude statements made to police and evidence seized from his home.

The accused had called 911 to report a break and enter, leading police to discover a distraught minor who made allegations against him.

The court found the accused was not initially detained during the preliminary investigation, but his s. 10(b) right to counsel was breached when an officer had him sign a written statement knowing an arrest was imminent.

The court excluded the signed statement under s. 24(2) but admitted the prior oral statements and evidence obtained via search warrants, finding no s. 8 breaches.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including human trafficking, procuring, withholding travel documents, and fraud, relating to his involvement with an 18-year-old complainant in the sex trade.

The Crown alleged the accused exercised coercive influence over the complainant's movements, took her earnings under the guise of a fraudulent condo investment scheme, and withheld her identification documents to maintain control.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as implausible and accepted the complainant's testimony.

The court found that the accused preyed on the complainant's vulnerabilities and exploited her for financial gain.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The defendants were found guilty of exercising control over the movements of a complainant to provide sexual services, receiving a material benefit, and advertising sexual services.

One defendant was also found guilty of trafficking MDMA.

The court found that while the defendants did not coerce the complainant into the sex trade, they exploited her serious drug dependency for financial gain.

The court sentenced A.M. to a global term of 24 months and M.P. to a global term of 18 months, ordered forfeiture of their cellphones as offence-related property, and granted pre-trial custody credit including for house arrest but not for curfews.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences related to recruiting teenaged girls into the sex trade industry.

The court accepted a joint submission for a total sentence of six years in custody, less 335 days of pre-sentence custody credit.

The court noted the serious aggravating factors of exploitation and the ages of the victims, balanced against the accused's youth, guilty pleas, and rehabilitative efforts while in pre-sentence custody.

Various ancillary orders were also imposed, including weapons prohibitions, a SOIRA order, and a non-communication order.

The defendants, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought a pre-trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on her history in the sex trade.

The Crown alleged the defendants used drugs to coerce the complainant into sex work.

The court applied the two-stage s. 276 framework, ruling that evidence of the complainant's prior sex work and subsequent sex work was inadmissible as it engaged the twin myths.

However, the court permitted cross-examination regarding the complainant's initial meeting with a third party and her independent sex work during the time of the allegations, finding this evidence relevant to the issue of coercion and not barred by s. 276.

The applicant husband brought a motion to change a 2010 final order, seeking to terminate his spousal support obligations.

The respondent wife sought to increase spousal support.

The court found that the wife was intentionally underemployed, had a materially improved financial position, and had not contributed to the children's section 7 expenses.

Given the husband's substantial contributions to the children and debt repayment, the court terminated both spousal and child support effective January 1, 2016.

The self-represented accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

During the trial, the court raised a Charter issue regarding the accused's right to counsel of choice under s. 10(b).

The accused had requested to speak to a specific lawyer, but the arresting officer failed to properly facilitate this request due to a misunderstanding of the lawyer's name and firm.

The court found that the officer did not take sufficient steps to help the accused contact his counsel of choice before defaulting to duty counsel.

Concluding that the accused's s. 10(b) rights were infringed, the court applied the Grant framework and excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused was convicted of luring a child by means of telecommunication contrary to s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and procuring the sexual services of a person under 18 years contrary to s. 212(4) of the Criminal Code.

The accused engaged in text communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 16-year-old girl, arranged for paid sexual services including unprotected intercourse and fellatio for $100, and attended a hotel to meet the purported minor.

The Crown sought 12-18 months custody; the defence sought the statutory minimum of 6 months.

The court imposed 9 months for luring and 6 months concurrent for procuring, along with probation, SOIRA registration, and a s. 161 order.

The accused was charged with Impaired and Over 80 Care or Control of a motor vehicle on January 30, 2015.

The Crown admitted the accused's blood alcohol content was 150 mg per 100 ml of blood and that she was impaired in law.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control of the vehicle.

The accused testified she occupied the driver's seat to change her boots while waiting for a restaurant party to begin, not to drive.

The court found the accused rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) on a balance of probabilities.

However, applying the de facto care or control test, the court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused created a realistic risk of danger through her poor judgment in consuming alcohol while seated alone in the driver's seat with her keys and the vehicle in a parking lot approximately 45 minutes before her planned departure.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm after pushing a taxi cab driver on December 31, 2012, causing the driver to fall and fracture his leg.

The Crown sought six months custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of six to eight months followed by probation.

The court imposed a sentence of four months in custody followed by probation, finding that a conditional sentence was not appropriate given the vulnerability of the victim, the seriousness of the injuries, and the accused's prior assault conviction.

The court also ordered restitution of $2,000.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence arising from a police strip search and penile swab following arrest for sexual assault.

The court found the removal of clothing and penile swab constituted a strip search and that the police lacked properly articulated grounds and failed to conduct the search in a reasonable manner, resulting in breaches of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court also found the accused should have been re‑informed of the right to counsel prior to the intrusive procedure.

Although the breaches were serious, they did not meet the threshold for a stay of proceedings.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the DNA evidence from the penile swab but admitted a later blood sample and ruled that the accused’s videotaped statement was voluntary.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a RIDE program stop.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on insufficient indicia of impairment.

Additionally, the court found two Charter breaches: the accused was not informed of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, and he was denied his right to counsel of choice when the officer failed to facilitate contact with his own lawyer and instead directed him to duty counsel.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The Crown brought pre-trial motions to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased to her daughter, and a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for murder.

The court admitted the deceased's statements under the state of mind and principled exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding they were relevant to her fear of the accused and desire to separate, and possessed sufficient indicia of reliability.

The court also admitted the accused's statement to police; although the officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by questioning him prematurely, the court found the subsequent spontaneous utterance was not tainted by the breach.