Alissa K. Mitchell

The applicant municipality sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent municipality from making new connections to its water and sanitary sewer systems, pending the resolution of a dispute over an expired services agreement.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured permitting three specific new development connections.

The injunction was granted on consent for all other new connections, with the three specific developments exempted.

This application concerned a creditor's attempt to set aside a property transfer from a bankrupt debtor to his spouse as a 'transfer at undervalue' under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The court found that the debtor's half-interest in the property was transferred for nil consideration, that the spouses were not dealing at arm's length, and that the transfer occurred within the five-year period preceding bankruptcy.

Crucially, the court determined that the transfer rendered the debtor insolvent by divesting him of his most valuable asset.

Consequently, the court declared the transfer void against the trustee, making the property available for distribution to creditors.

The respondent brought a motion to stay proceedings, arguing that a dispute resolution clause in the parties' separation agreement mandated binding arbitration for parenting time disputes under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The applicant opposed, contending the clause did not meet the mandatory formalities for "secondary arbitration agreements" as required by Ontario Regulation 134/07.

The court found that while the clause intended to provide for secondary arbitration, it failed to include the necessary provisions stipulated by the regulation.

Consequently, the clause did not constitute an enforceable arbitration agreement under the Arbitration Act, and the court dismissed the respondent's motion to stay the proceedings.

The plaintiffs, parents of the defendant Devon, brought a motion for summary judgment claiming a 50% interest in a property they co-resided in with the defendants.

The plaintiffs provided the $100,000 down payment, but title was taken solely in the defendants' names to secure mortgage financing, necessitating a gift letter.

The court found the defendants failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust, as the evidence showed the plaintiffs intended to acquire an interest in the property, not gift the funds.

The court granted summary judgment, declared the plaintiffs hold a 50% interest, ordered the property sold, and struck the defendants' counterclaim for damages.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, alleging misappropriation of funds.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action as statute-barred.

The court found that the plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt when the action was commenced, meaning the cause of action had vested in the trustee in bankruptcy and the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue.

The action was therefore a nullity.

Furthermore, the limitation period had expired, precluding any curative order.

The defendant's cross-motion was granted, the action was dismissed, and the plaintiffs' motion was dismissed.

This endorsement concerns the costs arising from successful summary judgment motions brought by Eaton Industries (Canada) Company and The Corporation of The City of London against Albert Bloom Limited (ABL).

The motions dismissed ABL's claims as statute-barred.

ABL conceded entitlement to costs but disputed the quantum, alleging duplication and excessiveness, particularly given Eaton's prior cost award in a related third-party motion.

The court found the claimed costs reasonable, noting the significance of the litigation, Eaton's efforts to avoid duplication, and ABL's failure to disclose its own costs for comparison.

In this criminal trial before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, John Gubbels faced charges of assault with a weapon and sexual assault with a weapon against the complainant, M.D., within the context of a BDSM relationship.

The central issue was consent.

The court found the defendant not guilty of sexual assault with a weapon (Count 1) and two counts of assault with a knife (Counts 2 and 3) due to reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's consent and the defendant's knowledge of lack of consent, stemming from inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and the nature of BDSM play.

However, the defendant was found guilty of one count of assault with a hose (Count 4), as these incidents occurred outside the BDSM context and were clearly non-consensual acts of intimidation.

The defendant contractor brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for damages arising from a slip and fall on a temporary ramp constructed during road work.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability.

The court found that the defendant was an occupier and breached its statutory duty of care by constructing an unmarked, unlit temporary ramp with a drop-off.

The court granted the plaintiffs' cross-motion, finding the defendant liable for the fall, and ordered the issue of damages to proceed to trial.

The defendants, Eaton and the City of London, moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's environmental contamination claims as statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged that historical manufacturing operations on the defendants' former property caused TCE contamination that migrated to the plaintiff's property.

The court found that the plaintiff had actual or objective knowledge of its potential claims against the defendants more than two years before seeking to add them to the action.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the ongoing migration of contaminants constituted a continuing tort or a continuing spill under the Environmental Protection Act.

The motions for summary judgment were granted and the claims against Eaton and the City were dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer questions refused at his examination for discovery and to serve a further and better affidavit of documents.

The underlying action involves a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff driver struck the defendant pedestrian and claims damages for exacerbation of pre-existing PTSD.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce various medical and counselling records, his ODSP application, and to answer questions regarding contributory negligence, but protected certain session notes due to privacy concerns.

The plaintiff was ordered to bear the initial costs of obtaining third-party productions.

The accused, Lawrence Thompson, was charged with sexual interference, sexual assault, kidnapping, and abduction of a child under 14.

The charges stemmed from an incident where Thompson picked up a four-year-old complainant, B.S., and drove her a short distance.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the child witness, noting inconsistencies but finding her core testimony credible.

The court found the accused's after-the-fact conduct (removing car parts, false statements) indicative of a guilty conscience.

The court rejected the defense of mistake of fact regarding consent for kidnapping, stating a four-year-old cannot consent to confinement by a stranger.

All four charges were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The moving party brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the responding party's underlying application, which sought to declare her a vexatious litigant.

The moving party argued the application was a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) intended to silence her.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while bringing legal proceedings constitutes expression, vexatious litigation does not relate to a matter of public interest.

The court held that the responding party was merely seeking a procedural gatekeeping order, not attempting to suppress protected expression.

The defendant, Nafi Selmanovski, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault against a complainant who was under 16 years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant and another former employee.

The defendant did not testify.

The court found numerous material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, both internal and external, which undermined credibility and reliability.

The court also noted a potential motive for fabrication by the complainant, who faced criminal charges involving police at the time of reporting.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant was acquitted on all counts.

A member of the public requested a digital recording of a hearing held on May 9, 2016, for an application involving Todd Elliott Speck and The Law Society of Upper Canada.

The court denied the request, exercising its absolute discretion.

The reasons for denial included that the hearing was public, the decision was already released and final, no oral evidence was introduced making the recording an aide memoire, the decision was based on a written record available to the public, and no persuasive reason or relevance to current proceedings was provided by the requesting party.

The plaintiff, Ian McLarty, was successful in his action for payment and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim.

This endorsement addresses the costs of the proceeding.

The court found that the plaintiff's offer to settle, though not strictly compliant with Rule 49.10, triggered substantial indemnity costs from June 18, 2018, onwards, and partial indemnity costs prior to that date, under the residual discretion of Rule 49.13.

The court assessed the reasonableness of the claimed costs, considering factors such as the exaggerated initial lien claim, the complexity of the case (simple breach of contract), the necessity of junior counsel, and the defendant's conduct (false affidavit, failure to answer undertakings).

The court ultimately awarded the plaintiff $45,000 in fees, $5,850 in HST, and $7,351.48 in disbursements, totaling $58,201.48.

The applicant, Adam Dabrowski, sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing material changes in circumstances: the COVID-19 pandemic and his sister's availability as a residential surety.

The court found that the sister's availability was not a material change, as it represented a change in legal strategy rather than new circumstances.

However, the court accepted the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change, triggering a de novo hearing.

Despite this, the proposed release plan, which included the sister as surety and house arrest, was deemed insufficient to address primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention, particularly given the applicant's history of breaching bail, credibility issues, and the surety's limited capacity for supervision.

The application for release was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a general contractor, sought payment for construction work performed for the defendant, Great Lakes Food Company, based on unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.

The defendant counterclaimed for damages due to delay and deficiencies.

The court found that delays were primarily due to the defendant's poor planning and CFIA licensing issues, not the plaintiff.

The court allowed the plaintiff's claim for extras at a reasonable "shop rate" but disallowed overtime and reduced the trailer damage claim.

The defendant's claims for deficiencies in Room D were dismissed, but a credit was allowed for drain covers in Room H. The defendant's counterclaim for damages under the Construction Lien Act for an exaggerated lien was dismissed due to lack of proven damages.

The court found the defendant wrongfully terminated the contract.

Judgment was awarded to the plaintiff for $87,244 plus interest.

The third party, Eaton Industries (Canada) Company, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the third party claim of the London Transit Commission (LTC) on the basis that it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The LTC's third party claim alleged environmental contamination caused by Eaton's predecessors.

The court found that the LTC had actual or ought to have had knowledge of its claim against Eaton by May 22, 2013, when it was served with the plaintiff's statement of claim, and failed to rebut the presumptive limitation period.

The court dismissed the LTC's arguments for a separate limitation period for other damages, concluding all claims were statute-barred.

In a derivative action, the defendants brought a motion seeking repayment of legal fees paid by the plaintiffs' representative, John Drake, and the establishment of a protocol for assessing future legal accounts.

The court dismissed the requests for repayment and the imposition of a trust, but established a detailed payment protocol requiring court approval for all future legal invoices rendered to the plaintiffs to ensure they are reasonably incurred.

The accused was charged with break and enter, assault, arson, uttering threats, and damage to property following a home invasion.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator.

The Crown relied on the eyewitness identification of the two complainants and a corroborating witness.

The court found the identification evidence to be unreliable due to the fleeting nature of the observations, the stressful circumstances, the influence of marijuana, and the fact that the witnesses had collaborated on a collective narrative before speaking to police.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt as to identity and acquitted the accused on all counts.