Zoltan Matthew Kaslik

The defendants Jing Liu and Yu De Xing (the "Xing defendants") brought a motion to enforce a Third Party Offer to Settle dated July 4, 2017, which they accepted on February 15, 2020.

The plaintiffs and Third Party argued that a subsequent global offer to settle from January 2020 impliedly withdrew the earlier offer, or that the court should exercise discretion due to inadvertent error.

The court found the two offers to be fundamentally distinct and that the later offer did not impliedly withdraw the earlier one.

The motion to enforce the July 2017 Offer to Settle was granted, and partial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving parties.

The plaintiff, a judgment creditor, brought an action to set aside a transfer of real property from the defendants (debtor and spouse) to the spouse for nominal consideration, alleging it was a fraudulent conveyance under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the defendants' request to redact the record, found the action was not limitation-barred (applying the 10-year Real Property Limitations Act period or, alternatively, the discoverability principle for the 2-year Limitations Act, 2002), and determined that the transfer was made with intent to defeat creditors, citing multiple "badges of fraud." The court granted judgment to the plaintiff, declaring the transfer void against creditors, and awarded costs.

The respondents granted a second mortgage on their Richmond Hill home to secure a $120,000 loan from the appellant.

Upon maturity, the appellant issued a discharge statement and subsequently a Notice of Sale with significantly inflated charges.

The respondents challenged the amounts and the premature notice in a Superior Court application under section 12 of the Mortgages Act.

The application judge determined the proper discharge amount and disallowed certain charges, including an illegal interest penalty and unsupported professional fees.

The appellant appealed, arguing the application judge lacked jurisdiction and that the matter should have been assessed by an assessment officer under section 43 of the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding he had jurisdiction to address all issues and that the respondents' application was a justifiable response to the appellant's unreasonable conduct.