Johanne N. Morissette

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had excluded both lay opinion evidence and expert evidence from police officers trained as Drug Recognition Experts (DREs), as well as a toxicology report, concluding that such evidence was inadmissible or failed to meet the Mohan criteria for expert evidence.

The appeal court held that lay witnesses, including police officers, may provide opinion evidence about impairment, and that trained DRE officers may give expert opinion evidence concerning drug impairment.

The court found that the trial judge erred in law by excluding the officers’ expert evidence and failing to consider the toxicology report.

As a result, the acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision when the defendant driver failed to yield the right-of-way at an intersection.

The plaintiff suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, depression, and chronic pain, which substantially interfered with her employment and daily life.

The court found the defendant driver fully liable and his employer vicariously liable.

The court held that the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold for non-pecuniary damages and awarded $100,000 in general damages, $50,000 for loss of competitive advantage, and $45,000 in Family Law Act damages.

The court also discharged the jury due to inflammatory opening statements by defence counsel.

The accused applied under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude blood evidence discovered during the execution of a general warrant authorizing police to search a residence for blood evidence related to an alleged assault.

During the search, investigators located bloodstain and blood spatter evidence in multiple areas of the home, which was later determined to belong to a missing person rather than the alleged assault victim.

The accused argued the police exceeded the scope of the warrant and should have stopped the search and obtained further judicial authorization once the evidence appeared unrelated to the assault investigation.

The court held that the forensic investigator reasonably believed the blood evidence could still relate to the reported assault and was entitled to continue the investigation within the warrant’s scope.

No breach of s. 8 of the Charter was established, and in any event the evidence would not have been excluded under s. 24(2).

A bankruptcy trustee sought directions regarding priority disputes over proceeds of sale from the bankrupt’s property.

The dispute concerned competing claims by a judgment creditor and two mortgage holders.

The court considered the validity of a mortgage granted to an accounting firm for tax services and a later mortgage granted to a lawyer securing unpaid legal fees.

Applying the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act, the court held that the earlier mortgage was valid and enforceable but that the later mortgage constituted a preferential transfer granted when the debtor was on the eve of insolvency.

The preferential mortgage was declared void and the proceeds of sale were ordered distributed accordingly.

Following a prior trial and a partial appeal, the court conducted a rehearing to determine the appropriate remedy in a certified class proceeding concerning participating account transactions and an unlawful pre‑paid expense asset used by life insurance companies.

The Court of Appeal had upheld the finding of illegality but directed the trial judge to determine the monetary amounts required to unwind the transactions and restore funds to participating policyholder accounts.

The central disputes concerned the calculation of merger synergy deductions, whether historical amortization charges should be deducted when determining the benefit received by participating accounts, the interpretation of a 6.91% return provision, and the appropriate “effective date” for unwinding the transactions.

The court concluded that amortization expenses since 1997 must be deducted to reflect the “no contribution/no benefit” principle and interpreted the Court of Appeal formula as adding, not subtracting, the 6.91% return to the participating accounts.

The court fixed December 31, 2011 as the effective date and ordered that $284,675,000 be paid to the participating accounts, with cancellation of the pre‑paid expense asset and related amortization charges.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss a civil action commenced by a former teacher alleging workplace harassment, bullying, and constructive dismissal.

The plaintiff had been a member of a bargaining unit governed by a collective agreement between the school board and the teachers’ federation.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the dispute or whether the claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration under the Labour Relations Act.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s framework from Weber, the court held that the essential character of the dispute arose from the employment relationship governed by the collective agreement.

As the matters should have been addressed through the grievance and arbitration process or before the Ontario Labour Relations Board, the court lacked jurisdiction.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking declarations that a civil judgment for personal injuries arising from an assault survived the defendant’s bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(a.1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and that the statutory stay did not prevent enforcement of the judgment.

The underlying jury verdict found that the defendant deliberately punched the plaintiff once in the head, causing catastrophic injury when the plaintiff fell and struck his head on a curb.

The court considered whether the damages constituted bodily harm “intentionally inflicted” within the meaning of s. 178(1)(a.1).

Relying on jurisprudence interpreting the provision as requiring intent to cause injury rather than merely intent to commit the act, the court held the evidence did not establish that the defendant intended to inflict bodily harm.

The motion to lift the stay and declare the debt non‑dischargeable in bankruptcy was dismissed.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment against a third‑party insurer seeking a declaration that the third‑party insurer provided valid coverage to the tortfeasor at the time of a motor vehicle accident.

The moving party argued the third‑party insurer had improperly denied coverage after cancelling the policy prior to the accident.

The court held that the doctrine of privity prevented the moving insurer from asserting contractual rights under the policy because it was not a party to the contract and had not obtained an assignment of rights from the insured.

Further, under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act, a third party may only proceed directly against an insurer after obtaining judgment against the insured.

As no judgment or assignment existed, the motion for summary judgment was premature and dismissed.

The plaintiff, a 16-year-old driver, was injured in a single-vehicle accident after failing to stop at a stop sign at a rural intersection and crashing into a concrete abutment.

The plaintiff had consumed alcohol prior to the crash.

The plaintiff sued the municipality, alleging the intersection was in a state of non-repair because it lacked warning signs for a change in road alignment (an 'offset' intersection).

The court found that the intersection posed a hidden hazard and required a warning sign in addition to the stop sign.

The court apportioned liability 50% to the municipality for failure to warn and 50% to the plaintiff for failing to stop and driving after consuming alcohol.

A senior employee with 38 years of service was reassigned from Vice President of Operations to Purchasing Manager following an internal restructuring.

The employee refused the demotion and alleged constructive dismissal.

The court held that the unilateral reassignment involved a significant loss of status, authority, and prestige, amounting to a fundamental breach of the employment contract despite the preservation of salary.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court awarded 24 months’ reasonable notice and found the employee reasonably declined to mitigate by returning to a humiliating subordinate role.

Claims for moral damages were dismissed because the employer’s conduct was not in bad faith.

The plaintiff corporation brought an action seeking unpaid rent for farmland and payment under a written agreement requiring reimbursement for soil preparation work performed for a future crop.

The defendants counterclaimed for conversion of a logging skidder.

The court found the rent claim statute-barred.

After reviewing banking records and witness evidence, the court concluded the defendants had substantially paid their share of the skidder, defeating the conversion counterclaim.

The court further held that the written agreement requiring payment for farm preparation work was valid and not induced by economic duress, and judgment was granted for $18,000 plus pre‑judgment interest.

The moving party sought to change a prior child support order and requested access to a child with significant medical and developmental needs after several years without contact.

The court declined to order access at that time, finding insufficient evidence that renewed contact would be in the child’s best interests given the child’s medical conditions and the parent’s limited understanding of those needs.

The court directed the moving party to consult the child’s pediatrician to obtain medical guidance before any future access request.

The court also addressed child support, imputing income to the moving party due to voluntary unemployment and rejecting a request for credit for alleged overpayments, although current support was suspended due to receipt of social assistance.

The court remained seized regarding the access issue for potential future review.

Following an administrative error where court staff failed to forward the respondent's costs submissions to the judge, the court reconsidered its initial costs order.

The court fixed the costs for the respondent, Menzies & Associates, at $20,000, payable by the appellants within 30 days.

Following an appeal where the appellants failed to file written submissions on costs, the Divisional Court awarded costs to the successful respondents.

The court awarded $30,000 to Woods Parisien, $20,000 to the Ville de Hawkesbury, and $20,000 to Menzies, payable by the appellants within 30 days.

The applicant sought costs for an original motion before Justice Maranger and for a judicial review application before the Divisional Court.

The Law Society opposed the request, noting the applicant had mixed success as she did not obtain the permanent stay she sought.

The court agreed the applicant's success was mixed, as it merely maintained the interim stay pending an appeal before the Law Society Appeal Panel.

The court awarded the applicant $5,000 in costs for the motion before Justice Maranger, but declined to award costs for the judicial review.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision dismissing their action against a municipality and their counterclaim against several lawyers for delay, and ordering them to post security for costs to defend an action for unpaid legal fees.

The Divisional Court found no palpable or overriding error in the Master's findings that the delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial, particularly given the death of a key witness.

The court also dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, finding the evidence was available at the original hearing and unreliable.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay $109,212.89 into court within 90 days to maintain their defence in the fee action.

The applicant appealed a Law Society Hearing Panel order suspending her licence for two and a half months.

She sought a permanent stay of proceedings, arguing her language rights were violated because the Law Society failed to form a francophone Appeal Panel in a timely manner.

The Divisional Court found that while the Law Society failed to demonstrate it took all necessary steps to fulfill its language rights duties, the applicant unilaterally began serving her suspension and did not show that allowing the appeal to proceed would be contrary to the interests of justice.

The application for a permanent stay was dismissed, but a temporary stay was continued until the appeal could be heard.