Laura Kathleen Fric

Following the dismissal of an environmental class action on appeal, the successful defendant sought costs for the period from certification to the trial decision, payable from the Class Proceedings Fund administered by the Law Foundation of Ontario.

The court held that the defendant was prima facie entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis under the general rule that costs follow the event.

However, under s.31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, the court considered that the proceeding raised novel legal issues concerning environmental mass torts and class proceedings and involved significant public interest, including access to justice and environmental concerns.

Balancing these factors with the defendant’s entitlement to compensation for substantial litigation expenses, the court reduced the costs award.

The defendant was awarded 50% of the otherwise assessed costs, payable from the Fund.

In a class proceeding costs dispute following the dismissal of environmental contamination claims, the defendant brought a motion to strike portions of affidavits filed by a third-party fund administrator opposing payment of costs from the Class Proceedings Fund.

The challenged affidavits contained opinion evidence from non‑expert witnesses asserting that the litigation raised issues of public interest.

The court applied the principles governing admissibility of lay opinion evidence from R. v. Graat, distinguishing between admissible opinion grounded in factual observations and inadmissible speculation or legal opinion.

While the court permitted most of the opinion evidence as permissible lay opinion supporting observations about the public interest and access to justice, it struck limited portions that lacked factual foundation or amounted to speculation.

Application for a final order approving a corporate plan of arrangement under s. 182 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The proposed transaction involved the acquisition and division of assets of the corporation among related entities, with shareholders receiving a combination of cash and shares.

The court reviewed the governing framework established in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, requiring that the transaction constitute an arrangement, comply with statutory and court-ordered procedures, be proposed in good faith, and be fair and reasonable.

Evidence showed overwhelming shareholder approval, provision of dissent rights, and oversight by an independent special committee with fairness advice.

The court concluded the arrangement had a valid business purpose and fairly balanced the interests of affected stakeholders.

In a proposed securities class action alleging misrepresentations in the primary and secondary markets, the plaintiffs sought an order compelling defendants to deliver statements of defence and requested that the certification motion be heard together with a leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act.

The defendants opposed delivering defences before certification and sought a sequence of motions beginning with the leave motion, followed by Rule 21 motions and then certification.

The court held that pleadings should generally be completed before certification and that ordering the delivery of a statement of defence was not contrary to law or due process.

However, the court limited the requirement to defendants who filed affidavits under s. 138.8(2) of the Securities Act, while permitting other defendants to plead voluntarily without losing the ability to bring Rule 21 motions.

The court further ordered that the leave motion and certification motion be heard together to avoid delay, inefficiency, and serial appeals.

In a proposed consumer class proceeding, the defendant sought directions permitting a summary judgment motion to be heard before the certification motion and sought leave to file a sur‑reply pleading.

The court considered the case management discretion under s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and the general principle that certification should normally be the first substantive motion.

The proposed summary judgment motion would not dispose of the entire proceeding and would likely delay certification and increase costs.

The court held that efficiency favored addressing certification first and declined to schedule the summary judgment motion or the proposed sur‑reply motion before certification.

The parties were directed to agree on a timetable leading to certification.

In an environmental class action concerning historic nickel emissions from a refinery, the appellant challenged findings of nuisance, strict liability, and aggregate damages for alleged property value stigma following public concern about soil nickel levels.

The Court of Appeal held that a mere chemical alteration of soil, without detrimental effect on the land or its use, does not constitute actual, substantial, physical damage for private nuisance.

The court also held that Ontario law does not recognize strict liability based solely on allegedly extra-hazardous activity, and that the refinery operation was not a non-natural use within the Rylands v. Fletcher framework.

The claimants further failed to prove any compensable diminution in property values on a proper analysis of the valuation evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the motion judge and finding the appeal had no merit.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission brought a hearing under section 127 of the Securities Act regarding Magna International Inc.'s proposed plan of arrangement to collapse its multiple voting share structure.

Staff alleged the management information circular lacked sufficient information and the transaction was contrary to the public interest.

The Commission found the proposed transaction was not abusive, but concluded the circular failed to provide shareholders with sufficient disclosure to make an informed decision, particularly given the lack of a board recommendation and the transaction's nature as a related party transaction.

The Commission ordered that the circular be amended to include specific material information, including financial analysis and alternatives considered by the special committee, before the shareholder vote could proceed.

The applicants, minority shareholders of MI Developments Inc. (MID), brought applications under sections 104 and 127 of the Securities Act alleging that MID failed to comply with Multilateral Instrument 61-101 (MI 61-101) by not obtaining minority shareholder approval for a series of related party transactions with Magna Entertainment Corp. (MEC).

The transactions included loans, loan extensions, and debtor-in-possession financing.

The Ontario Securities Commission dismissed the applications, finding that section 104 does not apply to related party transactions.

While the Commission permitted the applications under section 127, it concluded that MID was entitled to rely on the downstream transaction exception and the market capitalization exemption under MI 61-101.

The Commission also found no prima facie case of insider trading in connection with a related trust transaction.

During a hearing to review a decision of the Toronto Stock Exchange regarding HudBay Minerals Inc.'s proposed acquisition of Lundin Mining Corporation, HudBay and Lundin requested confidentiality orders for certain documents filed in evidence.

The Ontario Securities Commission considered the open court principle and the test for confidentiality under section 9(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Sierra Club.

The Commission granted confidentiality for documents that were not relevant to its decision on the merits, including handwritten notes and a financial presentation.

However, it ordered that relevant documents, such as special committee minutes and an engagement letter, be made public, subject to minor redactions for third-party sensitive information.

The respondents brought a motion for an order requiring Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission to make meaningful disclosure of documents relevant to the specific allegations against them.

Staff had provided a database containing over 4.3 million pages of documents obtained during a four-year investigation, without separating relevant from irrelevant material.

The Commission held that Staff had not satisfied its legal obligation to make meaningful disclosure simply by delivering the massive database.

Staff was ordered to apply reasonable judgment to identify and disclose the documents relevant to the specific allegations against each respondent, rather than foisting the obligation to sift through the material onto the respondents.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class action against the respondent bank for allegedly charging undisclosed and unauthorized fees on foreign currency credit card transactions.

The motion judge had refused certification on the basis that compensatory damages could not be determined on a class-wide basis, as it would require individual assessments of how each cardholder would have behaved had the fees been disclosed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in applying a tort-like approach to assessing damages for breach of contract.

The Court held that an aggregate assessment of damages was possible under section 24 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

Sunrise REIT initiated an auction process to sell its assets, requiring interested parties, including Ventas and HCPI, to sign confidentiality and standstill agreements.

Ventas submitted the winning bid, and Sunrise signed a purchase agreement containing a 'fiduciary out' clause allowing it to consider superior unsolicited proposals, but also requiring it to enforce existing standstill agreements.

HCPI subsequently submitted a higher bid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's ruling that the purchase agreement obliged Sunrise to enforce HCPI's standstill agreement, thereby precluding Sunrise from considering HCPI's bid, as it was not a 'bona fide' proposal due to the breach of the standstill agreement.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application to require Goldcorp Inc. to obtain shareholder approval for a transaction with Glamis Gold Ltd. The appellant argued the transaction was an 'arrangement' under s. 182 of the Business Corporations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that s. 182 is facilitative, not mandatory, and that Goldcorp did not 'propose' an arrangement.

The court found the transaction was an issuance of shares and a vertical short-form amalgamation exempt from shareholder approval.

Xstrata applied to the Ontario Securities Commission for an order to cease trade Falconbridge's shareholder rights plan, which was preventing Xstrata from advancing its unsolicited take-over bid.

Falconbridge cross-applied for an order prohibiting Xstrata from making market purchases of up to 5% of Falconbridge shares under the exemption in section 94(3) of the Securities Act.

The Commission applied the Royal Host factors and determined that it was in the public interest to allow the rights plan to continue for a brief period to allow the auction process to continue, given the competing bid from Inco.

The Commission also suspended Xstrata's ability to make market purchases under section 94(3), finding that such purchases, combined with Xstrata's ability to waive its minimum tender condition, could prematurely end the auction and deprive shareholders of the opportunity to tender to the bid of their choice.

Both the rights plan and the suspension of the 5% exemption were ordered to remain in place until July 28, 2006, or until Xstrata took up sufficient shares to meet its majority of the minority condition.

The appellant, a unionized employee, sued his former employer and union executive for allegedly misrepresenting the terms of an early retirement agreement.

The employer and union successfully moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the dispute arose from the interpretation and application of the collective agreement and the union's duty of fair representation.

Under the Weber principle and the Labour Relations Act, such disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator or the labour relations board, not the courts.

The defendant franchisor appealed an order certifying a class proceeding brought by franchisees regarding the distribution of rebates and allowances under a standard form franchise agreement.

The franchisor argued that the representative plaintiffs could not fairly and adequately represent the class and had a conflict of interest because they were not indebted to the franchisor, unlike other franchisees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the representative plaintiffs could fairly and adequately represent the class and that their lack of indebtedness did not create a conflict of interest on the common issues.

The defendant franchisor moved for leave to appeal an order certifying a class proceeding brought by franchisees regarding the withholding of rebates.

The defendant argued that the proposed representative plaintiffs had a conflict of interest with other class members who had different economic arrangements with the franchisor and feared disruption of their businesses.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the issue of whether the representative plaintiffs could fairly and adequately represent the class without conflict was open to serious debate and of general importance to the development of class action law.

The appellant brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence and to amend his statement of claim on appeal.

The court granted both requests, finding that the interests of justice favoured admitting the evidence, which had been read to the motions judge but not marked as an exhibit.

The court also permitted the amendment to the statement of claim, which effectively withdrew an admission, and imposed terms to address any prejudice to the respondents.