J. Safayeni

The defendant in a defamation action brought a motion for the production and preservation of documents from non-parties, as well as a sealing order and publication ban regarding the identities and medical information of two non-party insured individuals.

The court granted the unopposed production orders.

Applying the Sherman Estate test, the court granted the sealing order and publication ban for one insured whose identity remained anonymous, but dismissed the request for the other insured whose identity was already public and where the scope of the requested health information ban was too vague.

Following the dismissal of an action on cross-motions for summary judgment concerning contractual interpretation, the successful defendant sought costs exceeding $134,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court assessed the costs under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering proportionality, time spent, and the result achieved.

The judge reduced senior counsel’s claimed hourly rate and disallowed recovery for an expert where no expert report had been served under Tariff A. Applying the principles from appellate authorities governing fair and reasonable costs awards, the court fixed partial indemnity costs inclusive of HST.

The unsuccessful plaintiff was ordered to pay the adjusted costs within 30 days.

A law firm sought partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that it was entitled to invoice a bank for commissions relating to debtor payments received after the termination of a debt collection services agreement.

The bank brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment asserting that all amounts owed had already been paid under the agreement’s contingency‑based compensation structure.

The dispute turned on the interpretation of a termination clause allowing the firm to invoice for services performed up to the date of termination.

Applying established principles of contractual interpretation and considering the commercial context and factual matrix, the court held that compensation was limited to commissions on payments actually received before the termination date.

The plaintiff’s interpretation would have radically altered the agreed compensation methodology and was inconsistent with the contractual language and commercial sense.

A law firm sought partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that it was entitled to invoice a bank for commissions relating to debtor payments received after the termination of a debt collection services agreement.

The bank brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment asserting that all amounts owed had already been paid under the agreement’s contingency‑based compensation structure.

The dispute turned on the interpretation of a termination clause allowing the firm to invoice for services performed up to the date of termination.

Applying established principles of contractual interpretation and considering the commercial context and factual matrix, the court held that compensation was limited to commissions on payments actually received before the termination date.

The plaintiff’s interpretation would have radically altered the agreed compensation methodology and was inconsistent with the contractual language and commercial sense.

Following the dismissal of an environmental class action on appeal, the successful defendant sought costs for the period from certification to the trial decision, payable from the Class Proceedings Fund administered by the Law Foundation of Ontario.

The court held that the defendant was prima facie entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis under the general rule that costs follow the event.

However, under s.31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, the court considered that the proceeding raised novel legal issues concerning environmental mass torts and class proceedings and involved significant public interest, including access to justice and environmental concerns.

Balancing these factors with the defendant’s entitlement to compensation for substantial litigation expenses, the court reduced the costs award.

The defendant was awarded 50% of the otherwise assessed costs, payable from the Fund.

In a class proceeding costs dispute following the dismissal of environmental contamination claims, the defendant brought a motion to strike portions of affidavits filed by a third-party fund administrator opposing payment of costs from the Class Proceedings Fund.

The challenged affidavits contained opinion evidence from non‑expert witnesses asserting that the litigation raised issues of public interest.

The court applied the principles governing admissibility of lay opinion evidence from R. v. Graat, distinguishing between admissible opinion grounded in factual observations and inadmissible speculation or legal opinion.

While the court permitted most of the opinion evidence as permissible lay opinion supporting observations about the public interest and access to justice, it struck limited portions that lacked factual foundation or amounted to speculation.