E. Cherniak

The Town of Oakville brought applications seeking declarations that its heritage and zoning by-laws, which restricted the redevelopment of the Glen Abbey golf course, were valid.

The respondents, ClubLink, moved to strike the applications.

The Superior Court granted the motion to strike, finding that the applications were not properly brought under Rule 14 as they did not seek a determination of rights based on interpretation.

The Court declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction, noting that the by-laws are presumed valid, there was no active challenge to them in court, and the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) was the appropriate forum to resolve the underlying disputes.

The applications were also struck as an abuse of process for creating an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.

Following the dismissal of an action on cross-motions for summary judgment concerning contractual interpretation, the successful defendant sought costs exceeding $134,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court assessed the costs under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering proportionality, time spent, and the result achieved.

The judge reduced senior counsel’s claimed hourly rate and disallowed recovery for an expert where no expert report had been served under Tariff A. Applying the principles from appellate authorities governing fair and reasonable costs awards, the court fixed partial indemnity costs inclusive of HST.

The unsuccessful plaintiff was ordered to pay the adjusted costs within 30 days.

A law firm sought partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that it was entitled to invoice a bank for commissions relating to debtor payments received after the termination of a debt collection services agreement.

The bank brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment asserting that all amounts owed had already been paid under the agreement’s contingency‑based compensation structure.

The dispute turned on the interpretation of a termination clause allowing the firm to invoice for services performed up to the date of termination.

Applying established principles of contractual interpretation and considering the commercial context and factual matrix, the court held that compensation was limited to commissions on payments actually received before the termination date.

The plaintiff’s interpretation would have radically altered the agreed compensation methodology and was inconsistent with the contractual language and commercial sense.

A law firm sought partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that it was entitled to invoice a bank for commissions relating to debtor payments received after the termination of a debt collection services agreement.

The bank brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment asserting that all amounts owed had already been paid under the agreement’s contingency‑based compensation structure.

The dispute turned on the interpretation of a termination clause allowing the firm to invoice for services performed up to the date of termination.

Applying established principles of contractual interpretation and considering the commercial context and factual matrix, the court held that compensation was limited to commissions on payments actually received before the termination date.

The plaintiff’s interpretation would have radically altered the agreed compensation methodology and was inconsistent with the contractual language and commercial sense.