V. Hawkes

This is an appeal from a conviction for three counts of careless driving causing bodily harm and the dismissal of an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of a roadside statement, the trial judge's finding of guilt and sufficiency of reasons, and the ruling on unreasonable delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including a request to admit fresh evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in law, no unreasonable verdict, and no miscarriage of justice regarding the voluntariness of the statement, the conviction, or the 11(b) application.

The defendant was charged with speeding under the Provincial Offences Act after a collision resulted in a pedestrian's death.

The trial focused on the reliability of expert accident reconstruction evidence (Searle method) to determine speed, the necessity of corroborating such evidence, and whether the specific alleged speed (76km/hr) needed to be proven.

The court found the expert evidence reliable without corroboration and determined that the specific speed was not an essential element of the offence, serving as surplusage.

The defendant was found guilty of speeding at 75km/hr in a 60km/hr zone.

The Crown sought to adduce expert opinion evidence from a police accident reconstructionist regarding the speed of the defendant's vehicle at the time of impact with a pedestrian in a speeding charge.

The defence challenged admissibility on the grounds that the Searle method of speed calculation constitutes novel scientific evidence requiring special scrutiny, and alternatively, that the method was being used for a novel purpose.

The defence also argued that the cost-benefit analysis favoured exclusion.

The court admitted the evidence, finding that accident reconstruction methodologies are mathematical rather than scientific techniques, that the Searle method is not novel science, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any potential harm to the trial process.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of two statements given by the defendant to police following a motor vehicle collision that resulted in a pedestrian fatality.

The defendant was charged with speeding contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant conceded the roadside statement was voluntary under the traditional test but argued his Charter s.7 rights were breached because the statement was compelled by statute.

The court held that liberty interests under s.7 are not engaged for an absolute liability speeding offence, as the only penalty is a fixed fine with no risk of incarceration.

The roadside statement was therefore admissible.

The prosecution withdrew its request to adduce the video statement, rendering its admissibility moot.

The defendant was convicted after entering guilty pleas to five counts under the Highway Traffic Act: driving while license suspended, owning and driving a motor vehicle without insurance, failing to notify the Ministry of Transportation of vehicle ownership, using an unauthorized license plate, and not having a validated permit.

The defendant had an extensive driving record including nine prior convictions for driving suspended and six for operating without insurance.

The prosecution sought custody on two counts and a substantial fine for the insurance offense.

The defense argued for concurrent sentencing given the defendant's concurrent criminal convictions totaling 43 months.

The court imposed four months custody consecutive to existing sentences for the drive suspended offense, 15 days concurrent for the plate infraction, a $10,000 fine for the insurance offense with a 60-month payment period, and suspended sentence on the remaining charges.

The defendant was charged with three counts of driving while her license was suspended and operating a motor vehicle without insurance.

The Crown's evidence established that a police officer observed the defendant operating a motor vehicle on August 20, 2013.

The defendant and a civilian witness testified that the defendant was a passenger and that another individual was driving.

The court found the defendant's evidence and that of the civilian witness not credible due to significant inconsistencies and implausibilities.

The court accepted the officer's evidence and found the defendant guilty of the three driving while suspended charges.

The insurance charge was dismissed by Crown concession.

The defendant entered a guilty plea to driving while his license was suspended under the Highway Traffic Act.

After conviction was entered, the court discovered that the defendant was also facing a related Criminal Code charge of "drive disqualified" arising from the same circumstances.

The justice struck the conviction and underlying plea, finding that the municipal partner court lacked administrative authority to proceed when criminal proceedings had been commenced in relation to the same circumstances, pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the Crown and the City of Brantford.

The matter was directed to be marked returnable to the same court when the related Criminal Code charge would be considered.

The defendants were convicted of willfully evading compliance with the Retail Sales Tax Act by failing to collect, report, and remit retail sales tax totalling $240,866.42 over 54 reporting periods from August 1, 2004 to February 23, 2009.

The individual defendant, Eugena Hayward, was the sole director and operating mind of the corporate defendant.

The court found that the defendants had collected retail sales tax in trust for Ontario but failed to remit it, instead using the funds for personal benefit including dividend payments of $341,000 to Hayward.

The court imposed a custodial sentence and substantial fine on the individual defendant, reflecting the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence.